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In this project, I will explore how victims of sexual violence have faced epistemic injustices by 
reviewing the histories of two advocacy movements aimed at improving collective understanding of 
those experiences. In doing so, I will consider how those very activist movements may have 
introduced new epistemic lacunas and, even while successfully addressing some injustices, 
committed further epistemic wrongs as well. I will explore forms of hermeneutical resistance used 
by victims of sexual violence and their advocates. While these methods of resistance have been 
discussed elsewhere, I contribute to this ongoing work by applying these ideas to new examples. 
Finally, I will explore pitfalls of select methods of resistance commonly used by activists, and in 











Perhaps a better world is drawing near 
Just as easily it could all disappear 
Along with whatever meaning you might have found 
Don’t let the uncertainty turn you around 
Go on and make a joyful sound 
- Jackson Browne, For A Dancer 
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Insiders and Outsiders  
I need a way to refer quickly and consistently to people who are the subjects of experiences 
obscured from collective understanding and to distinguish them from the people who are not. While 
in many cases those who are the subjects of these hermeneutically obscure experiences are the social 
outsiders in those contexts, they are insiders in the sense that they are members of the relevant social 
group that is subject to the experience. Thus, when I use the term insiders from this point on, I am 
referring to the people who are subject to a given experience. Outsiders, on the other hand, are 
people who are not subject to the relevant experience.  
 
Admittedly, this language misleadingly suggests that there are clear boundaries between insiders and 
outsiders. This is not the case, not only because of disagreement about where to draw the conceptual 
boundaries around the definitions of both sexual assault and sex trafficking, but also because of 
incredible variability in the ways that individuals are subject to these experiences. According to the 
law, someone who has been sexually exploited once and someone who is exploited incessantly for 
years are both victims of trafficking. According to some advocates, anyone involved in commercial 
sex is a victim. The perspectives of these individuals, however, may be extremely different. While 
someone who has been a victim of some sexual violence may have more direct knowledge of 
experiences of that kind than someone who has not, an individual’s experience will not be 
generalizable in such a way that they have special insight into the experiences of all other victims.  
 
Advocate 
An advocate is someone engaged in work to improve understanding of an experience shared by a 
group of marginalized people. Advocates may include victims, community members, members of 
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Law enforcement representatives usually identify people have experienced sexual violence as victims, 
and the word is strongly tied to ideas of crime and legal intervention. Social workers and advocates 
often describe these individuals as survivors, a word that has stronger associations with triumph and 
resilience. Elsewhere the words may also be used to establish whether someone is presently being 
harmed, with “victim” indicating abuse is ongoing and “survivor” indicating it is wholly in the past. I 
will use the words “victim” and “survivor” interchangeably to refer to individuals who have sexual 
violence perpetrated against them. 
 
Commercial Sex Act 
I will use the phrase as it is defined by the Trafficking Victims Protecting Act (TVPA), which is to 
describe, “any sex act on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” 
 
Legal Definition of Sex Trafficking (US) 
The TVPA defines sex trafficking as any act involving the recruitment, harboring, transportation, 
provision, or obtaining of a person for a commercial sex act.  
 
Not all acts that meet this definition are punishable as trafficking. Punishable acts must be severe, 
meaning they involve either (a) sex trafficking of a minor or (b) sex trafficking of an adult induced 




Sex Trafficking/Commercial Sexual Exploitation 
By “sex trafficking,” I will refer to the severe form as defined by the TVPA. In other words, I will be 
referring to all and only those circumstances in which someone induces another person to engage in 
a commercial sex act through the means of force, fraud, or coercion. I will use the phrases “sex 
trafficking” and “commercial sexual exploitation” interchangeably. I will use the identifiers “victim 
of sex trafficking” and “victim of commercial sexual exploitation” to refer to people who have been 
induced to engage in commercial sex through the means of force, fraud, or coercion. 
 
Sex Work 
By “sex work,” I will mean any instances of commercial sex that are not induced through force, 
fraud, or coercion. I have in mind circumstances in which the sex act is consensual and intentional 
for all parties involved. I will use the identifier “sex worker” to refer to those who are involved in 
commercial sex intentionally or willfully.  
 
Abolitionists 
Abolitionists are anti-trafficking activists in the abolitionist movement, also known as the left/right 
coalition or the neo-abolitionist movement (Doezema 1999, 33). Abolitionists are also sometimes referred 
to as abolitionist feminists (Kempadoo 2015, 11) or anti-prostitution feminists (Peters 2010, 50 citing Stolz).  
Abolitionists view all commercial sex as either constituting trafficking or problematic because it 
contributes to demand for trafficking. Abolitionists favor a conceptual and legal distinction between 
sex and labor trafficking, sometimes arguing that sex trafficking is especially horrific. The Coalition 
Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) and Standing Against Global Exploitation (SAGE) are 





Rights-based advocates are anti-trafficking activists in the rights-based movement. They are also 
known as the liberal feminist coalition, mainstream feminists (Weitzer, 2007), or autonomy feminists (Schwarz, 
Kennedy, and Britton, 4). Kempadoo describes the anti-trafficking movement spearheaded by these 
advocates as modern slavery abolitionism (Kempadoo 2015, 9). Rights-Based Advocates tend to view sex 
trafficking as a species of labor trafficking, and they also distinguish between sex work and sex 
trafficking. The Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) is an organization that 






It is a time of shifting currents for victims of sexual violence and their advocates. The 
#MeToo movement has turned a spotlight toward the pervasiveness of sexual violence at work, on 
dates, and as a persistent background threat for many. Assault accusations against powerful people 
(Donald Trump, Brett Kavanaugh, Harvey Weinstein) and institutions (the Catholic Church, Boy 
Scouts of America) frequently make front-page news. Bill Cosby’s accusers were featured on the 
cover of The New Yorker, and Dr. Christine Blasey Ford was selected as a Times Magazine Person of 
the Year. Documentaries (Surviving R. Kelley, Leaving Neverland, Very Young Girls, Blowin’ Up)1 and 
narrative films (The Tale, Unbelievable) about and sexual abuse are popular and critically renowned.  
 
These changes may foster a sense that we as a society are in the midst of a great awakening, 
one that will, if we listen closely and are courageous enough to reflect sincerely, bring us closer to 
the truth. And perhaps with the right representation, steadfast activism, and appropriate 
accountability, we can come to truly understand sexual violence and empower and support victims. 
 
Knowing who is and is not a victim has more than epistemic value. Victims are often 
entitled to certain services and opportunities that non-victims are not. Victims may have legal 
options when accused of crimes or paths to citizenship available to them that non-victims do not. 
                                                          
1 The subject of this documentary is the Queens’s County Human Trafficking Intervention 
Court in New York City. My time working in this court as a representative of Mt. Sinai’s Sexual 
Assault and Violence Intervention program overlapped with filming for the documentary. I can be 
seen in a few shots of the film, but I was not meaningfully involved with its production. 
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They may have access to critical resources like housing, health care, and counseling based on their 
being identified as a survivor of sexual violence.  
 
This changing landscape raises complicated epistemic questions. Are we getting closer to 
accurate definitions of forms of sexual violence like sexual assault and commercial sex exploitation?2 
Can we engineer concepts that distinguish between sexual violations and non-violations? Is it 
possible to construct laws that do the same? When services or opportunities are contingent upon 
someone being a victim, who should get to decide whether they do or do not qualify? 
 
In this project, I will delve into the recent history of activist movements that have, among 
other things, aimed to raise awareness about the realities of sexual violence. This review, I will argue, 
can shed light on prior epistemic lacunas, and can thereby teach us more about epistemic justice and 
injustice. I will consider how ideas introduced by epistemologists like Spivak, Fricker, Medina, 
Goetze, and Dotson can help us understand what it would mean for 75 percent of women who have 
                                                          
2 This question presumes, of course, that there is an “accurate” definition of sexual violence. 
However, whether that is or is not the case depends on whether sexual violence is socially 
constructed. If it is, then we must ask what would make it such that some definitions are better than 
others. As the definition changes to encompass more kinds of behavior, we “create” victims and 
perpetrators in ways that are similar to those outlined by Ian Hacking in “The Making and Molding 
of Child Abuse” (Critical Inquiry, 1991). Ronald Weitzer discusses the social construction of 
trafficking and prostitution in “The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and 
Institutionalization of a Moral Crusade” (2007). Unfortunately, these are issues that extend beyond 
the scope of what I will be able to address in this project. 
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been raped to not realize they have had such an experience, or how alleged revelations about the 
nature of trafficking might support claims that we are in the midst of an epidemic.  
 
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I will review the concepts of epistemic injustice that I 
will make use of later in the project. I will consider who it is that has and who it is that lacks access 
to hermeneutical resources in different manifestations of hermeneutical injustice. Then, I will 
identify several warning signs that an epistemic lacuna may be afoot. While much of this chapter will 
function as a literature review, I will also introduce some novel concepts and frameworks that 
complement existing philosophical work and will be used in analyses to come in later sections of the 
dissertation.  
 
During the second chapter, I will turn my attention to the recent histories of activist 
movements and the arguments those activists have made (though not always explicitly) that victims 
of sexual violence have faced and continue to face epistemic injustices. This section will summarize 
key moments, findings, and claims of the advocacy movements dedicated to improving collective 
understanding of sexual assault and sex trafficking. While I will begin by taking the assertions of 
activists at face value in order to tease out connections to concepts of epistemic injustice, I will later 
turn a critical eye toward those claims.  
 
 In the third chapter of the dissertation, I will explore methods of hermeneutical resistance 
and dissent, again looking to these movements for examples and inspiration. Some of the methods 
of dissent introduced in this section have been thoroughly explored elsewhere in the literature, and 
my contribution will be to tie those to sexual violence intervention advocacy. Other methods of 




 In the final chapter of the dissertation, I will survey epistemic harms that may be produced 
by the kind of advocacy work reviewed in chapters two and three, even when that work is intended 
to improve collective understanding of a previously epistemically obscure experience. These very 
assertions, narratives, statistics, and perspectives can, I will argue, harm and wrong victims and other 
vulnerable people in their capacities as knowers. 
 
Anti-trafficking advocates are strongly divided on the question of whether all sex work is 
exploitative, and thus whether all sex workers are trafficked. Abolitionists, also known as the 
left/right coalition, argue that all commercial sex is exploitative and either constitutes sex trafficking 
or enables it. Activists taking a rights-based approach tend distinguish sex work from sex trafficking 
and instead support conceptualizations of trafficking that portray it as a manifestation of labor 
trafficking. Also referred to as the liberal coalition, these rights-based advocates argue that the 
abolitionist approach renders sex workers who do not identify as trafficking victims invisible. If the 
abolitionists are right, then what they are doing is attempting to expand the hermeneutical resources 
not only of collective society, but also of the victims who are not able to correctly interpret their 
own experiences. If they are wrong, then I will argue they are guilty of posturing and hijacking the 
process of hermeneutical dissent.  
 
It is in this final section that I will contribute most to ongoing efforts to identity species of 
epistemic harms and injustices. Ultimately, my aim is to articulate the complexities of engineering 
new or better hermeneutical resources in spaces where a deficit of interpretive tools exists, as well as 
the dangers that may befall those who try. It is no surprise that naming the unnamed, describing that 
for which we have insufficient conceptual tools, and raising collective understanding of experiences 
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considered impossible or inscrutable are not easy tasks. When taking on these efforts, we must be 








CHAPTER ONE: EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 
 
People can be wronged when they are deprived of access to epistemic resources, like 
libraries, databases, and knowledge-generating spaces like colleges and universities. A person who is 
not given an opportunity to learn to read is also prevented from making use of a trove of ideas that 
they might find useful for improving their epistemic standing. These can be thought of as epistemic 
wrongs, but they are more directly distributive injustices.  
 
In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007), an important contribution that has 
inspired articles, books, and conferences, Miranda Fricker argues that there are ways in which people 
can be wronged in their capacity as knowers. Recognizing the potential harms caused by these 
epistemic injustices, Fricker introduces a framework for understanding two types that she calls 
testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.  
 
In doing so, she joined existing efforts to identify ways that social identity, marginalization, 
and power impact who is seen as having knowledge and who can contribute to knowledge-
production efforts. Foucault recognized the entanglement of knowledge and power, acknowledging 
that power confers the ability to effect the conceptual framework used to determine what is and is 
not considered true or rational, how truth is assessed, and who is considered capable of declaring 
what is true and is not (1980, 131). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak wrote of the epistemic violence 
committed against “men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the trials, the lowest strata of the 
urban subproletariat” during colonial efforts to mark the knowledge of the oppressed as in deficient 
(1988, 25). Patricia Hill Collins took up a question posed by Maria Stewart, who asked why the “rich 
intellectual tradition” of Black women’s thoughts and voices “remained virtually invisible” for so 
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long. Collins argued that the obfuscation of Black women’s hermeneutical resources and 
contributions was “neither accidental nor benign,” but rather the result of a strategy by those with 
social power to further oppress the powerless through the suppression of their knowledge (2000, 3). 
 
In recent years, many authors have contributed to efforts to identify and taxonomize 
different forms of epistemic injustice. Below, I have identified three conditions that seem to carve 
out distinct classes of epistemic injustices.  
 
Figure 1: Select Kinds of Epistemic Injustices 
 
First, there are epistemic injustices that occur in particular instances of expression - when a 
speaker considers communicating or attempts to communicate something meaningful to a hearer or 
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hearers. Speakers may suppress their expressions due to features of the dynamic between themselves 
and their listeners (like in the case of testimonial smothering). In other cases, the listener’s evaluation 
of the speaker’s expression may be wrongfully affected by prejudice.  
 
Second, there are epistemic injustices that occur when there are gaps in a collective’s 
hermeneutical resources. Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice falls into this class, and this 
kind of injustice will be the primary focus of Chapter Two.  
 
Third, there are epistemic injustices that occur during efforts to produce new epistemic tools 
and to introduce those into the collective’s hermeneutical resources. I will explore these in depth in 
Chapter Four. 
 
As we continue to identify new forms of epistemic violence and better understand how they 
relate to one another (in what conditions they are produced, the unique and shared harms they 
cause, and how they may be ameliorated), I expect that our classification schemes will evolve. Not 
only do I present the orientation of harms presented in this taxonomy as tentative, it is important to 
note that these lists are not exhaustive. Heeding Dotson’s caution, we must leave open the 
possibility that there are additional unrevealed forms of epistemic injustice, lest we became 
overconfident that that which we cannot currently expect or understand would not be 
understandable were we to have different epistemic resources (2012, 24-25). In Dotson’s words, this 
is “an account of epistemic injustice,” (2012, 42) which I am confident will shift and expand, and as 
Medina notes, it may be to our advantage to explore multiple ways to classify epistemic injustices 




In the remaining sections of this chapter I will introduce the forms of epistemic injustice 
included in the figure above. Later in the project, I will use these kinds of epistemic injustices to 
evaluate some of the arguments and statements made by anti-sexual violence advocates. I will also 
use these descriptions of epistemic injustice to assess the arguments made by those who are critical 
of the statements and attitudes expressed by some advocates. Some of the forms of epistemic 
injustice I survey here been developed extensively elsewhere, and my contribution will be to apply 
those ideas to efforts to improve collective understanding of sexual assault and sex trafficking. In 
other cases, I will be proposing new definitions for capturing forms of epistemic injustice or further 
developing descriptions of forms described by others.  
 
All cognitive disadvantages are epistemically unfortunate. Whenever a person does not know 
something or does not have the tools to understand something, then they are in a worse 
epistemological position than they would be if they possessed that knowledge or had access to that 
epistemic tool. Some cognitive disadvantages are significant. A person is significantly cognitively 
disadvantaged if they do not know something that would be importantly in their interest to know. 
When someone suffers a significant cognitive disadvantage, they are epistemically harmed more 
severely than if they suffer an insignificant cognitive disadvantage. And while all cognitive 
disadvantages are epistemic harms, some may benefit subjects a great deal. As Fricker notes, 
someone who sexually harasses another may benefit from a deficit of collective understanding about 
sexual harassment, as the epistemic lacuna “suits his purpose,” and if the harasser is not someone 
who would have refrained from harassment had he known better, then the cognitive disadvantage is 




Epistemic harms may be either intrinsic or extrinsic, and extrinsic harms may be either 
epistemic or practical. Extrinsic harms include some unfortunate epistemic consequences - like the 
harmed person coming to doubt their own intellectual abilities or lose confidence in their beliefs and 
judgments (Fricker 2007, 47) - and other unfortunate practical consequences - like the harmed 
person not getting credit for their ideas, not being believed by police, in court, or in other spaces 
that can have a significant impact on the person’s life, or missing out on or being denied 
employment opportunities (Fricker 2007, 46).  
 
Epistemic objectification is the intrinsic harm characteristic of interpersonal harms. 
Epistemic objectification is the wrong of disrespecting a person’s humanity by undermining that 
person in their “capacity as a giver of knowledge” (Fricker 2007, 133).  In Fricker’s words, “[t]o be 
wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity essential to human value” 
(2007, 44). In so far as an essential part of humanity is our capacity to reason, wrongs that diminish 
one’s ability to express ideas and beliefs and potentially influence the ideas and beliefs of others 
strike at the core of one’s very being. This dishonoring of the individual as a knower and thus, as a 
person, is the primary, intrinsic harm of epistemic injustices that are interpersonal in nature. When 
one is persistently and systemically disrespected as a knower, that could erode one’s confidence not 
only in what one knows, but also in one’s very sense of self (Fricker 2007, 53).  
 
Structurally-produced epistemic injustices create situations where some people suffer 
asymmetrically significant cognitive disadvantages, as they are unable to understand some aspects of 
their experiences that are in their interest to make sense of (Fricker 2007, 151). Thus, the cognitive 
disadvantages of structural epistemic injustices are not equally felt by all. The central harm of 
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structural epistemic injustices is unequal, unfair treatment of subjects as contributors to our shared 
conceptual and interpretive resources.  
 
If someone suffers an intrinsic or extrinsic harm due to another’s epistemic mistake, but that 
mistake is not one for which they are both epistemologically and ethically culpable, then the harm is 
the unfortunate result of an innocent error (Fricker 2007, 21). This does not make the harm any less 
hurtful, but it does mean that the harm is not an epistemic wrong. No injustice occurs as a result of 
the mistake.  
 
If someone suffers a cognitive disadvantage that impacts them asymmetrically and is 
significant, but the disadvantage is not a result of structural prejudice that unfairly excludes the 
person from contributing to shared conceptual resources, then the person suffers from epistemic 
bad luck. Epistemic bad luck can have tremendous consequences. As Fricker notes, if there is an 
illness for which there is no diagnosis or treatment available, then everyone is at a cognitive 
disadvantage. But for someone who has that illness, the disadvantage is felt acutely - perhaps 
devastatingly. This is terribly unfortunate, but unless the lack of diagnosis is the result of structural 
inequalities or prejudices, it is not necessarily an injustice (Fricker 2007, 152).  
 
To be wrongful, epistemic harms must be not only unfortunate, but also unfair. 
Interpersonal epistemic harms are wrongful when the person who causes the harm is 
epistemologically and ethically culpable for their behavior or attitude. In cases where an epistemic 
injustice is committed, the ethically blameworthy component will often be rooted in the influence of 
prejudice on the wrongdoer’s epistemic attitudes and judgments. Ethically culpable epistemological 
misjudgments wrong their victims by disrespecting their status as knowers. When testimonial 
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injustices are caused by prejudices that “track the subject through different dimensions of social 
activity - economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and so on” (Fricker 
2007, 27), then the testimonial injustice is systemic rather than incidental.  
 
Wrongful epistemic harms that are structural in nature are produced by coercive dynamics 
that prevent some people from participating in meaning making. Fricker calls this hermeneutical 
marginalization. Structural epistemic injustices produce a sub-class of knowers, which disrespects 
these individuals as knowers, and thus as people. Someone is hermeneutically marginalized if they 
“have a less than a fair crack at contributing to the shared pool of concepts and interpretive tropes 
that we use to make generally share-able sense of our social experiences” (Fricker, 2016, 163), and 
this exclusion from collective knowledge production is identified by Fricker as the central harm of 
hermeneutical injustice, the structural epistemic injustice she introduces.  
 
Assessing when epistemic harms constitute wrongs and injustices and when someone or a 
group is epistemically oppressed rather than unlucky requires, in part, determining whether the 
possible injustice is interpersonal or systemic in nature. I categorize the injustices that I discuss in 
subsequent sections and chapters as follows: 
Interpersonal Systemic 
• Testimonial Injustice (including 
Posturing, Identity-Prejudicial 
Credibility Excess, and some forms 
of Testimonial Silencing) 
• Epistemic Exploitation 
• Testimonial Smothering 
• Contributory Injustice 
• Hermeneutical Injustice 
• Epistemic Appropriation 
• Hermeneutical Hijacking 
• Narrative Constraint 
 




While structural epistemic injustices occur even when no other knower is personally culpable 
for those wrongs, this does not preclude the possibility that individual knowers may be culpable for 
their behaviors and attitudes if those behaviors or attitudes support the structural inequalities that 
lead to the hermeneutical marginalization of less dominantly-situated people. I will argue that 
epistemic appropriation and hermeneutical hijacking are structural injustices, but that knowers who 
harbor prejudiced attitudes and behave in ways that enable the phenomena of epistemic 
appropriation or hermeneutical hijacking to occur are therefore culpable for the part they have 
played in those structural injustices.  
 
1.1 Relating to Expression 
 
Epistemic injustices of this kind occur in exchanges between marginalized speakers and 
relatively dominantly-situated listeners. All epistemic harms of this kind that I review are 
interpersonal in nature. They involve errors made on the part of individual listeners, and when those 




Epistemic exploitation occurs when marginalized people are compelled by those in 
dominantly-situated positions to offer an explanation of their own oppression (Berenstain 2016, 
570). This labor is often unrecognized and uncompensated, despite being extremely costly. But 
importantly, oppressed people do not have a legitimate choice about whether or not to engage in 
this work, as they face a double bind. If they do not engage, then they could be blamed for being 
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complicit in their own oppression by not taking a more active role in re-educating others. When 
speaking up, there is a significant risk that marginalized people will not be granted due credibility, 
thereby being subjected to a subsequent testimonial injustice (Berenstain 2016, 576). Even if their 
testimony is successful in changing the attitudes of listeners, there are costs nonetheless. In 
particular, Berenstain describes the opportunity cost that occurs when an oppressed person has been 
compelled to explain their oppression. Even when in doing so they transform the hearers 
understanding of their experience, they have still spent their time doing this labor instead of 
something else. This can result in a kind of busy work that keeps oppressed people caught up in 
activities and conversations related to explaining their experiences and trying to convince other 
people why they should be taken seriously.  
 
In order for epistemic exploitation to not only harm, but also wrong speakers, listeners must 
be ethically culpable for the harm they cause when compelling those speakers to present a case 
demonstrating they are oppressed. Some ways that a listener may behave unethically include, but are 
not limited to, holding prejudiced beliefs about the speaker, not acting in good faith when 
compelling the speaker to explain their oppression (i.e., by demanding that the speaker provide a 
convincing argument that they are oppressed when the listener already recognizes that the 
oppression exists), or refusing to engage in the labor of understanding if or how the speaker is 
oppressed themselves (in other words, requiring that this work be done by the oppressed person or 
not at all).  
 
To be clear, not all instances in which a marginalized person engages in epistemic labor to 
improve a listener’s understanding of their oppression will constitute wrongful epistemic 
exploitation. Even when listeners behave in epistemologically and ethically upstanding ways, there 
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will be circumstances where marginalized people will feel compelled to speak about their oppression. 
Marginalized people and their testimony must and should be central to efforts to bring about 
epistemic justice. Thus, epistemic justice itself compels marginalized people to speak about the 
oppression they experience. Even when they are not wronged, these experiences may be 
uncomfortable or painful; such unfortunate cases harm the speaker, and we may even feel that they 
are unfair. But they do not constitute an epistemic injustice if they are not brought about by some 
ethically culpable behavior of listeners.  
 
Berenstain derides the idea that oppressed people must explain or educate others about their 
oppression as a mistaken, stating “it masquerades as a necessary and even epistemically virtuous 
form of intellectual engagement” (2016, 570). It is unclear to me if she means that such labor is never 
necessary or epistemically virtuous, but if this is what she intends, then in distinguishing between 
unfortunate, possibly even harmful instances of epistemic labor and unjust, and wrongful instances 





Dotson identifies testimonial smothering as a kind of testimonial silencing. Other forms of 
testimonial silencing include testimonial quieting (when a speaker provides testimony, but that 
testimony is so completely ignored or disregarded that it is as if they said nothing at all. See Dotson, 
2011) and sincerity silencing (when a speaker’s statement is undermined by a listener’s assessment 
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that was has been said is not sincere. See McGowan, 2013).3 Using the classificatory scheme I have 
introduced, I identify all three of these forms of testimonial silencing as belonging to the class of 
epistemic injustices that relate to expression, but I classify testimonial quieting and sincerity silencing 
as belonging to the category of testimonial injustice.  
 
 Testimonial smothering occurs when epistemically oppressed people choose or are coerced 
into omitting, truncating, or otherwise altering their communicative contributions because they 
determine some conversations are too risky to have, possibly because other people in those 
conversations have demonstrated in the past that they are unwilling or unable to properly receive the 
testimony provided by the speaker. In many cases, testimonial smothering is a result of marginalized 
people taking steps to protect themselves; it is a way for folks who have been epistemically exploited 
in the past to protect their well-being and to avoid putting energy and resources into work that has 
proved to be harmful or futile. 
 
When the would-be speaker’s assessment of the would-be listener accurately picks up on 
some ethically culpable attitude that would make it risky to speak, then the would-be speaker has 
been wronged. In some circumstances, it may be so systemically risky to speak that would-be 
speakers are silenced across significant domains where it would be in their interest to have a voice. 
 
There is a collective loss when testimonial smothering occurs. Would-be speakers are 
deprived of the opportunity to express themselves, and would-be listeners suffer the cognitive 
                                                          
3 McGowan introduces the concept of sincerity silencing to explain how it is in cases of 




disadvantage of not being exposed to new ideas and information. Testimonial smothering prevents 
knowledge from entering the epistemic marketplace. However, the harms caused by testimonial 
smothering are asymmetrical. Ultimately those who are in relatively privileged positions are mostly 
fine without being exposed to the additional epistemic resources that are not being introduced 
because of the silence of those who are oppressed. The experiences and ideas of the oppressed, on 
the other hand, continue to be unspoken, truncated, or distorted, and that silence brings with it the 
harms of epistemic oppression. The silenced are compromised as knowers, and thus as human 
beings, as part of what it means to be a knower and a human being is to be able to express ideas and 
beliefs in an effort to influence the ideas and beliefs of others. Participation in the epistemic 
marketplace is an essential part of personhood, so exclusion from the epistemic marketplace (even if 
it is self-inflicted as a means of self-protection) harms the silenced individual as a knower and a 




According to Fricker, the central case of testimonial injustices involves a person being 
granted less credibility than they ought to be as a result of prejudiced attitudes the listener holds 
toward the speaker (2007, 4). Testimonial injustices are interpersonal in nature. They occur during 
interactions between speakers and listeners and result from assessments of the credibility of 
particular speakers by particular listeners. Inaccurate assessments of the credibility of a speaker may 
cause harm even when they are the byproduct of innocent errors. But when speakers are not given 
due credibility as a result of prejudiced beliefs about the speaker based on their social identity, then 




While acknowledging that “prejudicial discounting in testimonial practice can be of two 
kinds,” (2007, 17) Fricker argues that credibility deficits are more likely to wrong the speaker in their 
capacity as a knower than credibility excesses (2007, 20). Furthermore, she notes that the most 
severe cases of prejudicial credibility deficits are systemic, tracking speakers through different realms 
of their social lives based on widespread prejudiced attitudes based on the speaker’s social identity 
(2007, 28-29). Thus, her central case of testimonial injustice involves persistent and systemic 
identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. 
 
Davis, however, contests the idea that credibility excesses are most often benign or 
beneficial, contending that speakers may be harmed when they are presumed to have an excess of 
credibility, too. She calls this identity-prejudicial credibility excess, and states that this kind of 
injustice occurs when “hearers assume that features of their target’s social identity - as indicated by a 
target’s racialized, gendered, and so on, appearance - are reliable indicators of what sort of 
knowledge the target possesses” (2016, 487). Treating individuals as mere tokens of the groups to 
which they belong is epistemically objectifying, as doing so fails to recognize the individuality of 
each speaker.4 Identity-prejudicial credibility excess could also lead to epistemic exploitation, as 
individuals are compelled to advocate on behalf of their group regardless of their estimation of 
whether such advocacy will be successful and despite the costs associated with that work.  
 
In describing the conditions under which epistemic exploitation might occur and the harms 
that might result from it, Berenstain introduces an example in which a white person responds 
                                                          
4 This can lead to narrative constraint when certain speakers are vocal and their testimony 
comes to be treated as inappropriately generalizable. I discuss narrative constraint more in a later 
section of this chapter and in Chapter Four. 
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skeptically to a black person’s testimony about their experiences of racism. Berenstain states that in 
such a circumstance, the white listener “positions herself as the epistemic peer” of the speaker and 
“implicitly suggests that she is as qualified as her conversation partner to evaluate what counts as an 
experience of racism.” Berenstain describes this privileged listener as “uninformed,” adding that they 
engage in posturing when they mistakenly identify themselves as an epistemic peer of the speaker 
(2016, 579).  
 
Building on the idea touched on in Berenstain’s example, I will call the kind of epistemic 
harm that occurs when a listener inappropriately positions themselves in a way that suggests they are 
the epistemic peer of a speaker by the name ‘posturing.’ This harm constitutes an injustice if it is 
produced in an ethically and epistemologically culpable way, like as the result of a prejudiced attitude 
directed toward the speaker. When posturing results in an epistemic injustice, it is an interpersonal 
one.  
 
Berenstain’s example suggests it is the white listener’s race and relative privilege that makes 
her uninformed and mistaken in her self-identification as an epistemic peer of the speaker. We could 
take this to mean that any time a listener expresses doubt about or fails to endorse the views 
expressed by a marginalized speaker - particularly those related to their marginalization - they 
commit the harm of posturing. In other words, whenever an outsider doubts or denies the testimony 
of an insider, they posture. Such a view would require that we see the marginalized speaker’s insight 
into their marginalization as necessarily epistemically advantaged.  
 
However, there is good reason to doubt that we have privileged access to knowledge about 
our own mental states and processes. Understanding prejudice and marginalization requires not only 
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insight into our own internal states, but an understanding of complex relationships between people 
and institutions, as well. Thus, I will understand posturing in less absolute terms. I leave open the 
possibility that someone who has not had an experience of kind x could be the epistemic peer of 
someone who has, even when the discussion or disagreement pertains to an experience of kind x. 
Further, in some cases a person who has not had an experience of kind x could have a better 
understanding of those kinds of experiences than someone who has been the subject of x.5 In such 
cases, a listener would not make a mistake if they positioned themselves as an epistemic peer of the 
speaker. They would, therefore, not be guilty of posturing, even if they are skeptical of or disagree 
with the speaker’s testimony.  
 
Assessing whether someone is or is not guilty of posturing will be difficult in practice. In 
many cases, we will not be able to determine with certainty if this harm or wrong has occurred, as 
we will not have enough information to determine whether the listener’s assessment of themselves 
as appropriately situated to judge the speaker’s testimony is mistaken or not. But because of the 
possibility that the testimony of less socially powerful speakers will be treated with less than due 
credibility because of their social identity, and given the significant harms that are caused when these 
speakers are degraded as knowers, we should tread carefully when even the risk of posturing is 
present.  
 
                                                          
5 Later in this chapter I will recognize species of hermeneutical injustice that would produce 
dynamics where an outsider is better able to understand the experiences of insiders than insiders 
themselves. Namely, this would be true in situations of separation, exportation, and exclusion. In 
these cases, outsiders would not be mistaken if they were to see themselves as epistemic peers of 
insiders. In fact, they may sometimes be at an epistemic advantage. 
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There is a risk of posturing whenever a dominantly-situated listener takes a position of 
skepticism toward or denies the views expressed by a marginalized person. The risk may be greater 
or lesser depending on the situation. The risk is greatest in circumstances where the listener endorses 
prejudiced views of the speaker and has little exposure to the experience or subject the speaker is 
talking about. The risk is lesser in circumstances where the listener has dedicated time and energy to 
learning about the subject the speaker is talking about. Whether the speaker has committed 
themselves to the cultivation of good epistemic habits, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 
Three, might also inform an assessment of the risk of posturing in a given case. In Chapter Four I 
will consider examples where outsider advocates are at risk of posturing. In doing so, I will further 
explore conditions that enhance or mitigate that risk.   
 
1.2 Relating to Conceptual Gaps 
 
Some epistemic injustices occur because there are significant gaps in collective epistemic 




The resources we have available to us to make sense of our lives and the lives of others are 
shaped by the understandings and experiences of those in positions of social power. Thus, 
experiences that are unique to people and groups who are relatively powerless are more likely to be 
obscured from collective understanding. This may make it difficult for marginalized people to 
conceptualize their own experiences or to render those experiences intelligible to others. Fricker 
introduces the concept of hermeneutical injustice to pick out the way in which knowers are wronged 
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when some significant part of their social experience is obfuscated due to a lack of collective 
understanding that results from their being hermeneutically marginalized (2007, 154-55). 
Hermeneutical marginalization occurs when members of a disadvantaged group have less than equal 
participation in processes if meaning making. Hermeneutical injustices can render a person’s 
experiences, perspectives, and even life illegible in some substantial way.  
 
Ultimately, a hermeneutical injustice reflects a deep misunderstanding, but one that has the 
most significant consequences for the marginalized person who is misunderstood. While everyone 
subject to the epistemic lacuna suffers a cognitive disadvantage, the harm is borne asymmetrically. 
The person whose experience is obscured from collective understanding suffers a significant 
cognitive disadvantage, preventing “her from understanding a significant patch of her own 
experience: that is a patch of experience which is strongly in her interests to understand…” whereas 
the powerful person’s ignorance may even suit their interests in some way (Fricker 2007, 151). 
Goetze identifies the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice as being “that the subject has some 
distinctive and important social experience that at some crucial moment lacks intelligibility” (2018, 
79), though it is important to note that all unintelligible social experiences are not wrongful. Part of 
someone’s social experience could be unintelligible as a result of epistemic bad luck. To be wrongful, 




Contributory injustices occur when there are hermeneutical resources available to a listener 
that would enable them to understand what is being expressed by a speaker, but the listener refuses 
to make use of those resources (Dotson 2012, 32). Contributory injustice is importantly related to 
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willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when agents refuse to learn and make use of 
epistemic resources developed by marginalized knowers (Pohlhaus Jr. 2012, 722).   
 
 There may be some instances in which hermeneutical resources are available, but 
nonetheless some listeners may not be aware of their availability or skilled enough in their 
application. This does not necessitate that those listeners are willfully evading epistemic 
responsibility. Rather, it highlights the difficulty of creating, disseminating, and applying 
hermeneutical resources. As Dotson recognizes, fluency with new hermeneutical resources, 
concepts, and alternative logics can take years or even decades to gain. In some cases, epistemic 
resources may be intentionally kept secret from the broader collective so that they can be used 
strategically as oppositional secrets by marginalized people. 
 
Thus, departing from Dotson, I distinguish between: 
 
A)  instances where new conceptual tools have been introduced, are part of the collective 
hermeneutical resources, but are ignored or misused by people in positions of privilege. These are 
instances of contributory injustices.  
and 
B) instances where conceptual resources have been produced by a subgroup but are not yet 
intercommunally accessible, but that lack of access is without any willfulness impairing the uptake of 
those resources. These are instances of hermeneutical injustice, as there is still a significant part of 




While hermeneutical injustice is a structural phenomenon, contributory injustice is an 
interpersonal one. Contributory injustices occur when individual listeners fail to use resources that 
are available to them. For this failure, the listener bears epistemological culpability. When their 
failure is motivated by discriminatory or prejudiced attitudes, then their choices are ethically culpable 
as well. When many dominantly situated knowers are collectively willfully ignorant, this produces a 
severe, systemic form of the injustice. This combination of both personal and, at times, systemic 
complicity moves Dotson to identify contributory injustice as “located within the gray area between 
agential and structural perpetuation of epistemic injustice” (2012, 31).  
 
1.2.1 Conceptual Gaps: Who Doesn’t Understand? 
 
Much of my attention in the rest of the project will focus on highlighting hermeneutical 
injustices, evaluating methods of hermeneutical dissent, and identifying epistemic harms that that 
can result from those attempts to produce and improve collective understanding of those 
experiences that were hermeneutically inaccessible. 
 
So before moving on, I want to spend some time considering an important question about 
the nature of hermeneutical injustice. In order for a hermeneutical injustice to occur, there must be a 
deficit of interpretive resources available to the collective. But which resources make up the 
collective’s hermeneutical resources?  
 
The challenge of answering this question comes into focus when we recognize that for any 
collective and community that we identify, there are sub-groups that make up that larger group. 
Social groups are heterogeneous. Constituents will be members of a complex networking of 
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overlapping and distinct mini-collectives, which will themselves be made up of smaller subsets. As 
Davis notes, there are hermeneutical resources shared and used only within a subgroup 
(intracommunal) and resources shared and used between subgroups (intercommunal) (201, 702). 
 
A satisfactory account of what makes up a collective’s available hermeneutical resources 
should recognize and be able to make sense of the following conditions:   
 
1. There may be multiple social groups that constitute a collective. 
2. Those discrete social groups may have their own idiosyncratic epistemic resources that 
sometimes are and sometimes are not shared with other social groups. 
3. Hermeneutical dissent occurs in circumstances in which marginalized individuals create 
hermeneutical resources to address lacunas and attempt to alter collective understanding by 
dissemination of those resources.   
 
Now, let us review several ways of defining collective hermeneutical resources, evaluating 




One possible response is that hermeneutical resources include all resources available to 
anyone who is part of a community. Goetze describes this as a cumulative understanding of a 
community’s collective resources. If the community is made up of subgroups, and members of those 
subgroups have access to different hermeneutical resources, the collective’s resources are the sum of 
the resources available to all subgroups. Collective hermeneutical resources, on this account, include 
 
26 
all the hermeneutical resources available to all groups. Berenstain’s account of hermeneutical 
injustice when describing epistemic exploitation also presumes that hermeneutical injustice is 
restricted to instances in which everyone, including the hermeneutically marginalized subjects, has a 
deficit in the epistemic resources available to them. This presumes a cumulative account (2016, 584).   
 
According to the cumulative account, as soon as anyone or any subgroup has access to those 
resources, then there is no longer a lacuna, and thus, no longer a hermeneutical injustice (though 
other epistemic injustices, like contributory injustices, may persist). 
 




Thus, the cumulative account is not compatible with statement 3 above, that hermeneutical 
dissent occurs in circumstances in which marginalized individuals create hermeneutical resources to address lacunas and 
attempt to alter collective understanding by dissemination of those resources, because the cumulative account 
does not allow for the possibility there could be hermeneutical resources that both exist and are not 
part of the collective’s hermeneutical resources.  
 
To see why this understanding of what constitutes a collective’s hermeneutical resources is 
troubling, consider an example introduced by Trystan Goetze in “Hermeneutical Dissent and the 
Species of Hermeneutical Injustice.”  Members of the LGBTQ+ community have articulated gender 
and sexual identifications that, at their inception, were not part of the accepted lexicon. Concepts 
like agender, for example, came about because of difficult intergroup collaboration (2018, 74). 
Though such concepts are now at least somewhat recognized by the collective, we should not forget 
how hard they were to generate and disseminate in the first place. This work of creating alternative 
or additional hermeneutical resources to describe the experiences of those who are at a social 
disadvantage is hermeneutical dissent, and it is a powerful means of bringing about hermeneutical 
justice.  
 
 If collective hermeneutical resources include all resources available to anyone who is part of 
a community, then we lose sight of what is radical and challenging about the worked done by 
members of epistemically marginalized grips and their allies when they strive to create terms and 
concepts to describe their experiences when those are missing. Medina argues against this 
understanding of what constitutes collective hermeneutical resources on the grounds that we must 
acknowledge the “different interpretative communities and expressive practices that coexist” 






In her assessment of Fricker, Dotson states “Fricker seems to assume that there is but one 
set of collective hermeneutical resources that we are all equally dependent upon.” If this were the 
case, no resources would be available outside of them, and they would be available to all members of 
the collective. Both Mason and Dotson understand Fricker to be advocating for an exhaustive 
account of collective resources (Goetze 2018, 75), although they add the criticism that such an 
understanding renders dominant resources complete and in doing so erases the resources of 
marginalized groups. 
 
The exhaustive account is demonstrably unrepresentative of how epistemic resources 
actually function. There are hermeneutical resources available to some that are not available to 
others. Any nascent concept will at some point be available to only a few. If this were the account of 
collective resources we were to accept, then I believe Mason would be right in her criticism that we 
would “[miss] an ethically and epistemologically significant phenomenon,” namely, that of 
hermeneutical dissent by marginalized subjects (2011, 296).  
 
29 
   




As Goetze argues, a robust understanding of the possibility of hermeneutical dissent requires 
that the collective hermeneutical resources are neither cumulative nor exhaustive. It is important to 
preserve this conceptual space for hermeneutical dissent because even if resources have been 
introduced by marginalized people, if they have yet to be adopted by others, then those marginalized 




Goetze proposes that we understand collective hermeneutical resources as those that make 
up a subset of the cumulative and exhaustive resources, but a subset reflecting the perspectives of 
many decision-makers and epistemic “legitimizers” in a community.  
 
Though Fricker has been characterized as both endorsing cumulative and exhaustive 
accounts (based in different interpretations of her work) she has also explicitly recognized that 
resources available in localized hermeneutical communities may not be available to the broader, 
collective, global community. With this in mind, we can understand collective resources as those that 
are available to and used by different sub-groups within a community. Thus, collective 
hermeneutical resources are neither cumulative nor exhaustive, but instead pick out what is available 
and integrated intercommunally, across social spaces (Fricker 2016, 167).  
 
If a marginalized community generates interpretive resources, but those don’t gain uptake in 
other sub-groups, then this produces a situation in which hermeneutical resources exist (perhaps as a 
result of hermeneutical dissent), but the community whose resources have not gained uptake remain 
hermeneutically marginalized. I will call this the mainstream account, as it asserts that collective 
hermeneutical resources include all and only those resources that are available across some 
significant cross-section of social groups. The mainstream resources will typically contain resources 
used and endorsed by dominant subjects in the community, though they may include other 




Figure 4: Mainstream Account of Collective Resources 
 
I believe the mainstream account best explains the realities of the complicated epistemic 
dynamics that emerge between marginalized and socially dominant groups, as it allows for us to 
understand all three of the conditions listed above to be true of collectives experiencing 
hermeneutical injustice. Further, if the three statements above are true, then it must be the case that 
there are hermeneutical resources that are not part of the collective hermeneutical resources. 
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when some meaningful part of a marginalized group’s experience is 
obscured from understanding by application of the collective hermeneutical resources. Therefore, it 
is possible for hermeneutical injustices to occur even when hermeneutical resources capable of 
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making sense of the obscured experiences exist, so long as they are not part of the collective 
hermeneutical resources shared between groups. 
 
Given that different social groups have access to and successfully make use of different 
interpretive tools, hermeneutical injustices will manifest differently depending on who does and who 
does not have access to the tools needed to render legible the experiences of epistemically 
marginalized individuals.  
 
Goetze introduces distinct species of hermeneutical injustices. The dynamics likely to play 
out between the various social groups involved will vary depending on the species in question. I will 












Effacement No No No No 
Isolation No Yes No No 
Separation No No No Yes 
Ghettoization No Yes Yes No 
Exportation No Yes No Yes 
Obstruction No Yes Yes Yes 
Exclusion  No No Yes Yes 
 
Table 2: Species of Hermeneutical Injustices  




Effacement: In situations of effacement, no one, including the subject, has the interpretative 
tools to render the marginalized person’s experience intelligible (Goetze 2018, 81). 
 
 Consider the example of postpartum depression introduced by Fricker. The women 
identified in this example knew they felt unwell, knew, in some cases, it was complicating their 
bonds with their newborns, and knew their feelings were meaningfully connected to becoming new 
mothers. However, the shame and guilt these women felt suggests even they were not fully able to 
make sense of their experiences. Despite all that they did know, they did not possess knowledge that 
postpartum depression is a serious but common condition that can occur just before and in the 
months after labor and delivery, and that their feelings, as uncomfortable and upsetting as they were, 
were the result of a natural and biochemical reaction. The epistemic lacuna, in this case, impaired the 
understanding of not only outsiders, but subjects with the most intimate connection to the 
experience, too.  
 
Isolation: Isolation occurs when the subject has personally developed or uncovered 
interpretive tools to make sense of their situation, but is unable to communicate that to others, both 
within and outside of her social group, in a way that those others can understand. The subject is 
alone in their understanding (Goetze 2018, 81-82). 
 
The possibility of isolation also highlights the fact that no one member or subset of 





Separation: Separation occurs when hermeneutical tools that a subject could use to make 
sense of their experience are available, but only to members of different social groups. The subject 
and other members of their social group (the social group to whom this experience belongs) lack 
those interpretive tools, and thus cannot render their own experiences legible to themselves (Goetze 
2018, 82-83).  
 
Jenkins describes this manifestation of hermeneutical injustice as “the reverse of privileged 
ignorance,” since “the relevant conceptual resources are available at some social locations but are 
inaccessible to the person who needs to render their experiences of injustice intelligible” (2017, 200). 
 
Let us consider three contexts in which separation could occur: 
 
1) A social group that is marginalized in some similar way has generated the relevant 
interpretive resources, but for some reason communication between the two groups is nonexistent 
Goetze illustrates this way that separation can manifest using Fricker’s Sanford case, where a subject 
and others in her social group generate tools to make sense of postpartum depression, a 
phenomenon they previously had no hermeneutical resources to understand. But even when they 
lacked those resources, other similarly constituted groups in other places had those resources. Thus, 
the dividing line between the groups that had the tools and those that didn’t was not a matter of 
similarity of experience, but rather separation by time or space. 
 
2) Another social group with similar kinds of experiences develops interpretive tools that 
they use to gain knowledge of those experiences, but for some reason those tools are not shared 
with or seen as applicable to the subject and her group. For example, activists and survivors working 
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on unpacking the phenomena of domestic violence and various coercive techniques used by 
domestic abusers may develop interpretive tools for understanding those experiences. 
Simultaneously, survivors and activists in the world of commercial sexual exploitation may be 
unaware of some of those tools, even though they’d be applicable when trying to understand and 
gain knowledge about that phenomenon as well. In this case, the separation is more than a result of 
time or space, but of difference in the constitutive members of the groups that do and don’t possess 
the interpretive tools. But the members of these groups are more alike than different in the ways 
relevant to the interpretive tools in question. 
 
3) I would like to suggest separation can occur when a social group that is not subject to 
some experience (or similar experiences) nonetheless develops hermeneutical resources that are not 
available to the subjects of those experiences. In such cases, a group distinct from the group whose 
experiences are not collectively understood has hold of interpretive resources that would be valuable 
for collective uptake and that are not possessed by members of the group whose experiences they 
render coherent. 
 
It may be that some group of individuals who are not subject to an experience have a better 
understanding of that experience than those who are subject to it. Generation of hermeneutical 
resources is messy and complicated business, and sometimes outsiders may strike epistemic gold 
before insiders. Perhaps outsiders have some privilege that allows them to recognize those tools, or 
insiders are in too perilous a position to come to those resources first.  
 
But I believe we should be wary of the possibility of perpetrating further epistemic harms 
when separation seems to best describe the state of how hermeneutical resources are distributed.  
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When this happens, we should be concerned that the outsiders will mischaracterize the experiences 
they are trying to illuminate. We should worry that when outsiders claim to understand something 
more than insiders do, that the result will be paternalistic and may alter future attempts at further 
understanding. Self-understanding on the part of subjects may be shaped and guided by the tools 
crafted by outsiders. I will return to these dangers in the final section of this project. 
 
Ghettoization: Ghettoization occurs when a subject and the subject’s social group possess 
interpretive resources to facilitate knowledge of their experiences, but other social groups do not 
have those resources. Goetze’s characterization of ghettoization suggests this lack of uptake by other 
social groups is, at least in her limited example, a result of an indifference or resistance on the part of 
the other social group (2018, 83). In such cases, members of those other social groups could be 
accused of perpetrating a contributory injustice. They may also be accused of willful hermeneutical 
ignorance, and in circumstances where the epistemically oppressed attempt to communicate their 
tools and are prevented from doing so, there may be occurrences of testimonial injustice as well. 
 
However, in some cases ghettoization may be a result of strategic resistance on the part of 
the marginalized. As Hundelby acknowledges in “The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional 
Secrets,” in-group secrets can be extremely valuable for survival. Not all concepts developed 
through hermeneutical dissent would be prudent to share with outsiders in other social groups.   
 
If only the subjects of the epistemically obscure experience have access to the relevant 
concepts, we might expect that they will be met with incredulousness by those with whom they try 
to communicate their experiences. In such cases, the members of hermeneutically marginalized 
group may even have language to describe their experiences, and they may be able to communicate 
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about them with one another. However, that language is likely to be misunderstood by those outside 
of the group, and if these subjects aren’t given appropriate credibility when describing their 
experiences, this would result in a further testimonial injustice. Behaviors may be marked as deviant 
or criminal, and the epistemically marginalized people may be outright punished for responding to 
circumstances that are poorly understood. 
 
Exportation: This occurs when a subject has relevant interpretive tools to gain knowledge 
about their experiences, and some other group has those tools, too, but other members of the 
subject’s group do not. In such cases, a subject may have acquired those tools from the other group, 
but those resources have no yet gained uptake in the subject’s group (Goetze 2018, 83-84).  
 
Obstruction: This dynamic suggests what Goetze calls a “favorable hermeneutical climate,” 
since the subject, members of her own group, and members of some other group possess 
hermeneutical resources to gain knowledge of the epistemically obscured experiences (2018, 84). 
However, there may still be a hermeneutical injustice if there are some other social groups outside the 
in-group and the in-the-know out-group that do not possess the relevant interpretive tools. If the 
out-group that has resisted these tools or is for some other reason unable to incorporate them into 
their hermeneutical framework is powerful or dominant enough, then the marginalized group could 
still be at a significant disadvantage and suffer communicative harms.  
 
Perhaps there are circumstances in which powerful institutions constitute the other social 
group that recognizes the existence of what was once epistemically opaque before the general public 
can be said to catch on. This might occur in circumstances in which laws have changed in ways that 
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have outpaced public awareness and understanding. Those “official” changes can play an important 
role in ushering in a new era of general concern about the phenomena.  
 
If both the marginalized individuals and institutions recognize something important about 
gaps in understanding, but the general population does not, institutions may be able to help in 
communicating relevant information. In doing so, they can alleviate the burden of epistemic labor, 
but there is a remaining threat that the account will be distorted. The institutional interpretation of 
the experience may come to carry more weight that the individual accounts of the people affected, 
which could itself come to shape those experiences. Furthermore, the concepts and tools developed 
by the marginalized communities may be quickly co-opted to serve the interests of those in more 
dominant social positions. 
 
Exclusion: I would like to make the case for a seventh species of hermeneutical injustice, 
exclusion, in which members of a subject’s social group and members of some other social group or 
groups have relevant interpretive tools, but nonetheless the collective and some particular subject or 
sub-set of subjects of that experience lack those tools. To explain the need for an additional species, 
let us walk through a scenario in which different species may emerge at different times. We begin my 
imagining a circumstance in which workplace sexual harassment is occurring (women are being 
objectified and mistreated in the workplace), but no one currently has the appropriate hermeneutical 
resources to understand the phenomenon. At this time, we have a case of effacement. No one, not 
the collective, the subject of the harassment, the social group the subject belongs to, nor any other 




Then, these women impacted by this particular kind of mistreatment in the workplace come 
together and recognize their shared experience. They name it and develop ways of thinking and 
talking about it. At this point, the hermeneutical injustice transforms into a case of ghettoization. 
Subjects and their social group have interpretive tools to understand their situation, but those tools 
have not yet been widely disseminated. They are not yet mainstream. 
 
We can imagine that this motivated group of women then decides to share their interpretive 
resources with other social groups. They decide it is not strategically in their best interest to keep the 
tools they have developed as oppositional secrets, but to raise awareness that their experiences are 
real and rooted in systemic problems. We can even go so far as to assume that these consciousness 
raising efforts are sometimes successful, and members of some other groups grant credibility to their 
testimony and over time come to incorporate these hermeneutical resources into their lives and 
interpretations. Is it possible that a hermeneutical injustice lingers? I contend that it is. 
 
We may be inclined to say that in cases where a subject’s social group and other social 
groups have access to interpretive tools necessary to attain knowledge of an experience, but some 
particular subject or sub-group of subjects do not, there is no hermeneutical injustice because the 
lack of knowledge seem individual, personal even, and not systemic. Perhaps such dynamics are 
instead ones of mere epistemic bad luck.  
 
However, given that we have acknowledged that it is possible for multiple subgroups to have 
access to interpretive tools and for a hermeneutical injustice to still persist, then it seems similarly 
possible for a subject to be isolated from tools necessary for understanding their experiences while 
other members of their social group and members of other social groups have those tools. And this 
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separation could still to be the result of systemic barriers and prejudices, and thus the result of more 
than just bad luck.   
 
Imagine there is a subject who herself encounters the experiences of workplace sexual 
harassment, but lacks those interpretive tools. Maybe she’s just never been in the room when the 
label has been used. Maybe she is disinclined to engage in the kinds of conversations that would 
reveal them to her. Maybe she does not have a lot of time to catch up with her peers, and to 
discover that she isn’t alone in being harassed and violated by her boss. If her ignorance is simply a 
personal problem, that would not constitute a hermeneutical injustice. But what if it isn’t a personal 
problem? What if there are systemic reasons why she does not have access to those interpretive 
tools?   
 
Imagine she and others like her are members of the social group that developed the 
interpretive resources, but are also members of some other social groups that those women do not 
belong to. Maybe the women responsible for introducing language and concepts that make 
knowledge of workplace sexual harassment possible are mostly in secretarial positions, are educated, 
and are native English speakers. Imagine that our “out of the loop” subject works in a custodial 
position, or has not had access to certain educational opportunities; or maybe she speaks English as 
a second language or not at all. She may still be subject to workplace sexual harassment while 
nonetheless being deprived of the interpretive tools to attain knowledge of her experience. There 
may be others like her, all of whom belong to the social group “women,” and the narrower social 
group “women who are vulnerable to sexual harassment in the workplace.” Many, maybe most, 
members of that social group could have the relevant hermeneutical resources to attain knowledge 
of their experiences, other social groups could have those tools, and the subject (and others similarly 
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situated) could lack them for reasons that involve systemic barriers. In such cases, the subject faces 
both cognitive and communicative harms (Goetze, 78), and I will refer to this species of 
hermeneutical injustice as exclusion.  
 
1.2.2 Conceptual Gaps: Finding Lacunas 
 
When no one is aware that there is an epistemic lacuna, including subjects of the 
hermeneutical injustice, then the ignorance is shared and it is especially difficult to see how the 
injustice could be righted. How can we come to recognize that which we do not know is missing?  
 
Interestingly, many of Fricker’s examples in Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing 
(2007) are from works of fiction. In these pieces, we as the reader can stand outside of the events 
that are unfolding in ways that make it easier to see what the characters in those works may not. Her 
other examples are historic, as the benefit of time allows us to identify injustices in retrospect. She 
discusses the introduction of names and concepts like postpartum depression and workplace sexual 
harassment, conceptual innovations she describes as having been introduced into the lexicon and 
collective consciousness in the recent past. 
 
In what follows, I will try to motivate the position that there are certain epistemically 
obscure areas that require more and better-articulated resources. But ultimately, most of what we 
can learn about hermeneutical injustice has to be done after the fact. Once concepts are introduced - 




What I believe we can identify in real-time are the signs that a hermeneutical injustice is 
likely. Spotting these signs has practical value. When inadequate interpretive or communicative 
resources exist, then people attempting to communicate their experiences are likely to seem unclear, 
confused, or otherwise difficult to understand to those they are communicating with. A general take 
away from the discussion of epistemic injustice is a recognition that when we find ourselves 
incredulous of a speaker’s testimony or attempt to communicate about their experiences, we should 
consider ways that epistemic injustices may be at the heart of what makes it so challenging to 
understand what is being reported.  
 
Justice-minded listeners who want to improve their hermeneutical fluency, give speakers due 
credibility, and contribute to creating a more epistemically just community will have an interest in 
honing their sensitivity to the possibility that hermeneutical injustices are contributing to 
communicative failures and frustrations.  
 
I propose the following as indications that we should expect that the speakers in question are 
hermeneutically marginalized, and thus that aspects of their lives are not well described by available 
hermeneutical resources. These conditions are posited as neither necessary nor sufficient signs of 
hermeneutical injustices: 
 
1. The speaker is a member of a group toward whom prejudiced attitudes are held, particularly 
if those attitudes are present in a systemic way. 
2. The speaker is subject to testimonial injustices. Testimonial injustices make it difficult to 
overcome hermeneutical gaps, since attempts by the speaker to identify those gaps will be 
taken less seriously due to tendency to undervalue the speaker’s epistemic contributions. 
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3. A concept purporting to describe an experience shared by non-dominantly-situated people is 
in a state of flux, going through iterations of definitions that change the scope and meaning 
of the concept.  
 
I will now explore warning sign 3 in more detail, as I believe it requires the most in way of 
defense. 
 
First, when a concept is introduced or challenged by or on behalf of members of a 
marginalized group, that suggests the possibility that a hermeneutical injustice has been perpetrated 
at least up until that point, and that some part of the lived experiences of members of that group 
had, until that time, been obscured from collective understanding, namely. When we attempt to 
name what has been unnamed, to create interpretive resources where they’ve been lacking, we have 
to start somewhere. It should be more surprising than not if we happen to start in the right place. 
Because concept generation is such a hard project, we should expect that there will be continuous 
adjustments and redefining of the concepts and resources that we create when we’re attempting to 
fill a lacuna in our existing epistemic resources.  
 
This is especially worth noting because one common criticism of emerging social 
movements, particularly those surrounding the defining of what it means to be a victim, is that the 
definitions are always shifting. For example, we can think about controversies around the changing 
definitions of sexual assault. A common criticism is that what sexual assault is – how it is defined 
and what “counts” - keeps expanding. Critics suggest that this somehow introduces a question of 
legitimacy about whether or not there really is a “there” there, or whether or not people are taking 
advantage of work being done to highlight the existence of a certain kind of victimhood. Critics 
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suggest the expanding concept is evidence of a culture of victims, and that we’re expanding our 
concepts so that everyone will eventually fall under that umbrella.  
 
Taking seriously these changing definitions doesn’t require that we accept that concepts can’t 
be overextended; this isn’t to say that there isn’t a truth of whether or not we sometimes push the 
boundaries a bit too far.6 Rather it is a note that we should expect conceptual boundaries to ebb and 
flow, to expand and contract, as we try to get at the truth of our concepts and how to define them. 
We should expect that we’ll need to adjust meanings and definitions as we work to find concepts 
that ring true to the experiences of the people that were attempting to better understand or the 
people who are attempting to make themselves more legible. Rather, we should find ourselves 
suspicious of unchanging concepts and critical of those who police their boundaries.  
 
When conceptual boundaries remain in flux, then that is a signal that there may have been a 
pre-existing epistemic lacuna that resulted in a hermeneutical injustice for those whose experiences 
were rendered less legible as a result. The changing boundaries should also increase our awareness 
and sensitivity to ongoing hermeneutical injustices, as the concept at a given time may be deficient, 
introducing opportunities both for listening and increasing and understanding, on the one hand, and 
exploiting, silencing, and causing great harm, on the other. 
                                                          
6 In this dissertation, I am unable to seriously consider the question of how we can tell when 
a concept has been extended to far or why we should be alarmed by such a possibility. But we 
should be concerned about such questions because overextension of concepts threatens to 
pathologies, sermonize, and criminalize behaviors in ways that could results in further oppression 





Operating with this idea that fluctuating definitions and concepts relating to the experiences 
of marginalized folks is an indication that we’ve identified a “hot spot” of potential hermeneutical 
injustice, in Chapter Two I am going to discuss the histories and current state of affairs for 
describing, delineating, and understanding experiences of sexual assault and sex trafficking.  
 
Whether there are current, persisting hermeneutical injustices perpetrated against survivors 
of these traumas is not something I can say without the advantage of time and objectivity. But 
historic deficits in understanding and the fact that survivors are still relegated to a diminished role in 
the development of important resources to make sense of those experiences suggests to me that 
there likely are ongoing injustices of this kind.  
 
1.3 Relating to Concept Generation/Dissemination 
 
The final category of epistemic injustices I will review are those that occur during efforts to 
create and disseminate concepts in to fill an epistemic lacuna. I will use the phrase ‘hermeneutical 
resistance’ to refer to the broad category of efforts both insiders and outsiders might undertake to 
address hermeneutical blind spots. I will use Goetze’s notion of hermeneutical dissent to pick out 
the subset of efforts carried out by the hermeneutically marginalized subjects of those experiences 
(2018, 74). Both hermeneutical resistance and hermeneutical dissent are forms of conceptual 
engineering. Conceptual engineering is the idea “that there are concepts other than those we actually 
have and employ, and some of those concepts may be better suited for various purposes than our 
actual ones are” (Eklund, 1). In this case, the sense in which some concepts are better than others is 
 
46 
that some are better suited for epistemic justice. Some concepts better reflect the perspectives and 
capture the experiences of marginalized knowers. 
The three forms of epistemic injustice I introduce here all arise during the process of concept 
generation. All follow in the wake of a pre-existing epistemic lacuna obscuring some significant part 
of the lives of hermeneutically marginalized people. When lacunas exist in collective understanding 
as a result of structural prejudice, then that inhibits members of the hermeneutically marginalized 
group from influencing knowledge-production. This same structural prejudice will tend to sideline 
the voices of those marginalized people during the development of new hermeneutical resources. 
Finally, all injustices in this category demonstrate that even when new concepts are introduced to fill 




When outsiders involve themselves in the process of creating new hermeneutical resources 
in ways that make it harder for the subjects of those experiences to develop and disseminate their 
own interpretive resources, this results in an epistemic harm that I will call hermeneutical hijacking.  
 
Hermeneutical hijacking is characterized not by the intentions with which outsiders operate. 
As Alcoff notes in “Problem of Speaking for Others,” even well-intentioned speakers may 
“reinforce racist, imperialist conceptions and perhaps also further silence the lesser-privileged 
group’s own ability to speak and be heard” when they take themselves to be capable of speaking for 
the marginalized (1992, 26). Rather it is that the outsiders are problematically positioned to dominate 
the process of knowledge production; they risk speaking for the marginalized. Because allies may 
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have greater social authority, and thus are more likely to be believed and to have their voices 
amplified than marginalized subjects themselves, they may come to dominate the conversation. This 
should always be treated as sensitive and wrought with danger, and it should be especially alarming 
when members of the marginalized groups protest the out-sized influence of outsider voices. 
Hermeneutical hijacking produces the most severe harms when there is collective uptake of 
hermeneutical resources created or disseminated by outsiders against background conditions of 
hermeneutical marginalization.  
 
Importantly, the threat of hermeneutical hijacking illustrates that better understanding may 
not produce, on the whole, more justice if that improved understanding is brought about in a way 
that sustains intergroup dynamics that are hermeneutically marginalizing and epistemically 
oppressive. Though there may be no acute cognitive disadvantage if the hermeneutical resources 
introduced by more powerful outsiders adequately communicate what they are intended to 
illuminate, the subjects of those experiences are no less hermeneutically marginalized, as they are still 
denied a fair chance to contribute to shared hermeneutical resources. In some cases, the voices of 
those dominantly-situated knowers may exert such influence the voices of marginalized knowers are 
drowned out, and as a result they may find themselves with even further limited opportunities to 
contribute to the production of social meanings. The very fact that the dominantly-situated person 
took on the role of spokesperson may be used as evidence that the marginalized knower cannot or 
should not be included in meaning making. When this is the case, hermeneutical hijacking occurs, 
and victims of the injustice are wronged even when the result is some improvement in collective 
understanding. Hermeneutical hijacking sustains and possibly reinforces the existence of a class of 
sub-knowers, denying them the opportunity for full and fair participation in knowledge production 




The wrongness of hermeneutical hijacking is not dependent on any ethically bad attitude 
held by the outsider who has involved themselves in the process of hermeneutical resistance. Rather, 
it is rooted in structural prejudice that hermeneutically marginalizes its victims, excluding them from 
full and fair participation in the epistemic marketplace. This does not preclude the possibility that 
outsiders may be culpable in some cases. If an outsider recognizes that their involvement in a 
process of hermeneutical resistance is at odds with or has a silencing effect on the work of insiders, 
but they choose to continue their efforts, then they would bear personal responsibility for that 
decision. If those continued efforts are founded on a prejudiced belief about the insiders, then they 
are morally and epistemologically culpable for the harms suffered by insiders.  
 
For example, a doctor who is a man might see himself as engaged in work to improve 
collective understanding of the experiences of women by researching and publishing on postpartum 
depression. Because of his social power, he may be more successful at improving understanding that 
women dedicated to this work. Even while working in their interests, the doctor may harbor 
prejudiced beliefs about women, like a belief that they are less rational or intelligent than men. For 
this reason, he may refuse to take steps to amplify the voices of women engaged in hermeneutical 
dissent or to limit how much his own contributions hinder their work. In doing so, the doctor would 
be culpable for his wrongdoing.  
 
Other authors have suggested views that are similar to hermeneutical hijacking, though there 




For example, Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. argues that epistemic resources should be “developed from” 
the situations they describe. She states that such resources should be developed by people who are 
themselves subjects of those experiences, and that outsiders should “trust those persons have 
developed them well” (2012, 731). Thus, I understand Pohlhaus Jr. to argue that it is inappropriate 
for outsiders to develop or disseminate hermeneutical resources at all, regardless of whether doing 
so precludes contributories from hermeneutically marginalized knowers. If this understanding of 
Pohlhaus Jr. is accurate, then it is too absolute, especially given the possibility that in some cases, 
hermeneutically marginalized knowers may be unable to render intelligible their experiences to 
themselves even while the necessary tools for interpreting those resources are available elsewhere, as 
would be true in cases of separation (Goetze 2018, 82-83).  
 
Steers-McCrum argues for a species of testimonial injustice he calls self-appointed speaking 
for. According to Steers-McCrum, self-appointed speaking for occurs any time a person “speaks on 
behalf of or in place of another individuals or group without their authorization” (2019, 241). He 
identifies this as a species of testimonial injustice because the primary harm is that the person 
spoken for is disrespected as a knower. However, Steers-McCrum challenges Fricker’s 
conceptualization of the central case of testimonial injustice by taking the position that all self-
appointed speaking for is harmful and wrongful, regardless of whether it is the result of prejudice.  
  
Self-appointed speaking for has some commonalities with my concept of hermeneutical 
hijacking. Both are rooted in a recognition that significant epistemic harm can occur when 
marginalized subjects are spoken for. Furthermore, I completely agree with Steers-McCrum when he 
notes that it is not enough for the stories of marginalized people to be told or for their experiences 
to be highlighted, but that “[w]ho gets to do the telling matters too.” I also agree that the erosion of 
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hermeneutical marginalization requires that socially powerless people and groups not be excluded 
from active participation in the collective conceptualization of their own lives. Self-appointed 
speaking for and hermeneutical hijacking both highlight the risk that the voices of relatively 
powerful people could further silence those for whom they speak. Steers-McCrum and I also agree 
that these harms and wrongs can be produced even when those speaking for oppressed people do 
so with no prejudice or malicious intentions.  
 
However, there are important differences between the two. First, I do not identify 
hermeneutical hijacking as a species of testimonial injustice. Because the central feature of 
hermeneutical hijacking is the exclusion of some social groups from the creation of social meanings, 
hermeneutical hijacking is a structural kind of epistemic injustice. Because I identify hermeneutical 
hijacking as a structural epistemic injustice, I can explain why it can be both harmful and wrongful 
for outsiders to insert themselves into concept generation efforts even when those outsiders do not 
have prejudiced attitudes about the people they speak for without doing away with the condition 
that in order for interpersonal epistemic injustices like testimonial injustice to be wrongful, they 
must be tainted by the “ethical poison” of prejudice. 
 
Finally, hermeneutical hijacking leaves open the possibility that some instances of self-
appointed speaking for are not wrongful, which I believe is a virtue of the concept as I have defined 
it here. I will elaborate more on why I feel speaking for may sometimes be in the interest of justice, 





1) I agree that denying people the opportunity to contribute “as full participants in the 
epistemic community” because of prejudiced attitudes about who they are disrespects the 
person as a knower (2019, 245). But I reject Steers-McCrum’s suggestion that any time it is 
determined that someone may not have the requisite knowledge to speak for themselves or 
the hermeneutical resources to express themselves that this is necessarily disrespects that 
person as an epistemic agent. Sometimes people do lack the information or resources to 
articulate or advocate for themselves, even when the topic at hand is their own experience.  
 
Epistemic lacunas may render the experiences of marginalized knowers unintelligible even to 
themselves. Earlier in this chapter, I considered various species of hermeneutical injustice 
that would result from different subgroups within a collective having or not having access to 
interpretive resources that are not yet available to the collective, meaning they have not been 
incorporated into the set of intercommunal resources. In all but the species of effacement, 
someone or some group has access to interpretive resources that other individuals or groups 
do not. Hermeneutical resistance in response to all of those remaining species of injustice 
seems to necessitate some amount of speaking for others. Insofar as hermeneutical resistance 
is in the interest of epistemic justice, speaking for others may be not only permissible, but 
the right thing to do.  
 
Sometimes speaking for others in the name of epistemic justice may involve some 
individuals speaking for others who they have something important in common with. This 
occurs when people from oppressed groups work to raise awareness not only about their 
own circumstances, but about those that affect their communities. While the speakers may 
have something in common with those they have appointed themselves to speak for, it is 
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important to consider how within every group of people bound together by some common 
experience, there are tremendous variations in how those individuals feel about the 
experience and how the experience impacts other parts of their lives and identities.  
 
It may also sometimes be the case that those outside of a hermeneutically marginalized group 
are best positioned to shed light on epistemic blind spots that have rendered some 
experience of that group unintelligible using intercommunal hermeneutical resources, and 
they may be able to do so even when members of that group do not yet have the interpretive 
tools to make sense of those experiences for themselves. Consider an example I will explore 
in greater depth in later chapters. In the late 1980s, researchers and anti-sexual violence 
advocates argued that acquaintance rape was far more common than the public believed, and 
that most victims of acquaintance rape did not realize they had been sexually assaulted. 
These researchers and advocates spoke for the victims they had identified without having 
been appointed to do so. In fact, part of what they said on behalf of the victims they spoke 
for was that many of those victims were unable to appoint someone to speak for them 
because of the hermeneutical injustice they suffered. While there are many indications that 
people who later self-identified as victims appreciated that researchers and advocates spoke 
for them, this retroactive endorsement does not change the fact that at the time they spoke 
on their behalf, they had not and could not have been appointed to do so by those victims. 
 
One might retort that the researchers and advocates were, in fact, appointed to speak for 
victims. While many people who would later come to recognize their experiences as ones of 
sexual assault did not have access to the necessary concepts at the time, and thus could not 
appoint anyone to speak on their behalf about those issues, there were some victims who 
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were able to identify their experiences as ones of rape. In fact, many advocates and 
researchers involved in consciousness raising work about acquaintance rape were survivors 
themselves. So, perhaps approval by victims who had the requisite hermeneutical resources 
means that the researchers and advocates who spoke out about the experience were 
appointed to do so. 
 
This response highlights another flaw in Steers-McCrum’s concept of self-appointed 
speaking for as an epistemic injustice. If speaking for is not unjust when the speaker is 
appointed, who has the authority to appoint someone as the mouthpiece for a group? Yes, 
some survivors of sexual assault were comfortable appointing advocates committed to 
raising awareness about acquaintance rape to speak on their behalf, but others were not. 
Some felt these advocates presented themselves as if they were speaking for women 
generally. This was strongly contested by women who expressed in no uncertain terms that 
the advocates did not speak for them. 
 
Efforts to improve collective understanding of harms and injustices suffered by marginalized 
groups will require that some individuals speak for others. Sometimes people from within 
the affected group will speak for others in that group, and when they do they will appoint 
themselves to speak for some members of the group who feel they ought not. Sometimes 
people from outside of the group may speak for insiders, and they may do so even when 
insiders are unable to authorize those mouthpieces because of their hermeneutical deficits at 




2) Secondly, not all speaking for is disrespectful and exclusionary. Rather, some speaking for 
could be motivated out of a deep respect for marginalized knowers and recognition of the 
high costs of the epistemic labor that they would otherwise have to do. Steers-McCrum 
states that self-appointed speaking for harms those who are spoken for because “[e]ven if 
what is said is exactly what victims would have said, they are denied the chance to participate 
for themselves” (2019, 244), but in some contexts it may be more accurate to say that they are 
spared the obligation to participate in costly speech and debate.  
 
Steers-McCrum considers this sort of objection. He accepts that this may be a sort of 
necessary evil in cases where subjects cannot speak for themselves or where there is a strong 
likelihood that they will be ignored if they do so. According to Steers-McCrum, self-
appointed speaking for in such cases is an unfortunate strategic concession, but maybe the 
best of bad options. But I do not see why we must concede that in such cases, speaking for 
is unjust. We can accept that self-appointed speaking for may inflict some harms, but still see 
it as an act of epistemic justice when carried out with respect for the subject’s capacity as a 
knower and potential as a contributor to collective hermeneutical resources.  
 
Rather than identify all instances of self-appointed speaking for as unjust, I believe we can 
evaluate the examples Steers-McCrum provides and identify alternative explanations for how the 
speakers may wrong or harm those they intend to speak for. Steers-McCrum first presents an 
example in which a man orders for a woman at a restaurant, stating that regardless of the man’s 
intentions or attitudes, he has disrespected her as a knower and excluded her from the opportunity 
to express herself as a knower. I contend that he may be guilty of an epistemic injustice if he harbors 
a prejudiced attitude toward women, but he could also have been misinformed about what counts as 
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respectful behavior in that context. If so, then it is not clear that the woman has been harmed as a 
knower. He has not undervalued her capacity to contribute as an epistemic agent, and insofar as she 
is able to correct him, she has not been excluded from epistemic participation, either. In McCrum’s 
example that recounts Cordova’s telling of an interaction with a white folklorist, it is more evident to 
me that an epistemic injustice has occurred. Had the folklorist succeeded in co-opting Cordova’s 
story, and in doing so made it more difficult for Cordova and other Native Americans to contribute 
as knowers, then according to the definition I have introduced above, the folklorist would be guilty 
of hermeneutical hijacking. The folklorist’s insistence that Cordova ought to share those stories, and 
the added pressure to “teach ‘natives’ how to do such transcriptions” (Steers-McCrum quoting 
Cordova, 2019, 243) constitutes epistemic exploitation.  
 
To be clear, I believe many instances of speaking for others will be harmful and wrongful. If 
a subject protests that someone is speaking over them, or if it is the case that someone’s speaking 
for another makes it more challenging for the subject to contribute to the conversation when and 
how they want, then there is good reason to worry that the subject is being harmed and possibly 
wronged as a knower. But whether speaking for another is unjust depends not only on whether one 
has been appointed to do so, but how that act of speaking for perpetuates or alters the conditions of 




According to Davis, epistemic appropriation occurs when, during hermeneutical dissent, 
marginalized folks become detached from the dissemination of new hermeneutical resources they 
have created or when those resources are then used in ways that disproportionately benefit the 
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powerful (2018, 705). Thus, while epistemically marginalized subjects are able to contribute to the 
development of conceptual tools that make sense of their experiences, they are “prevented from 
being recognized” for that labor (2018, 722). Importantly, epistemic appropriation is not a species of 
hermeneutical injustice, as in cases of appropriation, Davis argues there is no conceptual deficit 
(resources exist - they are precisely what is being appropriated) and individuals may behave in 
culpable ways when participating in the process of conceptual theft (2018, 719).  
 
While I agree with Davis that there are instances where the individuals who appropriate the 
hermeneutical resources produced by marginalized people are blameworthy for doing so, I do not 
believe individual wrongdoing gets to the core of the injustice brought about by epistemic 
appropriation. Davis herself acknowledges that “epistemic appropriate involves individual agents 
(some of whom are culpable) and structures alike” (2018, 719). Marginalized knowers may be 
unfairly detached from the resources they have created even if no particular, dominantly-situated 
knowers intend to exclude them. Rather, the primary wrong of epistemic appropriation is the 
continued hermeneutical marginalization and epistemic oppression of victims, even when they have 
done work that should prove to any naysayers that they deserve to be full participants in the 
production and sharing of hermeneutical resources. The exclusion of the hermeneutically 
marginalized from making an impact with and on shared epistemic resources is sustained by their 
being detached from their efforts. While in cases of epistemic appropriation, the epistemically 
oppressed have succeeded in impacting the collective’s shared epistemic resources, this success is 
mediated by the insertion of dominantly-situated knowers and speakers into the process. Exclusion 
from knowledge-production processes cannot be executed by any particular listener. Rather, it is the 
product of structural prejudice that privileges the resources and ways of communicating available to 




If a hermeneutically marginalized knower is detached from their epistemic contributions and 
those resources disproportionately benefit the powerful, then the knower is both harmed and 
wronged by epistemic appropriation. This can occur even when individual agents involved in the 
appropriation have not behaved in ethically culpable ways. For example, Davis presents the example 
of Taylor Mill’s ideas and writings being published under the name of her husband, John Stuart Mill. 
While the result is one in which “a marginalized knower contributes to the intercommunally shared 
pool of epistemic resources, but only be first detaching herself from her epistemic contributions,” 
(2018, 709-10) the decision to be detached from those resources was carried out strategically and 
through the collaborative efforts of both Taylor Mill and John Stuart Mill. Taylor Mill was harmed 
and wronged when she was separated from the ideas she developed, but John Stuart Mill is not 
blameworthy for the role he played in that separation. While one may be inclined to interpret Taylor 
Mill’s active role in detaching herself from her ideas as an indication that she was neither harmed nor 
wronged by the situation, it is important to remember that subjects may strategically silence 
themselves to protect against additional harms or wrongs. This sacrifice on the part of the 
marginalized knower does not mitigate the harms and wrongs they suffer because of the double bind 
they face.  
 
However, if agents involved in the co-opting of hermeneutical resources developed by 
marginalized knowers are or should be aware that their actions unduly benefit the powerful, or if 
they are motivated by prejudiced attitudes about the marginalized knowers, then those wrongs are 
both structural and interpersonal. In such cases, those agents are culpable for the harms and wrongs 
that result from their actions. Let us contrast the example of Taylor Mill and John Stuart Mill with 
another Davis that introduces. Davis assesses and article written by Harriet Beecher Stowe about 
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Sojourner Truth. She notes that Stowe appropriated Truth’s ideas while presenting her in a 
caricatured way. It is plausible that Stowe’s misrepresentation of Truth - presenting her “words in an 
artificial dialect that utilizes obsessive detail to depict Truth - who was borne in the state of New 
York - as a foreign ‘exotic’” - was motivated by her own prejudiced beliefs. Furthermore, Truth did 
not condone Stowe’s depiction of herself and her ideas (2018, 711-12). Again, this involuntary 
appropriation of Truth’s work contrasts with Mill’s strategic, volitional detachment from hers. 
Because of her prejudiced othering of Truth while simultaneously benefiting from her epistemic 
labor, Stowe bears personal culpability for some of the harms and wrongs produced by the epistemic 
appropriation of Truth’s hermeneutical dissent.  
 
 Both hermeneutical hijacking and epistemic appropriation have to do with dominantly-
situated knowers inserting themselves into the process of hermeneutical resistance and efforts to 
improve collective understanding, though they differ in that hermeneutical hijacking involves the 
creation of resources and epistemic appropriation has to do with the communication and delivery of 




No group of people is monolithic. But efforts to improve collective understanding of the 
experiences of marginalized people often highlight the stories and experiences of a few. Despite the 
particularity of those stories and experiences, they may be generalized and come to be seen as 
representative of the group. They may shape collective understanding of that group in a way that 
distorts the heterogeneity of the group’s actual composition. In some cases, those accepted 
narratives may become prescriptive, deeply connected to ideas about how members of that group 
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should behave or how they should see themselves. People with different experiences or perspectives 
may be rendered less visible and legible, further concealing those who already have some significant 
parts of their lives obscured from collective understanding. 
 
When, in the process of improving collective understanding about the experiences of 
epistemically marginalized people, certain kinds of experiences come to be seen as representative in 
a way that further marginalizes the experiences of others with different experiences, I will refer to 
this as narrative constraint. The harm of narrative constraint is that it restricts the collectively 
accepted ways of being for members of a group. This harm is separate from the central harm of 
hermeneutical marginalization, which is exclusion from the processes of contributing to the 
collective’s epistemic resources. But the two are closely connected, and the harm of narrative 
constraint demonstrates the potential for hermeneutical dissent to produce further hermeneutical 
injustice.  
 
Not all circumstances where members of a group are presented in oversimplified ways result 
in narrative constraint. Dominantly-situated knowers may be painted in broad (and sometimes 
unflattering) strokes. Some outsiders may even come to believe that those stereotypes are accurate; 
the stereotypes may make the relatively socially powerful group members uncomfortable. However, 
if their available ways of being are not meaningfully restricted by those generalizations, then they 
have not suffered a wrong in the form of narrative constraint. The wrong of narrative constraint is 
essentially tied to generalizations producing restricted ways of conceptualizing people and their 
experiences, and this restricted way of seeing placing subsequent constraints on the available ways of 







In this chapter, I have reviewed various forms of epistemic harms and wrongs. In what 
follows, I will turn my attention toward statements made by advocates in anti-sexual violence 
movements. In Chapter Two, I will primarily highlight potential hermeneutical injustices that victims 
of acquaintance rape and sex trafficking have experienced as evidenced by the consciousness raising 
work carried out by those advocates. The other forms of epistemic injustice I have reviewed thus far 





CHAPTER TWO: APPLYING CONCEPTS OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE TO SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE INTERVENTION ADVOCACY 
 
In what follows, I will review claims made by advocates working to improve collective 
understanding about, first, sexual assault and, then, sex trafficking. In both cases, advocates, who are 
both insiders and outsiders, argue that there are prevalent myths and misunderstandings that have 
distorted our ability to recognize and respond to victims of these harms. They allege that these 
cognitive deficits afflict the general public, people in positions of power, and even subjects of those 
experiences.  
 
Influential advocates in both movements and the positions they have put forth have been 
vigorously criticized, often by advocates similarly committed to improving collective understanding 
of these experiences. These dissenters have argued that in both movements, advocates have 
exaggerated statistics, meddled with definitions, and cherry-picked stories for maximum emotional 
impact to produce a desired response. In both cases, dissenters have also criticized those advocates 
for depicting victims as helpless, innocent, passive, and ignorant. The result, they argue, is a moral 
panic that itself influences the reality of how people perceive and make sense of their experiences.  
 
In this chapter, I will review the recent history of both movements. I will consider how the 
claims made by advocates and changing laws suggest the existence of a prior and at times persisting 
hermeneutical lacuna. In subsequent chapters, I will review common strategies used by outsiders and 
insiders in these movements to improve collective understanding. I will also consider how the 
objections presented by dissenters highlight ways that efforts to improve collective understanding 
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about sexual violence may lead to additional epistemic harms and wrongs committed against victims, 
sex workers, and other marginalized people. 
 
2.1 Victims of Sexual Violence, Identity Prejudice, and Hermeneutical Marginalization 
 
As a volunteer with and eventual employee of Mt. Sinai’s Sexual Assault and Violence 
Intervention Program (SAVI), a non-profit in New York City, I have worked with over one 
thousand survivors of sexual assault, intimate partner violence, or sex trafficking who have sought 
supportive services. I began my relationship with the organization in 2015 as an advocate working in 
emergency departments. There, I provided support to patients who disclosed a sexual assault or 
violent encounter with an intimate partner while at the hospital. This often involved helping 
survivors consider their options, advocating for the patient’s wishes to medical staff and law 
enforcement, and informing survivors about resources available to them once they left the 
emergency department. In 2016, I began representing SAVI in Queens County’s Human Trafficking 
Intervention Court (HTIC). From 2018 until 2020 I served as the organization’s intake coordinator. 
I cite these experiences only to provide some context for why, in this dissertation, I am identifying 
and exploring epistemic injustices as they relate to sexual assault and sex trafficking.7 
                                                          
7 Because my focus in this project is on the epistemic injustices faced by victims of sexual 
violence and the measures taken by advocates to improve collective understanding of those 
experiences, I will limit my discussion of trafficking to sex trafficking. This is a rather unfortunate 
restriction, as the general focus on sex trafficking has meant that the experiences of victims who are 
trafficked in other industries (like hospitality, food, domestic services, and agriculture) have been 




I contend that victims of sexual violence are not only harmed as knowers, but in many 
instances they are also wronged. As I reviewed in Chapter One, it is possible for an epistemic blind 
spot to be harmful without being wrongful or unjust. For example, someone who has an illness that 
has not been recognized by the medical world at the time they are alive may suffer greatly as a result, 
both epistemically and otherwise. While harmful, that suffering may not be unjust. It could rather be 
a case of epistemic bad luck. The poor soul could happen to be alive at a time when doctors and 
researchers just do not have the tools to diagnose and treat the disorder. In order for the epistemic 
lacuna that obscures a person or group’s experiences from collective understanding to count as an 
epistemic injustice, it must be a result of the person or group in question being hermeneutically 
marginalized. Hermeneutical marginalization occurs when a group faces structural or institutional 
barriers that prevent their fair contribution to shared hermeneutical resources. If the sick person’s 
undiagnosable illness has been under researched or otherwise treated with little regard because of 
the relative powerlessness of the people who typically suffer from the ailment, then that could 
constitute a hermeneutical injustice. If, for example, someone suffers from postpartum depression 
during a time when that is not a recognized medical diagnosis in large part due to it being the case 
that the people who experience it are seen as irrational and unable to offer testimony about the 
disorder that is taken seriously by the medical community, then the resultant lacuna is at least partly 
the result of the hermeneutical marginalization of those who suffer from the condition. We can 
imagine that a better understanding of the disorder would likely be available if doctors and medical 
researchers did not discount the complaints of new mothers as being overly emotional and indicative 
of personal problems and shortcomings and instead took them to be evidence of a problem worthy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
serving these survivors, they may garner less sympathy, and they may be more likely to be 
overlooked even when working in plain sight. 
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of further investigation. Not only is the hermeneutical deficit harmful, creating a significant 
cognitive disadvantage for those who suffer from postpartum depressing, it is also wrongful, as the 
collective ignorance about the condition is a result of their being systemically excluded from shaping 
available interpretive resources.  
 
 In some cases, victims of sexual violence are wronged because of prejudiced attitudes held 
by particular listeners they encounter. In others, they are wronged by structural inequalities that 
result in their hermeneutical marginalization.  
 
There is no shared trait that distinguishes victims of sexual violence from non-victims; the 
difficult truth is that anyone can be harmed in this way. But something that many victims share is 
vulnerability because of some aspect of their identity that renders them powerless or less powerful in 
some situations. Being disabled, having limited resources, not speaking English, not having a legal 
immigration status, being a person of color, having a mental illness, suffering from a substance 
abuse problem, being a LGBTQ+ person, and other identifications or statuses that increase a 
person’s social vulnerability also increase one’s risk of being a victim of sexual abuse or exploitation.  
 
Sexual assault and sex trafficking are often described as forms of gendered violence. 
Evidence suggests that women are victims of these violations at higher rates than men, and, in many 
cases, they are subject to these experiences because they are women. Interpersonal epistemic 
injustices occur when a listener is morally and epistemologically culpable for their mistreatment of a 
speaker, and such prejudiced devaluations of women’s testimony often occur when they disclose 
they have been the victim of sexual violence. A listener may disregard the testimony because they 
hold sexist beliefs about women and their sexuality, like the idea that women should not even 
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suggest that they are sexually available, and that if they behave in ways that are perceived as 
promiscuous then they are “asking for” whatever ends up happening to them. Other listeners may 
be unjustly dismissive of the testimony of women because they believe women falsely claim they 
have been sexually assaulted to avoid the responsibility of having made the decision to have sex or 
because they regret the decision the next morning. Prejudiced attitudes about women and their 
intellectual abilities have long resulted in their being excluded from many spaces where knowledge is 
created and shared, including those related to education, law, social and political policies, and health. 
The sexist exclusion of women from spaces where collective concepts are developed and systemic 
devaluation of women’s testimony and epistemic contributions combine to make it the case that 
women are hermeneutically marginalized by structural sexism.  
 
Because victims of sexual violence do tend to be women, by and large, perhaps it is partly 
because of the existing prejudices about gender that there is a deficit of epistemic resources for 
understanding these experiences. If so, then sexual violence is connected to gender in an important 
way even though not all victims are women. For example, it could be that one of the reasons we 
systemically decrease credibility granted to survivors of sexual assault is that those survivors are 
more often than not women, and women are granted a deficit of credibility generally. This strong 
association of women and victims may result in a transfer of the decreased credibility to victims who 
are not women. Some have argued that the vulnerability of women as trafficking victims and many 
of the problems that will be discussed relating to the defining of and response to trafficking have to 
do with the social identity of women as marginalized people. According to Doezema, “trafficking is 
characterized as the result of women’s sexual subordination and/or women’s economic 




However, I worry that conceiving of the epistemic injustices suffered by victims of sexual 
violence in this way threatens to contribute to the erasure of people who are not women or who do 
not identify as women from the conversation. Men and boys are also assaulted, violated, and 
exploited. Importantly, sexism affects non-women, too. Insofar as masculinity is strongly associated 
with physical strength and a lack of emotion and vulnerability, men and boys who are victims of 
sexual violence may be seen as weak and unmanly. Some people mistakenly believe that it is not 
possible for men or boys to be sexually assaulted because of common stereotypes that men are 
always interested in sex or the mistaken belief that men are not able to perform sexually if they do 
not want to have sex. If they are assaulted by someone of the same sex, victims may question their 
own sexuality and persistent prejudiced attitudes about homosexuality may heighten that anxiety. 
Fear of such responses, which are all tainted by prejudice, may cause many survivors to remain silent 
about their suffering. This is an example of wrongful testimonial silencing. If survivors speak up, 
their feeling of violation may be met with a testimonial injustice, with their testimony being treated 
without due credibility or disregarded so completely that it’s as if they did not speak at all.  
 
2.2 Epistemic Injustice and Changing Conceptions of Sexual Assault 
 
In Chapter One I suggested that when the way that something is defined is in a state of flux 
- when we find ourselves engineering and re-engineering a contested concept - that could be an 
indication of a possible hermeneutical lacuna. The moving boundaries suggest there is some 
underlying experience that we have not quite managed to articulate well enough or that there are 
cases that are considered marginal or beyond the scope of those concepts that warrant inclusion or 




Ideas of what constitutes sexual consent and sexual assault are far from settled. Laws and 
definitions relating to both have changed time and time again, and there are still significant 
controversies over what exactly constitutes an assault or violation, who decides, and how we can tell. 
These changing concepts signal that there is some obscurity at the core of our understanding of 
what sexual assault is and is not. Because victims are so often relatively socially powerless or 
members of vulnerable populations, these changing concepts should serve as warning signs that this 
is a domain of experiences about which we are likely to have epistemic blind spots.  
 
A deficit of collective understanding of sexual assault can be largely attributed to the social 
silence around the topic that was prevalent until the middle of the 1970s. According to Rutherford, 
silence reinforced general beliefs that “rape, incest and domestic violence rarely happened…” (2017, 
104). But a tremendous amount of change and growth has occurred surrounding this subject in just 
the last 50 years. Much of the evolution of the concept of rape has been carried out publicly and 
recorded for assessment in ways that other conceptual engineering projects perhaps have not. This 
provides an opportunity for reflection on who knew what (and who claimed to know what) when. 
 
Significant attention began to be paid to date rape in the 1980s and early 1990s. In a New 
York Times special report published in 1991, it is stated that ‘[s]exual activity that goes too far and 
becomes abhorrent to the woman is not new among college students… but calling it date rape is” 
(Celis, 1991). Ms. Magazine published a study conducted by Mary P. Koss that looked at the 
prevalence of acquaintance rape among college women. She found that 1 in 4 women surveyed was 
a survivor of rape or attempted rape (15 percent were survivors of rape). The vast majority of the 
survivors knew their attacker (at odds with the stereotype that rapists are strangers hiding in bushes) 
(Warshaw 1994, 11). Critically, only 27 percent of the women who reported an experience of rape 
 
68 
identified themselves as rape victims (Warshaw 1994, 26). This demonstrated a “disconnect between 
experiencing certain acts and labeling them rape” (Rutherford 2017, 107).  
 
2.2.1 Why Victims May Not Self-Identify 
 
How could it be that nearly 3 out of every 4 individuals Koss surveyed that reported an 
experience that fit the legal description of rape or attempted rape did not identify as victim of those 
crimes? 
 
The information reported by Koss’ study indicates that there was an experience (what would 
later come to be known as date rape) and the ability to make sense of it (at least to some degree, as 
indicated by the ability of Koss’ research team to conduct and report on the study), but there were 
subjects of that experience who did not have the interpretive tools to arrive at correctly identifying 
the experience for themselves. In fact, so many individual subjects lacked that knowledge that the 
relevant social group, generally speaking, lacked the relevant knowledge. The relevant knowledge 
was mostly held by members of some other social groups, but not ones that are representative of the 
collective. In this case, the social group aware of the concept included some folks in the legal 
community and at least some psychologists like Koss and her collaborators. We know this 
community has the relevant concepts because the assessment that 1 in 4 women included in the 
survey were raped because the criteria for assessing whether a woman’s responses indicated assault 
came from the “North American statutes” at the time, defining rape as “unwanted sexual 
penetration perpetrated by force, threat of harm, or mental or physical inability to give consent 
(including intoxication)” (Warshaw 1994, xiii). This dynamic suggests the hermeneutical injustice is 




Warshaw recognizes the oddness of the dynamics the study establishes between the 
experiencers and knowers, asking “[h]ow can women count as rape victims if they don’t call 
themselves that?” Her answer again appeals to the superior epistemic position of “[c]riminal justice 
experts” (1994, xxiv), who have precise definitions to help clear up ambiguities that might confuse 
non-experts. But this seems to reduce the lack of understanding to a mere linguistic difference. 
Survivors just don’t have the right word and the right definition. This interpretation is supported by 
Koss’ finding that 90 percent of rape victims felt victimized, despite not seeing themselves as rape 
victims (Warshaw 1994, xxiv-xxv). Another way to understand the purported fact that nearly three-
quarters of victims don’t recognize they are victims is that they don’t have a conceptual recognition 
of the systematicity of their experiences, that they are not merely victims of an anomalous situation 
that they may be made to feel is their fault, but rather that their experience is one that is tragically 
familiar to many others.  
 
Both of these ways of making sense of Koss’ surprising findings suggest her work is 
significant because it illuminates and makes articulable a description of experience that resonates 
with many victims. Because so many victims of sexual violence are hermeneutically marginalized, the 
experience had not previously been recognized by those who had, “traditionally, held the power to 
name certain experiences as consequentially real” (Rutherford 2017, 116) New terminology and ways 
of understanding sexual violence that led to greater awareness of the kind of experience Koss called 
date rape did not create an experience that did not previously exist. Rather, advocacy to improve 
collective understanding made the experience of acquaintance rape expressible and publicly 




Even if we accept that it is possible for outsiders to have knowledge about the nature of an 
experience when insiders do not, we may still wonder how that can be. Warshaw reviews numerous 
studies which purport to the prevalence of acquaintance rape (1994, 13), so the concepts Koss 
makes use of in the Ms Magazine. study were not hers exclusively. If these researchers could have the 
information (going as far back as 1957 in the studies cited by Warshaw), why didn’t victims? 
 
Another way to make sense of how victims may not possess hermeneutical resources to 
make sense of their experiences even when such resources are available to someone, somewhere is 
to recognize the role that internalized myths play in how we interpret our lives. Katharine Jenkins 
argues that, “persistent social misconceptions, or myths” about domestic violence and rape can, 
“obscure understanding of these phenomena, including victims’ understanding of their own 
experiences” (2017, 191-192).   
 
Jenkins identifies the belief “[t]hat rape is only committed by strangers and cannot occur 
within marriage/a relationship/a friendship” as an example of a common rape myth (2017, 192), 
noting that this myth persists despite being at odds with the legal definition of rape. Jerkins cites a 
study by Petersen and Muehlenhrad (2004) that found that rape victims who had experiences a rape 
that fits the description of a widely accepted myth while themselves accepting that myth were less 
likely to identify their own experiences as ones of rape. Jenkins concludes that this research 
“strongly suggests that one effect of rape myths is to prevent some victims of rape from 
conceptualizing their experience as one of rape” (2017, 193).  
 
To explain how it could be that victims could suffer an epistemic injustice while the relevant 
resources are available somewhere in the epistemic marketplace, Jenkins makes use of Haslanger’s 
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distinction between manifest and operative concepts. Manifest concepts are formal definitions, while 
operative ones are those that are actually used in the broader community. In this case, the manifest 
concepts available to some (like anti-violence advocates and law enforcement) have not gained 
uptake in the broader community. The operative concepts of rape and the myths that accompany 
them sustain an epistemic lacuna (2017, 195-196). 8, 9  
 
When accurate concepts are not widely available, collective misunderstanding can be used to 
harm victims. For example, Warshaw notes in the foreword to I Never Called it Rape that widespread 
beliefs that a woman’s prior sexual history could justify what would otherwise be seen as assault 
were internalized by victims themselves, and “would convince many women… not to pursue 
[criminal] cases” against their perpetrators (1994, xviii).  
                                                          
8 While in this case the formally defined manifest conceptive is presented as the right one, 
Jenkins notes that the formally defined concept should not always be preferred. Sometimes the law 
takes a while to catch up, and it may be that a community comes to understanding something as 
oppressive or harmful that was previously misunderstood or ignored. In such a case, the operative 
concept may develop to better recognize a previously hermeneutically obscure experience before it is 
formally acknowledged by a manifest concept. She uses the example of marital rape laws lagging 
behind public opinion about the wrongness of marital rape. Before the law changed, the operative 
concept (which condemned marital rape) was more hermeneutically enlightened than the manifest 
one (2017, 196). 
9 Note that Jenkins’ discussion of hermeneutical injustice assumes that it is possible that 
within a given community, hermeneutical resources can exist for an experience that remains 





Katie Koestner was thrust into the spotlight in 1990 after she began publicly speaking about 
being sexually assaulted during a date. In her retelling of the event, she notes that even when pinned 
to the ground by someone and while trying to prevent him from undressing her, she “never thought 
about being raped,” because “rape was still stranger rape” in her mind at that time. Even after she 
found words to describe her experience, the people she reached out to for help were still operating 
with those myths in mind, recommending she sleep the experience off, think carefully before ruining 
the perpetrator’s life, and blaming her for making the choice of inviting him to her room (Koestner, 
2016). 
 
To understand how it could be that so many people could be victims but so few victims 
would recognize themselves as such, we must consider how isolating it would be to experience an 
assault in a community where such an experience is treated as unspeakable. Considering how often 
victims are scrutinized and blamed for their assaults, it becomes easier to understand why one may 
feel inclined to resist classifying oneself as a victim. When such denial and avoidance is widespread, 
that would prevent individuals from being able to see that their experiences are shared by many and 
are symptoms of systemic problems. 
 
2.2.2 Harms Resulting from Poor Understanding 
 
According to Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice, all parties suffer an epistemic 
harm when a lacuna exists in shared understanding. When she describes the revelation of workplace 
sexual harassment as a reality, she notes that prior to the introduction of new hermeneutical 
resources, both victims and perpetrators of such harassment lacked conceptual tools to name the 
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experience or make sense of its systematic impact on other members of the hermeneutically 
marginalized group. Nonetheless, only the victims of such harassment experienced an epistemic 
injustice, since the perpetrators were not harmed by and more likely benefited from their ignorance.  
 
However, greater understanding and access to additional hermeneutical resources does not 
necessarily and immediately reduce these harms. Warshaw acknowledges that being able to identify 
her assault as such did not help, at least not right away (1994, 6). Coming to obtain or identify 
concepts relevant to one’s situation is not necessarily beneficial. It is contingently beneficial if 
understanding permits one to exert greater control over one’s situation, and, given enough time, it 
may provide the benefit of diminishing feelings of personal responsibility and shame. 
 
When experiences are shrouded in epistemic obscurity, they are available to none or few. 
Changing attitudes about what constitutes sexual violence as a result of increased awareness of the 
prevalence of acquaintance assault also produced increased anxiety among those who feared they 
might be the perpetrators of such assault. In a New York Times report titled ‘Agony on Campus,’ it 
was stated that “[m]en who have been accused of rape by women they have known or dated are 
often befuddled by the current controversy,” adding that they believed refusals to engage in sex were 
part of “a ‘mating game’ ritual.” One student at Lehigh University is quoted as initially denying 
having ever committed rape, but then expressing some a lack of confidence that all his past sexual 
partners had consented, concluding that he felt “very confused” and may have assaulted some of his 
partners (Celis, 1991).  
 
While it is possible that some people who are guilty of perpetrating dating violence were not 
aware that they were committing a crime or behaving violently, they were not harmed by their 
 
74 
ignorance in the same way that the victims of sexual violence were. Rather, it is the knowledge of 
what they have done that is likely to cause them the most harm. For those who were truly ignorant, 
awareness of the harm that has been caused would likely produce unpleasant feelings.  
 
Corrigan and Shdaimah argue that whether or not a person is believed when making a claim 
that they have been sexually violated is best assessed by evaluating the area of intelligibility that the 
alleged victim and their listeners occupy (2016, 446-47). Being identified as a victim brings resources 
and recognition (2016, 448). This space plays a critical role in determining what facets of a person’s 
experience are considered reasonable or even legible. Intelligibility is determined by the interaction 
of “women’s representations of themselves; criminal justice officials’ individual preferences… and 
institutional forces that make some responses viable and other s unlikely” (2016, 451-52). Thus, 
having a way of communicating about one’s experiences that is considered acceptable and 
understandable is essential for being recognized as a victim and being treated appropriately.  
 
2.3 Advocacy for Victims of Sex Trafficking and Epistemic Injustice 
 
In this section of the project, my aim will be to provide support for the idea that there are 
survivors of commercial sexual exploitation who have had their experiences obscured from 
collective understanding due, in part, to their hermeneutical marginalization, and thus that those 
victims have suffered epistemic injustices. I will survey changing laws and advocacy movements 
aimed at improving collective awareness about sex trafficking, as well as arguments and surveys 
intended to shed light on myths that obscure understanding of the purported realities of those 
experiences. To achieve these aims, I will take the claims made by activists that those experiences 
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have been largely misunderstood, both by the larger community and those subjects themselves, at 
face value. 
 
 Later in the dissertation, I will turn a critical eye toward some of these assertions. The 
specifications of anti-trafficking laws and the accuracy of the statistics and descriptions of the reality 
of sex trafficking presented by the most vocal and visible anti-trafficking activists are all 
controversial. I will give serious consideration to objections to all of the above when reviewing some 
of the potential epistemic harms perpetrated by the anti-trafficking movement. 
 
2.3.1 The Legal Definition of Sex Trafficking 
 
At the very end of the twentieth century, a remarkable thing happened. Some feminists10 on 
the left of the political spectrum and conservative activists on the right came together to raise 
awareness about human trafficking.11 In 2000, these efforts culminated in two significant legislative 
landmarks; Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA), and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
Especially Women and Children, also known as the Palermo Protocol, was ratified by the United 
Nations. 
 
                                                          
10 The feminists associated with this alliance would mostly likely be identified as representing 
the second-wave movement. 
11 The circumstances surrounding this unlikely alliance and the development of these articles 
of legislation are controversial and will be explored later in the project. 
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According to the TVPA, any act involving the recruitment, harboring, transportation, 
provision, or obtaining of a person for a commercial sex act is sex trafficking.  Thus, any commercial 
sex that is facilitated or supported by a third party constitutes sex trafficking, even when no 
exploitative or harmful means are used to induce someone to engage in a commercial sex act against 
their will.  
 
In order to be punishable, however, trafficking must be of a “severe form,” and thus must 
involve either: 
 
(a) commercial sex involving adults induced by means of force, fraud or coercion, or 
 
(b) commercial sex involving a minor 
 
Thus, punishable trafficking of adults involves certain actions - like recruiting, harboring, or 
obtaining - brought about by particular means - force, fraud, or coercion - for the purposes of 
commercial sex. Contrastingly, any instance in which someone facilitates a commercial sex act that 
involves a person under the age of 18, regardless of how they do so, counts as an instance of severe 
sex trafficking.  
 
The Palermo Protocol was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in November 
of 2000 just one month after the TVPA was passed. It required that ratifying states make a 




Article 3 of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children states: 
 
(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or 
receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments of benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of 
the prostitution others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 
 
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in 
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph 
(a) have been used; 
 
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose 
of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does not involve any of the 
means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; 
 
(d) ‘Child’ shall mean any person under eighteen years of age. 
 
The TVPA mandated an annual Trafficking in Person’s Report, and in the 2002 issue, the 
first to provide estimates of the scale of both international and domestic trafficking, the U.S. 
Department of State asserted that as many as 4 million people were victims of transnational human 
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trafficking, with 50,000 of those victims residing in the United States. Vocal anti-trafficking 
advocates asserted that the problem was “mushrooming” and that victims were getting younger (see 
Yen, 2008). In the years that have followed, the estimated number of trafficking victims has 
fluctuated significantly, but the highest estimates have approached 25 million (combining both labor 
and sex trafficking).  
 
In the decades since the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA were passed into law, a significant 
number of federal and state agencies have created forces or programs dedicated to investigating or 
responding to human trafficking. These are reviewed thoroughly by Peters in her dissertation titled 
“Trafficking in Meaning: Law, Victims, and the State,” in which she assesses the contentiousness of 
debates about the meaning of trafficking from an anthropological perspective. These dedicated 
forces and programs include the FBI, ICE, the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Department of Justice, Department of Sates, Department of Labor, Homeland Security, and 
countless state and city law enforcement departments (Peters 2010, 6-8). The number of NGOs 
dedicated to serving victims of sex trafficking has increased by 50 percent, and the number of 
articles published on the topic rose from nearly nothing to over 400 each year (Bonilla and Mo, 
2018). 
 
2.3.2 Myths and Misunderstandings 
 
Despite what may seem to be a straightforward definition of trafficking provided by the 
TVPA, what does and does not “count” as trafficking is controversial and conceptually ambiguous. 
Hume and Sidun note that “[t]here are no clean boundaries, no tidy classifications that 
unambiguously tell us that this is trafficking, and that is not trafficking,” and “not everyone who 
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might fit the definition of a victim of trafficking will self-identify as such” (2017, 9). Furthermore, 
advocates have argued that the general population lacks an understanding of what trafficking is and 
who trafficking victims are. Advocate Linda Smith likens the current state of ignorance and 
opportunity for understanding trafficking to changes around public understanding of domestic 
violence (2015).  
 
Advocates frequently argue that many people do not understand what trafficking is because 
they have consistently been shown a version of trafficking this is misleading. Karly Church, a 
survivor of trafficking, states in a TEDx talk that based on her experience, “[m]edia and movies 
portray human trafficking to look one way, and it looks completely different than that.” Human 
trafficking, sometimes called “modern day slavery,” tends to call to mind images of people being 
transported internationally, violently forced to work in dangerous or grueling circumstances, and 
kept in isolation from a larger community – frequently in shackles or otherwise restrained (2020). 
However, advocates argue and the law dictates that trafficking is both a domestic and international 
issue, may or may not involve transportation across borders, and often occurs in circumstances 
where the trafficked person is not always or may never be physically restrained.  
 
These statements indicate that there is a kind of experience, the existence of which is certain, 
but the nature of which we have a limited understanding. Victims of the experience are marginalized. 
And as I argued in the first chapter, the presence of a concept with fluctuating boundaries and a 
controversial scope is a sign that a hermeneutical injustice may be afoot. While the law recognizes 
trafficking as a complicated issue that manifests in a plurality of ways, arguably the legal definition is 
not broadly recognized. This suggests a large gap between, using Jenkins’ language, the manifest 
concept and operative concepts available. Common myths about trafficking give rise to a shaky 
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operative concept that applies only to a limited subset of victims - namely, those who are physically 
abused, smuggled, and innocent seeming enough to elicit sympathy. 
 
Myths about the nature of sex trafficking and ideas about who is trafficked contribute to 
making it the case that individuals who are trafficked have their experiences hidden from collective 
and, at times, personal understanding.  
 
Some of these myths include beliefs that a person is not commercially sexually exploited if 
they:12  
 
1. Are not physically restrained or abused 
2. Were not smuggled across a border 
3. Are a United States Citizen 
                                                          
12 I do not believe this list is exhaustive. It is based on my experiences working with an 
organization that provides services for survivors of trafficking and in a trafficking intervention court, 
conversations I’ve had with social workers who support victims of trafficking, and research cited in 
this section.  
 
Dr. Makini Chisolm-Straker, co-founder of HEAL Trafficking, provides an overlapping list of 
myths. Chisolm-Straker also identifies the tendency to think of trafficking as limited to that which 
involves commercial sex as a pervasive and harmful myth. I agree that the lack of collective 
awareness about and interest in labor trafficking is unjust, and feel it is unfortunate that the limited 
focus of this paper may contribute to ongoing neglect of such experience (Look Beneath the Surface 
to End Trafficking, 2018). 
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4. Have ever voluntarily engaged in the commercial sex industry 
5. Have a personal relationship with the person who is their trafficker 
6. Are not a woman or a child 
7. Are not kidnapped or made choices that made them vulnerable to being exploited 
8. Do not accept help when it is offered 
 
I will now review these myths in more detail, providing some motivation for rejecting these limiting 
ideas about who is and who is not a victim of commercial sexual exploitation. 
 
Myth 1: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they are not physically restrained or abused 
 
People who are trafficked may not be physically restrained at all. Instead, control may be 
exerted using means of fraud or coercion. For example, Peters interviewed a victim she calls Silvia 
who reported feeling trapped not only by physical violence, but because her trafficker would make 
“threats about harming her children.” A victim named Nadia was coerced by threats that “if she did 
not pay the $200 a day, her family would be in danger” (2010, 166). 
 
Myth 2: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they are not smuggled across a border 
 
Peters quotes Katherine, a federal prosecutor, as reporting that one reason it is difficult to 
correct collective understanding of trafficking is because of the pervasive “media conception of 
human trafficking that’s just very general, and it’s pretty much akin to smuggling or movement of 
people” (2010, 149). Bonilla and Mo found evidence of this misunderstanding in a survey they 
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conducted. Many participants incorrectly indicated they believe trafficking and smuggling are 
synonymous (2018).  
 
Though the transportation of someone for the purpose of exploitation may count as 
trafficking, neither the TVPA nor the Palermo Protocol require that people be transported to meet 
the conditions of being trafficking victims. Illegal transportation of people is essential for smuggling, 
whereas trafficking is essentially tied to labor under exploitative conditions.  
 
Myth 3: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they are an U.S. Citizen 
 
Barbara Amaya, a victim of sexual exploitation as a child, remarks that people are often 
surprised that sex trafficking happens in the United States (2015). Nacole, the mother of a minor 
who was sexually exploited, begins a TEDx talk by admitting she was surprised when her daughter 
became a victim because she had previously believed sex trafficking was a problem that happens 
somewhere else (2014). 
 
Myth 4: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they have ever voluntarily participated in the commercial sex 
industry13 
 
Some victims of trafficking may have willingly engaged in sex work at some point in their 
lives, and they may return to sex work after being trafficked. For example, Markie Dell, a trafficking 
survivor, was initially forced into commercial sex acts by physical and sexual violence. After meeting 
                                                          
13 Abolitionist advocates will take issue with what I have presented here, as they are 
committed to the idea that all sex work is inherently exploitative. 
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a police officer who shared information with her that led her to see that she was being trafficked, 
she escaped her circumstances and moved to a safe house. Sometime after arriving at the safe house, 
she was propositioned by another resident to have sex in exchange for money. She accepted the 
offer, reporting she felt it might make her feel more in control (2019).  
 
The persistent perception of sex workers as liars also makes victim identification and 
support challenging. Nacole notes that when her daughter had run away and was being exploited, 
she was once held by police and let go. When asked why, the officer responded “well, these girls lie. 
Big boobs and a pretty face” (2014). 
 
Sometimes victims may even voluntarily participate in activities that fit the legal definition of 
trafficking. Peters quotes Ella, an immigration attorney as saying “sometimes when people have a 
sort of management position in the operation, like they were doing it for a little while, and then 
they’re called in to recruit other women…” Peters quotes a federal agent she calls Will as responding 
to such situations by saying “Not all victims are victims” and advocating that people who are 
complicit in these ways should be punished as severely as their traffickers, even if they are minors 
(2010, 98-99). 
 
Myth 5: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they have a relationship with their trafficker 
 
Trafficking victims may know their traffickers, and they may have complicated personal 




 Peters indicates that “[c]riminal justice authorities often questioned whether situations 
involving family members or romantic relationships were really trafficking, even when force or 
coercion were involved… [t]here have been multiple cases in which the traffickers recruited young 
women by romancing them and then forced them into prostitution, but because of the relationship 
it was difficult to evaluate the level of force that was used” (2010, 97-98). 
 
Myth 6: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they are not a woman or child 
 
Even the name of the Palermo Protocol, officially the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, emphasizes a 
connection between trafficking and victims who are minors or are identified as women. Victims who 
are non-binary, trans, or men are often overlooked.  
 
Myth 7: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they were not kidnapped or made choices that made them vulnerable 
to being exploited 
 
Not all victims are kidnapped. Some may choose to leave their homes to live with the people 
who will become their traffickers, sometimes to begin a relationship with those individuals (like 
Nacole’s daughter). Others may choose to work with smugglers to enter a country illegally. They 
may be told they are going to be given a different kind of job, and then forced to engage in 
commercial sex. They may be aware they are going to be expected to provide sexual services, but 
believe the conditions of their labor (their pay or living conditions) will be different than they are 
once they are too vulnerable to back out. As Ella, an immigration attorney interviewed by Peters, 
notes that for victims who cross borders, “[i]t’s really often about someone wanting better economic 
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opportunities for themselves, and … US immigration law is so limiting on who can migrate here and 
work legally, when an opportunity comes up for better economic opportunity or sometimes love… 
it’s sort of a hope for a better life” (2010, 96). 
 
Myth 8: A person is not a victim of trafficking if do not accept help with it is offered 
 
An expectation that anyone who is a victim of trafficking would feel tremendously grateful 
to law enforcement or victim’s services programs that offer assistance or support may lead people to 
reject the idea that anyone who turns down such an offer can truly be a victim. However, people 
may not accept offers of “help” for many reasons. They may not trust law enforcement, fearing 
arrest or deportation. They may feel that the assistance will be insufficient to protect them from the 
risks their traffickers pose. They may worry that talking about their abuse may bring harm to their 
families or others they care about (especially if they have a personal relationship with their trafficker, 
as they may even be inclined to protect them).  They may feel shame about the work they have done 
or have been made to do. The help may have conditions that they are not willing to accept (like 
religious obligations, curfews, or being unable to communicate with family or friends still involved 
with sex work). Finally, they may not identify as victims, so they may not see themselves as qualified 
for the services that are offered.  
 
2.3.3 Why Victims May Not Self-Identify 
 
“I started to read and quickly realized that what had been happening to me for the past year had a name. I was 




A common refrain among advocates and those who provide services for trafficking victims 
is that they typically do not identify themselves as victims of sexual exploitation. Peters reports that 
many of the survivors she met and interviewed “did not even know that a crime had been 
committed against them” (2010, 174). This sentiment was shared by immigration attorneys she 
interviewed.14 In a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services report, the first item included in 
a list of “Barriers and Challenges to Accessing and Providing Services” is that victims are “unable to 
self-identify,” followed in second by “lack of knowledge of services.”15 The same report states that 
“research has suggested that trafficking victims are often reluctant to identify themselves as victims” 
(Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the Literature, 18-19). 
 
One reason we have for believing that some people are victims even if  they do not self-
identify as such is that some survivors come to recognize themselves as having been in retrospect. 
For example, one survivor of  childhood sexual exploitation stated in an interview that, “I started to 
see that I was a victim once people believed and told me I was a victim” (2018). In her memoir, 
Jasmine Grace, a survivor of  trafficking, alternates between sharing journal entries from the period 
in her life where she was trafficked by her boyfriend and offering commentary from ten years later 
while she is in, in her words, recovery. Often her later commentary draws attention to how much she 
did not understand about her vulnerability and victimhood while those experiences were ongoing 
(2016).  
 
                                                          
14 For example, see Peters’ interviews with Ella and Radh. 
15 The same report indicates that the barriers from the side of providers (those positioned to 
support victims) also involve knowledge-based obstacles, including “difficult to identify/reach 
victims (hidden crime),” and “lack of awareness/training.” 
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 In this section, I will consider why it might be that victims lack this kind of  self-
understanding while outsiders have access to epistemic resources that allow them to make victim 
identifications.  
 
Reasons victims may not self-identify 
 
Vaughn Harper, a special agent with Homeland Security Investigates, states that “[m]any of  
the victims don’t identify themselves as victims. Through psychological manipulation, physical 
intimidation, or just fear of  law enforcement or the stigma that society may give them once they are 
identified as a victim of  trafficking” (Look Beneath the Surface to End Trafficking, 2018). Not 
understanding that they are victims or that there are protections and services they are entitled to, 
victims may not “come forward because they fear retribution from their traffickers and fear arrest 
and deportation” (Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the 
Literature, 18).  
 
It may be that when victims first make contact with people who have access to the epistemic 
resources that would classify their experiences as ones of  trafficking, they are neither in a position to 
engage in the narrative labor of  recounting those experiences nor comfortable disclosing 
information to those outsiders, many of  whom will be connected to law enforcement. In such cases, 
they may not come to recognize themselves as trafficking survivors (or to apply the label to 
themselves), or come to benefit from the services available for victims - like immigration relief  
(TVISAs), federal benefits (like Medicaid, food stamps, and cash assistance), case management, or 
legal assistance. Given the very real threats of  arrest and deportation sex trafficking victims and sex 
workers face, this is not an unreasonable concern. The antagonistic relationship between victims and 
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those who have access to the epistemic resources that would enable those victims to see themselves 
as such is a significant barrier to understanding.  
 
Even when victims are aware of  the definition of  trafficking, that it is illegal, and have a 
general understanding of  what it looks like, they may not apply those concepts to themselves and 
self-identify as trafficking victims. A study by Peter Olayiwola found that while most of  the children 
and parents surveyed were aware of  the definition and illegality of  trafficking, these children and 
parents did not realize trafficking described their situations (children in the study were victims of  
domestic servitude, not sex trafficking) (2019, 57-58). Instead, they saw this information as not 
affecting them.  
 
It may be that some people resist or are unable to conceive of  themselves as victims while 
actively being trafficked. Casandra Diamond, a trafficking survivor, reflects on how she wanted to 
feel she was in control while working in commercial sex, and resisted thinking she was being 
controlled or manipulated (2020). Hughes states that “[f]ew women and girls in prostitution are 
willing to acknowledge that they have or are controlled by a pimp. The pimp has convinced her that 
he is a boyfriend or someone who cares about and looks after her” (2005, 15). Hughes explains that 
admitting that they are being sexually exploited can be “psychologically devastating.” 
 
Strong feelings of  attachment to an alleged trafficker are sometimes pointed to as signs that 
someone has been brainwashed or so manipulated by their exploiter that they are not able to assess 
their own victimhood. Nacole, the mother of  a trafficking victim, reports that when her 15-year old 
daughter was arrested and returned home, she was mad at everyone except the man who sold her 
(2014). A U.S. Department of  Health and Human Services report also notes that some victims may 
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not see themselves as victims and may protect their exploiters “at all costs” because of  “the power 
of  the trafficker’s or pimp’s seduction and manipulation, as well as the manifestations of  Stockholm 
syndrome” (Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the Literature, 18). 
 
Trafficking victims are often isolated, unable to talk openly about their circumstances 
because of  the taboo and illegal nature of  sex work. When people are isolated, they may not be able 
to see the systemic nature of  their suffering. Instead, they may feel that they are especially unlucky or 
responsible for what has happened to them. As Hundleby notes, “isolated individuals won’t develop 
strong communal perspectives. Isolation from others who share experiences of  the same form of  
oppression makes experiences of  marginalization seem idiosyncratic, or personal rather than 
political” (2005, 45). Oree, a trafficking survivor, states that she was unable to see her victimhood 
until it was recognized by others. Because people ignored her (despite her age and visible signs of  
abuse) she felt her circumstances were just personal problems and that she had to figure them out 
for herself  (2018). 
 
Peters reports that “many providers and prosecutors told me that trafficking survivors do 
not self-identify, that is they do not know the language of  trafficking and sometimes even that what 
has happened to them is a crime” (2010, 122). Markie Dell, a survivor of  sex trafficking, recalls that 
for a long time she didn’t know what sex trafficking was. She found out from a police officer. The 
officer provided her with literature on trafficking, and she reports, “I started to read and quickly 
realized that what had been happening to me for the past year had a name. I was human trafficked” 
(2014). Dell knew something was wrong (she describes the horror and humiliation she felt from the 
start), and was able to recognize her experiences as ones of  trafficking when exposed to the 
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conceptual tools she needed to make that connection. The police officer already had those epistemic 
tools and applied them to identify her as a victim. 
 
Finally, it could be that victims may not see themselves as such because their lives while 
being commercially sexually exploited are not as bad as their real or perceived alternatives. The idea 
that someone could prefer conditions that are generally seen as so undesirable may be confusing and 
frustrating for outsiders. Peters quotes a federal prosecutor she calls Molly as explaining that while 
some outsiders may feel sex trafficking is the worst thing that could happen to someone, victims 
may feel differently. According to Molly, a “16-year-old prostitute might be like, ‘Yeah I’m chilling, 
I’m cool... I’ve got my new outfit, I’m good,” while nonetheless they are a trafficking victim 
according to the TVPA (2010, 101).  
 
Reasons outsiders may be able to identify victims  
 
Outsider advocates often imply or assert outright that they can identify victims of  trafficking 
even when those purported victims do not self-identify or even reject the label of  trafficking victim. 
For example, Bernstein quotes one panelist at an anti-trafficking event in New York as describing 
the clients who works with at a nonprofit as being trafficking survivors, “even if  the women in 
question refuse to admit it.” I myself  have heard doctors and social workers express similar 
sentiments. 
 
It may be that outsiders are sometimes in the position to identify victims because they have 
the benefit of  comparison. Having worked with many survivors of  trafficking in the past, service 
providers may develop skills to spot the signs of  exploitation even when they are unacknowledged 
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by victims themselves. Sheila, a service provider interviewed by Peters, is confident that she has the 
ability to distinguish victims from non-victims, explaining that through interviews she feels she can 
get a sense of  whether they “were coerced or that their freedom was restricted” (2010, 123). Peters 
seems to express some skepticism about this ability, noting Sheila assuredness despite how long it 
can take to “draw out details of  coercion from trafficked persons.”  
 
Others may feel they can identify victims not because they have honed an ability to recognize 
hard to see signs of  abuse or trauma, but because they have come to understand that all commercial 
sex is inherently exploitative and all people who provide commercial sex acts are trafficking, even if  
they deny it. This is the position taken by abolitionists. In this case, the special insight advocates 
believe that have hold of  is conceptual. They feel they have the right definition, which means they 
have the right understanding of  who is and who is not trafficked even if  the people they are 
assessing disagree. 
 
2.3.4 Harms Resulting from Poor Understanding 
 
Even if  an epistemic lacuna exists in our collective understanding, more needs to be 
established in order to demonstrate that trafficking victims are subject to a hermeneutical injustice. 
As Fricker notes, not all cognitive deficiencies constitute hermeneutical injustices. In order for some 
lack of  understanding to count as a hermeneutical injustice, there must be substantial costs that 
result from that ignorance. When discussing sexual harassment, for example, she notes that the 
“harasser and harassee alike are cognitively handicapped … but the harasser’s cognitive disablement 




The trafficker’s handicap is not typically to their disadvantage. In fact, the dynamics of  
trafficking are directly to their benefit. The victim, on the other hand, who is deprived of  the 
cognitive resources to make sense of  their situation, suffers what Fricker calls a “cognitive 
disablement” (2007, 151), because presumably it would be in the victim’s interest to understand the 
systematic dynamics of  trafficking, which they are – unwillingly and unwittingly – a part of. 
  
Victims of  human trafficking are often vulnerable and, therefore, exploitable members of  
society. Risks that increase the likelihood that someone will be trafficked include (but are not limited 
to) being the member of  a stigmatized group in society (i.e. being a member of  an oppressed race, 
being of  a sexual orientation that is discriminated against), having limited educational or financial 
resources, being unable to speak the dominant language within a community, not having legal status, 
and having a history of  sexual abuse.  
 
Trafficking victims may also be vulnerable because they feel that they are at least partially 
responsible for the situations they find themselves in. For example, someone who entered the 
United States through smuggling and agreed to work upon their arrival may believe that they, 
therefore, must do whatever it is they are asked to do by an employer. In these cases, the victim may 
see their situation, as undesirable and exploitative as it may be, as the result of  their own actions.  
 
Victims may also feel shame because of  social or religious attitudes about sex or sex work. 
They may not want others to know that they’ve been made to engage in commercial sex acts, and 
traffickers may use that fear to further exploit them. A report by the U.S. Department of  Health and 
Human Services states, “[t]he stigma associated with sexual exploitation in general, and prostitution 
in particular, also increases the difficulty in identifying victims… not likely to disclose they’re 
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involved in prostitution to providers, especially law enforcement, due to their own sense of  shame 
and fear of  the response” (Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the 
Literature, 18). 
 
Social workers and doctors are challenged by the invisibility of  trafficking as they attempt to 
help and treat those who suffer from it, and even when working with victims of  trafficking they may 
lack the language and conceptual tools to identify the victim as a victim or to make sense of  their 
situation. 
 
Peters reports that a Congressional staffer told her that lawmakers must be continually 
educated about trafficking as defined by the TVPA, and even though “everyone up here knows that 
trafficking is something that is bad and that trafficking is modern-day slavery, and therefore horrible, 
but they don’t really know what trafficking is, and so you can totally mischaracterize it in so many 
different ways it you’re inclined to do so.” (Peters quoting Victor, 100) 
 
A deficit of  public awareness also places some people at risk of  being trafficked. Speaking to 
representatives at a Congressional hearing, Beatrice Fernando, a trafficking survivor and associate at 
the American Anti-Slavery Group, noted that a lack of  public awareness led to her being “swept up 
in human trafficking because I did not understand the risks and did not know how to look out for 
myself ” (Combating Human Trafficking: Achieving Zero Tolerance, 31). She advocates for the 
education of  those who are vulnerable to “reduce the power of  traffickers.” Carly Church, a 
trafficking survivor, states that she thinks that if  she’d been more aware of  the threat of  trafficking, 




The lack of  conceptual clarity surrounding the realities of  trafficking results in tremendous 
emotional costs for trafficking victims, presenting barriers to resources that might aid in exiting a 
trafficking situation. Furthermore, this lack of  understanding alters how the larger community views 
trafficking victims, and in many cases they may not be viewed as victims at all. Notably, interactions 
with police and the courts are likely to occur in contexts where victims are themselves defendants 
and are treated as criminals. A report by the U.S. Department of  Health and Human Services notes 
that, “[a] significant challenge to identifying victims of  trafficking is that many have historically been 
and in some instances continue to be, viewed as criminals (e.g., undocumented migrants, prostitutes) 
and subject to arrest, detention, and/or deportation” (Clawson et al. 2009, 15). Shandra, a trafficking 
survivor, reports trying to get help from police and being turned away because they did not see her 
as a victim (Look Beneath the Surface to End Trafficking, 2018).  
 
Some of  the officials interviewed by Peters note that a lack of  understanding of  the nature 
of  trafficking is a barrier to recognizing victims, connecting them will services, and prosecuting 
trafficking-related crimes. She quotes a federal agent she calls Dean as saying, “many people have 
different definitions of  trafficking, and every time people with different definitions start talking it 
creates confusion, and what that confusion does is to… either cause people to report lots of  things 
as trafficking or think things are trafficking that aren’t, at least from our perspective, prosecutable... 
Or it’s so narrow that they think somebody has to be chained to a desk to something, that they 
overlook cases that could be prosecuted” (2010, 99-100). A lack of  understanding or different 
understandings of  what trafficking is allow for “providers, investigators, government bureaucrats, 
and prosecutors,” to make “discretionary interpretations of  law and policy, some challenging and 
other reinforcing normative assumptions about prostitution and sex trafficking” (2010, 134). Linda 
Smith argues that a lack of  public understanding of  sex trafficking as making it hard for district 
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attorneys to enact laws. They worry that juries will not be sympathetic to even child victims (seeing 
them as prostitutes) and may sympathize with Johns (who they may see as being like their sons or 
fathers) (2015).  
 
Advocates argue that these myths may be weaponized by traffickers. Traffickers may tell their 
victims that they deserve what happens to them or that they made a choice to be where they are and 
do the work that they do. Traffickers may exploit the vulnerabilities of  victims by exerting control 
over their access to knowledge and concepts that would help them to make sense of  their own 
experiences. When those in positions of  authority do not have or do not apply conceptual tools to 
understand trafficking, traffickers may use that lack of  understanding to control victims. Victims 
may be told that the will be arrested or deported if  they attempt to seek help (Clawson et al., 2009).  
 
96 
CHAPTER THREE: RIGHTING AND RESISTING EPISTEMIC WRONGS 
 
 In this chapter, I will consider various strategies for combating the harms caused by 
epistemic injustices and righting epistemic wrongs. This list of  strategies to address epistemic 
injustices is not exhaustive. Rather, my decisions about which strategies to highlight have been 
guided by which I feel are used by victims of  sexual violence and advocates attempting to raise 
awareness about those experiences. Epistemic rebellion or resistance of  the kind reviewed here may 
be required when hermeneutical erasure is threatened, with the most radical responses justified when 
hermeneutical death is a risk (Medina 2017, 49).  
 
Outsiders - people who are not themselves subjects of  an at issue epistemic injustice, but 
who want to engage in epistemically and morally good practices - may attempt to right epistemic 
wrongs by 1) cultivating good epistemic habits, and engaging in 2) consciousness raising efforts. The 
important difference is that 1) is self-directed and involves the outsider making changes to their own 
attitudes and behaviors, whereas 2) involves the outsider attempting to change the attitudes and 
behaviors of  others. 
 
These responses to epistemic injustice may be available to insiders, too. But there are other 
responses that are exclusively available to insiders. Among these are strategic 







Type of  Hermeneutical 
Resistance/Rebellion/Dissent 
Who Would Use It? 
Cultivate good epistemic habits Both (Listeners/Outsiders/Allies and 
Subjects/Insiders) 







Table 3: Types of  Hermeneutical Resistance 
 
As I stated in Chapter One, I will use the phrase hermeneutical resistance to refer to the 
broad category of  efforts both insiders and outsiders might undertake to address hermeneutical 
blind spots. Both insiders and outsiders may participate in efforts to engineer or re-engineer 
concepts so that they better capture the experiences of  marginalized people. Some of  these 
strategies are forms of  hermeneutical dissent, a term introduced by Goetze to describe the 
production of  new concepts by people who are epistemically marginalized (2018, 74). 
Hermeneutical dissent begins when subjects experience a feeling of  hermeneutical dissonance. 
Fricker introduces the language of  hermeneutical dissonance in 2007, and Medina describes it as 
“the phenomena in which the communicative conflict is internalized and both the dominant and 
resistant voices are within one and the same subject” (Medina 2012, 209). This feeling of  dissonance 
suggests that something is wrong that leads marginalized folks to create new concepts and to disrupt 
ways of  understanding. It can eventually lead to alternative hermeneutical resources that may even 
be incorporated in collective understanding.  
Other strategies are forms of  resistance or rebellion that allow a marginalized person to 
refrain from making use of  belief  systems that require that they accept untrue or oppressive things 
about themselves or other likes them, but that may not directly result in the production of  new 
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hermeneutical resources. For example, disengaging may allow a subject to protect themselves from 
harmful ways of  thinking and seeing, but it will not result in the development of  new, less 
oppressive concepts unless additional strategies are employed. 
 
3.1 Cultivating Good Epistemic Habits 
 
Those who are concerned with issues of  social justice will of  course ask what can be done 
to address injustices once they have been identified. In this section, I will consider how good 




To combat contributory injustices, a listener may try to develop fluency with different 
hermeneutical resources. Contributory justice requires being able to switch between different sets of  
hermeneutical resources as is appropriate. But of  course, gaining this kind of  fluency will not be 
easy. It might take years or decades for someone to become fluent in different hermeneutical 
resources.  
 
What Doezema does in “Loose Women or Lost Women” is compare the current activism 
and political attention being paid to sex trafficking to the panic about white slavery that occurred at 
the start of  the 20th century. In doing so, she attempts to shed light on ideas and concepts that may 
seem inscrutable given the tools we have available to us at this time, but which may be better 
understood by making us of  hermeneutical resources from the past.  
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As is the case for current advocates, reformers thinking and writing about “white slavery” in 
the early 1900s meant different things by the term. Some were referring to all sex work, while others 
were referring only to sex work that involved crossing borders or elements of  force or coercion. But 
according to Doezema, a general consensus can be observed, and for most “‘White slavery’ came to 
mean the procurement, by force, deceit, or drugs, of  a white woman or girl against her will, for 
prostitution” (Doezema 1999, 25). Notably, this is virtually identical to the TVPA definition, though 
with the added specification that the victims must be white. 
 
There are enormous similarities between the “white slave” panic of  the 20th century and the 
current state of  political and social discussion about sex work and sex trafficking. Both highlighted 
stories in which women and girls were kidnapped or deceived into believing they would be doing 
work other than sex work. Both strongly connected sex work to child sex abuse and focused on 
portrayals of  young victims (Doezema 1999, 28). Doezema cites research by contemporary 
historians who argue that the number of  women who actually met the widely accepted definition of  
being white slaves at that time was much lower than the explosive, headline numbers that were 
accepted as truth by many then and now (1999, 25-26).  
 
 If  such concepts were defined, argued about, protested, and applied over one hundred 
years ago, it becomes harder to make the argument that no possible hermeneutical tools exist to 
conceptualize trafficking in the modern day. Of  course, many dynamics and particulars have 
changed, and the trafficking discourse from the turn of  the 20th century did not get everything right. 
But given how much ground we have retreaded in the last few decades of  increased attention toward 
trafficking, we may be faulted for not making use of  the epistemic resources at our disposal. The 
fact that we’ve had a very similar conversation with very similar disagreements so recently also may 
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justify some incredulous toward the countless reports citing an unprecedented, unforeseeable 




Hermeneutical injustices, by definition, involve circumstances in which there is a conceptual 
deficit that obscures some part of  the marginalized person’s self  or experience from understanding. 
How can we know what we don’t know? How can we spot hermeneutical lacunas? 
 
One possible solution involves recognition of  how testimonial and hermeneutical injustices 
interact. Listeners may recognize that marginalized peoples’ experiences are less likely to be 
collectively recognized or deemed legible, and thus they are more likely to be placed in a situation 
where they are taken to not make sense. They may be labeled irrational, over-reactive, or unserious. 
When they protest these labels or attempt to explain their own understandings, that testimony may 
be disregarded or challenged because of  a combination of  systematically downgrading the quality of  
the testimony of  the marginalized speaker combined with the lack of  coherence the explanation may 
have given available hermeneutical resources. A justice-minded listener might make an effort, then, 
to exercise what Louise Antony calls epistemic affirmative action, whereby privileged listeners 
assume that if  a marginalized person attempts to communicate something that seemingly does not 
make sense, that it is the privileged person who has a deficit of  interpretive resources, not the 
marginalized person who has failed to communicate (1995, 89). This approach will be most relevant 
to species of  hermeneutical injustice like isolation, ghettoization, exportation, and obstruction, in 
which subjects have access to relevant epistemic resources even though they have not gained uptake 




Because concept generation is such a hard project, we should expect that there will be 
concepts and resources that we create when we’re attempting to fill a lacuna in our existing 
hermeneutical resources will be continuously adjusted and redefined. Accordingly, we should 
manage our skepticism when such concepts are contested or their boundaries are expanded or 
contracted.  
 
For example, there have been many vocal critics of  the changing definitions of  sexual 
assault. The Ms. Magazine study inspired criticisms that accused feminists of  attempting to “redefine 
seduction as a form of  rape,” (Podhoretz, 1991) and suggested the expanded understanding had the 
ulterior motive of  “giv[ing] women a simple way of  thinking about sex that externalizes guilt, 
remorse or conflict” (Is Date Rape Fraud? 1990). One of  the most vocal critics of  Koss’ study, 
Katie Roiphe, famously objected to the finding that date rape was remarkably common by stating, 
“if  I was really standing in the middle of  an ‘epidemic,’ a ‘crisis,’ if  25 percent of  my female friends 
were really being reaped – wouldn’t I know it?” (1993). 
 
To cultivate good epistemic practices capable of  warding off  complicity in hermeneutical 
injustices, we might think that Roiphe and other critics should suspend her incredulousness in this 
case and consider seriously that such an epidemic could be a reality without their having been the 
wiser. Rather, if  those 25 percent of  her friends who are women lacked language and the conceptual 
tools necessary to render those experiences legible to themselves and others, it could be that the true 




Of  course, the options described above will not bring about the desired outcome of  better 
understanding in all cases. These strategies will be most effective in instances where some alternative 
hermeneutical resources have already been developed, though have not yet been taken up by the 
collective. However, there are circumstances where a hermeneutical injustice renders an experience 
invisible or uninterpretable to everyone, including the subjects themselves. Marginalized people are, 
of  course, themselves members of  the larger community and thus have access to many of  the same 
tools shared collectively with nonmembers. This may mean they themselves are unable to name or 
described phenomena that reside within a hermeneutical blind spot.  
 
Furthermore, the advice to listen more closely and believe more willingly also applies most 
clearly to individual listeners. Given the argument that hermeneutical injustices are the consequences 
of  systematic failings rather than individual shortcomings, we should also expect that this solution 
will not go far enough to bring about hermeneutical justice.  
 
It should also be noted be that the changing bounds of  concepts like sexual assault may be 
overextended. A common criticism is that what sexual assault is – how it is defined and what 
“counts” - keeps expanding. Critics suggest that this somehow introduces a question of  legitimacy 
about whether or not there really is a “there” there, or whether or not people are taking advantage 
of  work being done to highlight the existence of  a certain kind of  victimhood. The conceptual 
expansion is rather evidence of  a culture of  victims.  
 
To suggest that listeners manage their skepticism when people who are likely to be subjects 
of  hermeneutical injustices attempt to change what has been collectively accepted is not to say that 
concepts can’t be overextended; this isn’t to say that there isn’t a truth of  whether or not we 
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sometimes push the boundaries a bit too far. Rather it is a note that we should expect conceptual 
boundaries to ebb and flow, to expand and contract, as we try to get at the truth of  our concepts 
and how to define them. We should expect that we’ll need to adjust meanings and definitions as we 
work to find concepts that ring true to the experiences of  the people that were attempting to better 
understand or the people who are attempting to make themselves more legible to themselves and to 
others.  
 
3.2 Consciousness Raising 
 
All I can say is that 1 hour spent with a victim who has been locked in a brothel for years, locked in a home or locked 
in a factory will make a bigger impression than hours of  reports. – Representative John R. Miller, Combating 
Human Trafficking: Achieving Zero Tolerance, 2005 
 
If  we believe many people lack a collective understanding of  some sort of  harm or injustice, 
but would adjust their concepts and beliefs if  shown the error of  their ways, then improving 
collecting understanding through storytelling seems like a promising approach to unveiling epistemic 
wrongs. Such initiatives involve the use of  stories to raise awareness - with those stories often being 
shockingly sad, unfair, or otherwise upsetting - told by sympathetic subjects.  
 
In addition to being an effective strategy for improving collective understanding, storytelling 
is an opportunity for those who have been silenced to be heard. When subjects describe their own 





Communicating one’s experiences of  trauma can open eyes, hearts, and minds and can 
influence those in power to see things differently and extend more compassionate or charitable 
treatment toward those they - as a result of  those stories - come to see as victims. Successfully telling 
one’s story can lead to greater access to resources and recognition (Corrigan and Shdaimah, 2016). 
Thus, storytelling can be a way to bring about systemic change, as well as a way to help realize 
beneficial outcomes in individual circumstances, too. Some victims also report that storytelling is an 
important part of  their healing process. Barbara Amaya, a survivor of  trafficking, shares that telling 
her story and advocating for changes in laws and responses to victims has helped her take her life 
back (2015).  
 
Of  course, storytelling requires that the storyteller has the relevant hermeneutical resources 
to make sense of  their experiences, and they must be able to render those experiences intelligible for 
listeners. Therefore, storytelling will not be a tool available for improving collective understanding in 
circumstances of  effacement, separation, or exclusion, as those all entail that a subject does not have 
the necessary hermeneutical resources for understanding their experiences. We may expect that 
storytelling is most likely to be effective in cases of  exportation and obstruction, where 
hermeneutical resource are available for subjects and some members of  other social groups.  
 
Consciousness raising efforts play an important role in influencing policymaking. Stories are 
often shared at Congressional hearings. At the start of  a Congressional hearing about human 
trafficking that was held in 2010, numerous speakers highlighted the role a documentary on child sex 
trafficking, ‘Playground,’ played in raising their awareness and concern about the exploitation of  
American children (In Our Own Backyard: Child Prostitution and Sex Trafficking in the United 
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States, 2010). A number of  members of  congress have indicated that “they become interested in 
trafficking only after hearing a particular victim’s testimony” (Weitzer, 2007, 463). 
 
As Rutherford notes, storytelling is “a prominent strategy of  the anti-rape movement,” as it 
lets “the voices of  victims/survivors speak for themselves” (2017, 105). In fact, one of  the earliest 
moments in the anti-rape movement can be traced back to the 1860s, when a group of  black women 
testified to Congress about assaults committed against them during the Memphis Riots (Memphis 
Riots and Massacres, 1866). Speak-outs during the 1970s were an essential tool for bringing about 
changes in collective understanding and lobbying for greater legal protections. 
 
The tremendous popularity of  the #MeToo movement came about as a request that people 
who had experiences of  sexual assault post a hashtag on social media to both let other victims know 
they were not alone and to raise awareness about the pervasiveness of  the problem. In an attempt to 
prevent the confirmation of  Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court of  the United States of  
America in 2018, many survivors of  sexual assault gathered in Washington to share their stories, 
confront lawmakers, and attempt to get those who may otherwise be reluctant to hear their stories 
and acknowledge their existence. Some victims gathered on Capitol Hill to talk about their 
experiences of  violation and assault. The importance of  storytelling as a method of  collective 
awareness raising is highlighted by the practice adopted by some of  these protesters in which one 
victim would tell the story of  their assault, while the others in the group would loudly repeat the 
story line for line, amplifying the volume and hopefully resonance of  the story. Images of  Ana Maria 
Archilla and Maria Gallagher demanding that Senator Jeff  Flake acknowledge them captured a 
powerful moment of  shared experience and shared pain. Online, another hashtag was used to shed 
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light on the reasons why someone who has been assaulted might not go to the police. 
#WhyIDidntReport was used in hundreds of  thousands of  tweets in a matter of  days.  
 
When Katie Koestner was raped in 1990 in her dorm room by someone she had been 
romantically interested in, the term ‘date rape’ had not yet made its way into common parlance. 
Though some researchers and advocates were aware of  the frequency with which sexual assaults 
were perpetrated during dates and by acquaintances of  victims - evidenced by the study conducted 
by Kloss and reported by Mrs. Magazine and Warshaw’s 1988 publication - the collective had not yet 
come to possess that information or the interpretive tools necessary to make sense of  the 
experiences of  victims of  such sexual assaults. While the words “date and acquaintance rape” appear 
on the cover of  Warshaw’s book, Koestner’s use of  the term “date rape” in 1990 and 1991 is 
sometimes credited with bringing widespread awareness to the language.  
 
It may be that prior to this widespread recognition that a hermeneutical injustice prevented 
collective understanding of  the experience of  acquaintance rape. If  that is the case, then that may be 
best described as a case of  obstruction (the subject, some members of  the subject’s social group, 
and members of  another social group possess the hermeneutical resources required for 
understanding, but the collective does not). However, it may also be a case of  contributory injustice. 
It may be that those who continued to deny the possibility of  date rape, blamed Koestner for her 
purported responsibility for the sexual encounter, and felt her rapist should not be held accountable 
could have made use of  hermeneutical resources that were available to them. Distinguishing 
between cases of  obstruction and cases of  contributory injustice will be challenging, largely because 
the difference is one of  whether those who are ignorant have done their due diligence to be able to 
understand the experiences of  the oppressed. I do not know if  the reporters, school administrators, 
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law enforcement representatives, and members of  the general public who were initially incredulous 
when Koestner shared her story had access to but refused to implement the hermeneutical resources 
that would have permitted them to understand her experience.  
 
It is not always possible to tell if  any particular effort to improve collective understanding 
has been especially successful, but in Koestner’s case there is good reason to believe her storytelling 
had a significant impact, helping to usher previously siloed hermeneutical resources more broadly 
into collective understanding. Her experience, her willingness to share it, and undoubtedly her 
presentation as a sympathetic victim made an impression on many people and likely factored into 
subsequent changes in how colleges responded to sexual assault allegations. Koestner achieved a sort 
of  celebrity, repeatedly describing her traumatic experience and the aftermath of  it on platforms like 
The Oprah Show, Larry King Live, BBC, and in an HBO mini-series episode. In 1991, she appeared on 
the cover of  Time Magazine. According to Koestner’s website, she has given over 16,000 speeches, 
and in those presentations she continues to use storytelling as a tool to do the work of  raising 
awareness. She regularly speaks on campuses and is the executive director of  Take Back the Night. 
 
We should be concerned about storytelling as a means for improve collective understanding 
for a number of  reasons. Consciousness raising through storytelling requires a substantial emotional 
and psychological investment on the part of  the speakers. Such story-centered collective awareness 
raising efforts also require subjects to discuss some of  the more difficult and traumatizing aspects of  
their lives, and sometimes these disclosures are received incredulously by listeners. In the next 
chapter, I will discuss possible epistemic harms that may occur when speakers tell their stories. 
 




Improving collective understanding can be exhausting and even dangerous work. To 
demonstrate this, consider barriers that victims of  sex trafficking might face when trying to improve 
collective understanding of  their experiences. One impediment to survivor-led advocacy is that 
many victims of  sex trafficking and sex workers do not feel free to express themselves publicly. By 
telling their stories or expressing their views, they put themselves at risk of  violence (from 
traffickers, buyers, and others), judgment (given the taboo nature of  sex work), and legal 
repercussions (deportation and arrest are very real threats). Those most impacted by commercial 
sexual exploitation may also be limited in their ability to communicate about their experiences 
because of  language and economic barriers. To attend rallies and speak outs, to write articles and 
create organizations, to circulate petitions and protest legislation all require some investment of  
time, energy, and often money. In the words of  Kate Zen, cofounder and interim director or the 
migrant sex worker advocacy group Red Canary Song, “representation is very difficult to achieve 
given the systemic barriers of  race, class, language, immigration status” (Song, 2019). 
 
Because of  the significant toll that work to improve collective understanding can take on 
those who endeavor to achieve that end, there are times when it is more appropriate for the work to 
be done by people who are not themselves subject to the experiences that awareness is being raised 
about. In other words, because outsiders have less at risk, sometimes they must take responsibility 
for doing the difficult work.  
 
What I will call consciousness raising from the outside occurs when allies attempt to 
improve understanding of  the experiences of  epistemically marginalized people. Because of  their 
relative social privilege, it is less likely that outsider allies will be exploited, ignored, silenced, or 
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disbelieved. Thus, consciousness raising involves allies leveraging their testimonial credibility to 
improve awareness about hermeneutical lacunas and to address other epistemic harms committed 
against others.  
 
Some consciousness raising efforts include ad campaigns, social media campaigns, and 
documentaries. These also now include digital storytelling in the form of  apps or video games 
(O’Brien and Berents 2019). Digital games hold the promise of  being able to tell more nuanced and 
complex stories than ad campaigns, but still have the effect of  distancing game players from the 
experiences and people that are simulated. Kim Dempster, creator of  an ad campaign called Stop 
the Nightmare, is an outsider who has attempted to use her marketing skills to improve collective 
understanding about human trafficking (2014). Another activist, Jessica Minhas, explains that after 
being introduced to the reality of  trafficking, she was compelled to “use her voice on behalf  of  the 
voiceless” (2013). 
 
Some social workers and service providers see themselves as responsible for speaking on 
behalf  of  survivors. A social services program director interviewed by Peters states “I think 
[advocacy is] a really important role because we are the… closest thing that comes to the survivor’s 
voice…” (2010, 106). Because of  their first-hand experience working directly with victims, Peters 
describes services providers as a possible “conduit to survivor experience.” (2010, 235). 
 
Social scientists may play an active role in improving collective understanding. For example, 
Koss’ study of  acquaintance rape among college students had notable consequences. The 
information collected, interpreted, and reported by Koss played a key role in the passage of  the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of  1994 (Rutherford 2017, 101). The influence of  the study 
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is demonstrated by the Act’s requirement that all colleges and universities receiving federal aid report 
sexual assault statistics.  
 
Rutherford’s work notably recasts the role of  social scientists like Koss not as mere talliers 
of  a phenomenon, but as playing an important role “in actually realizing new ontological, social and 
political realities” (2017, 102).  The question of  construction versus discovery is an important and 
interesting one, though one that unfortunately is beyond the scope of  what I can address here. But I 
do think that if  we consider realization as a key stage in the process of  hermeneutical resistance - as 
a part of  the engineering/re-engineering and dissemination of  new hermeneutical resources - then 
we can understand Rutherford as suggesting social scientists like Koss contribute to the 
identification of  hermeneutical lacunas and take steps toward addressing them. Rutherford describes 
Koss’ work as using accepted scientific and methodical practices to render “a particular experience 
as ontologically and politically legible, and therefore significant for policy-makers and other 
stakeholders” (2017, 102). By rendering legible what was previously inscrutable, the study has 
facilitated understanding not only for outsiders, but for insiders, too.   
 
Furthermore, Rutherford argues that the methods used by Koss and others have not merely 
lifted the curtain to reveal an epistemological entity - a concept or conceptual tool - that has been 
there all along. Those methods are not “transparent measuring instrument[s],” but rather they 
contribute to an ongoing creation of  reality. This is importantly distinct from the claim that Koss’ 
work “conjured up a phenomenon that did not previously exist,” which has been a frequent criticism 
by those who believe sexual assault statistics grossly misrepresent the frequency of  sexual violence. 
According to Rutherford, social scientists studying sexual assault are not making up experiences that 
were not there before, but they are playing an active role in the development of  hermeneutical 
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resources for making sense of  those experiences. According to Rutherford, “the concept of  
date/acquaintance rape was realized through a method, and an examination of  its scientific, public 
and political trajectories shows how tightly enmeshed the very legibility of  the phenomenon remains 
with the method that has realized it” (Rutherford, 102-103).   
 
Of  course, when outsiders take on the mantle of  doing the work to engineer or disseminate 
hermeneutical resources, there are risks they will do so in ways that do not ultimately serve the 
interests of  those they advocate for. This work by outsiders may be endorsed by those they see 
themselves as representing, but they may also be self-appointed. The ideas they champion may or 
may not align with the ideas upheld by insiders. I will review some of  the harms that outsiders can 
cause when engaged in consciousness raising work in Chapter Four.  
 
3.3 Strategic Ignorance and Appropriating Dominant Meanings 
 
Bailey, in ‘Strategic Ignorance,’ writes about how cultures may be marked by dominant 
epistemologies that intentionally “see wrongly” (2007, 88). Bailey makes use of  the work of  Charles 
Mills to argue that dominant individuals in a society may endorse a factually incorrect way of  
viewing the world, since doing so makes the maintenance of  their dominant position easier. For 
example, white people in America may participate in a kind of  shared hallucination that tells them 
that there was a prior time in American history where everything was good for hardworking, middle 
class, white Americans (2007, 80). Along with seeing things that are not there, a dominant 
epistemology may ignore parts of  reality that do not mesh well with beliefs that are convenient for 




Citing Mills and Lugones, Bailey also discusses ways that oppressed people in a society may 
make use of  these dominant epistemologies, fictional as they are, to resist their oppression. Because 
this method of  resistance requires behaving as if  one believes something that is not true, Bailey calls 
it strategic ignorance. One way to be strategically ignorant is to pretend not to be as smart or capable 
as one is. Bailey cites a study by Robin Kelly that found that Southern black laborers would act in 
ways that fit stereotypes about blackness: slowing their work, breaking things, and feigning illiteracy. 
While pretending to be exactly what their oppressors expected them to be, they managed to organize 
and share civil rights literature with less notice than they would have drawn had they challenged 
those stereotypes in front of  their employers (2007, 88). Because their dominantly-situated 
employers did not understand the truth about the people they employed, they were susceptible to 
being duped. Meanwhile, black laborers were able to covertly develop hermeneutical resources, 
which they wanted to conceal as oppositional secrets. Bailey notes that this strategy takes a 
psychological toll on the subject, who must carefully mask their true self  and in ways that are likely 
uncomfortable and upsetting. Furthermore, strategically ignorant subjects cannot afford to be truly 
ignorant. They need to remain aware of  the dominant meanings and how they are being received by 
those dominant actors (2007, 89).  
 
Strategic ignorance is a form of  hermeneutical resistance because it allows marginalized 
people to avoid some of  the harmful effects of  being misunderstood. It provides space for 
hermeneutical dissent and for engineering and re-engineering better concepts. It keeps those 
concepts hidden when hiding them is prudent to avoid hijacking or appropriation. And while 
mistaken epistemologies are widespread, it can help victims protect themselves from the practical 
and epistemic harms that epistemic injustices can cause. It allows victims to avoid confrontations 




While some victims may strategically emphasize sympathy-eliciting aspects of  their 
victimhood, it is also possible that people who are not victims of  sex trafficking, for example, those 
who are willfully engaging in sex work or who have immigrated illegally but are not exploited, could 
present themselves as victims in order to access opportunities and resources available to victims. A 
number of  studies have found that many people involved in commercial sex who crossed borders 
were aware of  the nature of  work they would be doing. This runs counter to a narrative often 
espoused by abolitionists that highlights stories in which unsuspecting people, typically women, are 
tricked into migrating and are forced into sex work despite having been under the impression that 
they would work in a different industry. Doezema cites studies conducted in Australia, Ghana, the 
Dominican Republic, and Hungary to show that “women seeking to migrate are no so easily ‘duped’ 
or ‘deceived,’ and are often aware that most jobs on offer are in the sex industry” (1999, 33). Weitzer 
reviews reports from Cambodia and Holland, noting that in each study a small percentage (6 out of  
100 in Cambodia, and “few” of  72 in Holland) were defrauded or coercively trafficked. The others 
knew the work they were migrating to do would be sex work, and many had been involved in 
commercial sex before migrating (2007, 453). Reports of  how often women enter sex work after 
migrating may be unreliable because those who participate in those studies may misrepresent the 
kind of  work they were doing before migrating. This misrepresentation could be motivated by a 
desire to avoid legal trouble and to better conform to the expectations of  those who believe sex 
workers are in need of  rescue. Knowing that many people believe sex workers are helpless and in 
need of  rescue, some sex workers may use a strategy of  strategic ignorance and behave as if  this 






“There’s power in not telling your story.” - Tarana Burke, quoted in Wulfhorst, 2019 
 
I will explore two ways that epistemically marginalized people might epistemically engage to 
protect their well-being. The first involves disengaging from instances where attempting to 
understand would be harmful. The second involves disengaging from instances where attempting to 
improve collective understanding would be harmful.  
 
In Chapter One, I reviewed a number of  ways that individuals can be harmed or wronged as 
knowers. I argued that these epistemic harms occur when listeners are unfairly excluded from 
contributing to shared conceptual resources or from being able to meaningfully attempt to change 
the ideas and attitudes of  others. Both forms of  disengaging I introduce below involve subjects 
making a choice to remove themselves from certain intercommunal exchanges of  information and 
knowledge. Thus, one might object that someone who disengages is no longer subject to epistemic 
injustices of  the kind introduced in Chapter One. By choosing to remove themselves from the 
epistemic marketplace, the argument might go, it cannot be said that they have been excluded from 
that marketplace. 
 
However, this objection is mistaken. When a subject refuses to engage or even to understand 
another knower because understanding would require accepting ways of  seeing the world that would 
undermine their own epistemic agency or because they recognize listeners would contort or ignore 
their testimony, that subject engages in an act of  hermeneutical resistance. But they also suffer the 
epistemic injustice of  testimonial smothering. That a would-be speaker chooses not to respond 
when another attempts to compel them to provide an explanation of  their oppression does not 
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negate the fact that the request is epistemically exploitative. That a would-be speaker chooses not to 
express certain ideas around some people because they have good reason to believe their epistemic 
labor will be, at best, ignored or, at worst, used to cause them further harm, does nothing to nullify 
the fact that the would-be listener’s prejudiced attitudes have created an environment where the 
would-be speaker must undermine themselves in their capacity to provide knowledge to protect 
themselves from the ethically and epistemologically bad behavior of  the would-be listener. That a 
sub-group of  knowers are unwilling to share conceptual resources they have developed to protect 
themselves is not incompatible with it being the case that members of  that group are excluded from 
meaning-making practices, thus obscuring aspects of  their lives from collective understanding.  
Rather, as Pohlhaus Jr. notes, disengaging from others, especially more dominantly-situated knowers, 
may be necessary if  further engagement will result in those contributions being “distorted or 
misapprehended” (Pohlhaus Jr. 2017, 21), which could result in epistemic harms of  hermeneutical 
hijacking or epistemic appropriation.  
 
We must not confuse the steps that knowers may take to protect themselves from further 
harm with epistemic justice or an absence of  conditions that coerce a knower into silence. Even 
when silence is prudent, that does not mean victims are not harmed or wronged by being silenced. 
A subject can both choose to protect themselves by not speaking while also being harmed by the 
circumstances that have compelled them to remain silent. When disengaging occurs against 
background conditions of  epistemic oppression, then overall it would be in the would-be speaker’s 
interest to be able to be able to express themselves and be better understood. Conditions that make 
it imprudent to speak thereby disrespect and hermeneutically marginalize knowers, even if  those 




As Medina argues, hermeneutically marginalized people facing possible hermeneutical death 
have “a right (if  not a duty) to fight epistemically by any means necessary (including the right to lie 
to hide, to sabotage, to silence others, etc.), demonstrating loyalty and solidarity only with alternative 
epistemic communities (communities of  resistance)” (2017, 49). Disengaging is epistemically 
permissible when a speaker has good reason to believe that sharing testimony or hermeneutical 
resources would lead to either testimonial silencing (a lack of  response such that it is as if  the 
speaker said nothing at all) or worsened conditions for oppressed people (epistemic or otherwise).  
 
3.4.1 Strategic Refusals to Understand 
 
In “Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand,” Pohlhaus Jr. argues that 
sometimes when we ask someone to try to understand a certain line of  reasoning, we can thereby 
wrong that person. Understanding requires that one situate themselves within a conceptual 
framework and accept certain background conditions as being true (2011, 225). If  those background 
conditions render a subject unintelligible or require that they accept oppressive assumptions about 
themselves, then requests for understanding in those cases is harmful (2011, 231-32).  
 
To illustrate what it means to transition between conceptual framework, Pohlhaus Jr. 
explores what it would mean for someone or some group of  people to both be and not be capable 
of  playfulness. Pohlhaus Jr. argues that it might be the case that someone who is playful in many 
contexts cannot be said to be playful in other circumstances. This inability to be playful in certain 
contexts is not because they’re not physically capable of  engaging in the same kinds of  actions that 
would characterize playfulness in other contexts. Rather, it is because of  the social structure, in those 
other contexts, that playfulness is inhibited. Pohlhaus Jr. calls these different worlds. An individual 
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can occupy multiple worlds at once. Thus, we do not say something contradictory when we say that 
someone can both be playful and not. Instead, what we’re saying is that certain worlds permit that 
characterization, whereas others do not (2011, 231).  
 
If  a black woman is asked to understand why a white store owner might not answer a buzzer 
when she rings it in an attempt to enter their store, an example first introduced by Patricia Williams 
that Pohlhaus Jr. explores in the paper, then she is asked to try to adopt the kind of  beliefs - at least 
for a moment - that such a store owner would have to possess for their actions to make sense (2011, 
233). Such requests for understanding often happen in circumstances where we want to explain 
someone’s behavior without endorsing it. Often this kind of  rhetoric is followed by a plea that we 
cut the person, whose actions might have been wrong but are understandable from a particular 
vantage point, some slack. We also engage in this kind of  adaption of  other perspectives when 
where we are trying to develop ways to argue against particular conclusions and perspectives. To 
develop a persuasive counterargument, we may feel that we must adopt those background 
assumptions that our conversational opponent has assumed. 
 
As Pohlhaus Jr. points out, when we call upon someone to be understanding in such cases, 
we are compelling them to enter into a world that might actually be harmful for them and might 
undermine their ability to communicate important aspects of  their experience. Returning to the 
example introduced above, by asking the black woman who’s attempting to enter the store that she’s 
being kept out of  to try to understand the perspective of  the shop owner, we ask her to occupy a 
world in which her own testimony is rendered non-credible. We are asking her to enter a world in 
which her own existence is in some way suspect, because that is a world in which the shop owner 




To engage someone in a good faith argument requires accepting that both parties are in 
agreement about certain logical moves and endorse some common premises, thereby conceding a 
great deal about the shared logical space in which the argument takes place. And in some cases, it 
might not be in the best interest of  hermeneutically marginalized person to agree to those logical 
moves, and thus not in their best interest to engage in that argument. Thus, resistance, in such cases, 
may manifest as a refusal to engage with an argument or line of  reasoning.  
 
While storytelling is one way of  trying to improve that which is not understood, it comes at 
a cost. I want to note here that refusing to engage in such disclosures is a way that victims and other 
hermeneutically marginalized people may choose to protect themselves. Refusal to engage is a way to 
resist some of  the epistemic harms I review in the next chapter, like hermeneutical hijacking and 
epistemic appropriation. It is a way to reject the demand that one convince others of  their 
oppression, which is what occurs in cases of  epistemic exploitation. It is a way to protect 
oppositional secrets and refrain from contributing to prescriptive and constrictive narratives. It is a 
way to resist having to accept dominant ways of  seeing that might invalidate the speaker’s own 
authority. As Tarana Burke stated at Women Deliver in 2019, “There’s power in not telling your 
story” (Wulfhorst, 2019). 
 
A sort of  disengaging was exercised by sex workers during negotiations and advocacy to 
inform the articulation of  the definition of  trafficking in the Palermo Protocol and TVPA. In 
Doezema’s words, “Paradoxically, the best way of  protecting sex workers rights in the debate on 
defining trafficking was through making sex workers invisible” (2005, 78). Sex workers strategically 
tried to make both their presence invisible in the work and to make sure mention of  sex work did 
 
119 
not appear in the law. If  prostitution was mentioned by the laws, then it would be further cemented 
as tied to trafficking. Exclusion of  prostitution and sex work would leave conceptual space between 
the two. 
 
Some anti-trafficking advocates have also reported feeling that engaging the abolitionists on 
their descriptions of  trafficking involves participating in conversations that distort reality and require 
that they make use of  distinctions and relations that they reject. Peters describes a conversation she 
had with a director of  a social services program that she calls Charlotte, wherein Charlotte remarks 
on the frustration of  trying to engage abolitionists on the issue of  whether labor and sex trafficking 
are distinct kinds, saying, “I don’t like talking about sex trafficking versus labor trafficking, because 
to me it’s all trafficking.” But because abolitionists have been relatively successful in controlling 
conversations about trafficking, resistance of  that idea is perceived as necessary. It requires using a 
distinction that people like Charlotte see as false. In trying to convince others that labor trafficking 
can be as horrendous as sex trafficking, arguing that there are not meaningful differences between 
the two kinds (though there can be meaningful differences in the experiences of  victims), and thus 
there truly is a single kind, Charlotte finds herself  frustrated by her own points. She highlights how 
traumatic labor trafficking can be, and how sexually assault can be a part of  labor trafficking. 
Contrastingly, she notes that some sex trafficking victims sometimes have more freedom of  
movement and outside resources when compared to someone labor trafficked in a domestic setting, 
for example. But she catches herself, adding “But then again, that’s leading into their saying one is 
more horrible that the other” (Peters 2010, 106-9). 
 




There may be instances in which marginalized people are not interested in outsiders having a 
greater understanding of  their lives and experiences or some facet of  their lives and experiences. 
They may choose to disengage from efforts to improve collective understanding about particular 
aspects of  their experiences, and instead develop information intended for insiders only. This 
shared, insider information may constitute an oppositional secret. This secrecy may involve the 
development of  “covert network to escape or mitigate oppression,” or may manifest as a sort of  
strategic appropriation of  dominant meanings or a “politically central identity” (Hundleby 2005, 47).  
 
For example, in communities where homosexuality is not accepted, it may be that some 
people will choose to try to pass as straight in order to avoid discrimination. They may date or marry 
partners of  the opposite sex, dress according to gendered expectations, and engage in other 
behaviors to obscure their sexual orientation. It may also be the case that there are signals or covert 
ways of  communication shared by people within the gay community that enable them to identify 
one other. They may form spaces in which they can feel comfortable expressing their sexualities. In 
such a case, the experiences of  gay people in this community is not understood by the collective 
community. We can imagine that even attempts to express certain parts of  that experience to 
outsiders would fail, as those experiences are rendering unintelligible. These ways of  being and 
communicating with insiders constitute oppositional secrets. These secrets provide group members 
with tools for sustaining and protecting themselves and can be instrumental in building resistance to 
the status quo. Ideally, such secrets would eventually become needless as homosexuality became 
socially acceptable. However, if  they are revealed too early, they may invite increased scrutiny and 




Sex work can be extremely dangerous, but people engaged in sex work, either coercively or 
by their own volition, have sometimes found ways to mitigate the risks they face. One way that some 
people involved in commercial sex have been able to protect themselves is by using the Internet to 
advertise their services, set up meetings, and exchange payments. Sex workers have also used the 
Internet to communicate with one another about clients who are abusive, also known as “bad date 
lists.” In response to the introduction of  the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers (SESTA) and Allow 
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking (FOSTA) Acts, some people involved in sex work 
report that they are attempting to make online posting about their work even more covert. These 
insider-generated and protected trade secrets may be thought of  as oppositional secrets. 
 
We may wonder whether, when oppositional secrets are intentionally blocked from collective 
understanding, the marginalized person is in fact a victim of  a hermeneutical injustice. In order to 
experience a hermeneutical injustice, one must be excluded from the generation of  epistemic 
resources that are in one’s interest to be created and collectively employed. If  one is intentionally 
keeping resources to oneself, then one is not being excluded from, but opting out of, the epistemic 
marketplace (Fricker 2007, 153). In some ways, the fact that the marginalized group is keeping 
secrets that they could share seems to inflict an epistemic harm on the larger community. 
 
Broader understanding of  oppositional secrets does not bring about epistemic justice if  the 
marginalized people using them are not able to contribute more generally to meaning-making 
practices. Overall levels of  understanding may be temporarily improved, but the marginalized people 
are not better off  because of  it. They are no less hermeneutically marginalized. And as Hundleby 
observes, part of  the value of  hermeneutical justice is that the underdeveloped understandings must 
be of  benefit to the people who are being oppressed. Greater collective understanding of  this secret 
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information may even be used to harm subjects, as the relevant concepts could be hermeneutically 
hijacked or epistemically appropriated. Secrets can be a way for marginalized people to protect 
themselves from physical harm, exploitation, and further epistemic wrongs.  
 
Davis, acknowledging that not all hermeneutical resources are part of  the collective 
hermeneutical resources, notes that resources can be shared in a number of  ways: accidentally, 
mutually, forcefully, or through acts of  resistance (2018, 703). Accidental sharing of  resources occurs 
naturally when people from different communities mingle with one another. Mutual sharing occurs 
when members of  different communities make an intentional and explicit attempt to better 
understand one another. Forceful sharing occurs when a members of  a powerful group strong-arm 
others into sharing information and interpretive tools. Forceful extraction of  intracommunal 
resources may result in the divulging of  oppositional secrets. Forceful extraction also jeopardizes the 
viability strategic ignorance as a strategy of  resistance and dissent. 
 
An advocate, interested in addressing an epistemic lacuna and improving collective 
understanding of  the marginalized group, may attempt to raise collective consciousness of  those 
experiences. In doing so, they may disclose insider information that the group would prefer to keep 
to themselves. Both insiders and outsiders may reveal oppositional secrets either with or without 
knowledge that at least some of  the insiders of  that group do not want greater collective 
understanding of  the experience at issue. In some cases, someone who is trusted and permitted into 
spaces where oppressed people feel comfortable and safe could become privy to and subsequently 
disclose oppositional secrets. Accordingly, allies engaged in consciousness raising should be wary of  
accidentally revealing oppositional secrets. Even with good intentions and when motivated by the 
aim of  revealing hermeneutical blind spots, secret revelation can occur. Hundleby argues that if  the 
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further one is from the content of  a secret, the less authority one has to reveal it. In other words, the 
less the secret has to do with you, the more likely it is that you shouldn’t share it. But she also 
contends that one should refrain from personally seeking more information about the secret, while 
acknowledging the hardship this imposes. If  one is in a position to investigate something, then one 
likely does not yet know if  what one is investigating is an oppositional secret. Part of  finding out 
whether something is a secret used to gain power and fight oppression is uncovering the secret itself  
(Hundleby 2005, 50). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PITFALLS 
 
When I began this project, my intention was to use historical analyses of  advocacy movements 
that have aimed to raise awareness about sexual violence to demonstrate the existence and 
persistence of  epistemic injustices for victims of  those kinds of  experiences. Initially, I took largely 
for granted the accuracy of  the definitions used by and assertions made by advocates engaged in 
such work. Much of  my initial perspective was informed by my own experiences working with a 
survivor support organization that connects with victims in hospital emergency departments, 
courtrooms, and through referrals from the likes of  social workers, lawyers, doctors, and detectives. 
In that work, particularly as it pertained to sex trafficking, I frequently heard statements like “most 
victims don’t know they are victims,” and these assertions were uncontested and treated as obviously 
true. In fact, it was such a statement made during a conference held by Womankind, a New York-
based nonprofit that serves survivors of  gender-based violence, in 2017 that led me to begin 
thinking of  the potential connections between human trafficking and epistemic injustice. 
 
However, as I began to seriously investigate the history of  both the anti-sex trafficking and anti-
sexual assault movements, it became clear that there are heated disagreements about who, in fact, 
knows what.  
 
In Chapter Two, I reviewed the legal definition of  trafficking, the position of  advocates who 
believe widespread myths and misunderstandings make trafficking invisible for insiders and outsiders 
alike, and some of  the harms that result from that poor understanding. In the first section of  this 
chapter, I will introduce some criticisms of  the ways some of  the most visible advocates have gone 
about defining and raising awareness about commercial sexual exploitation. Trafficking has been 
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defined in ways that are at odds with the views of  many sex workers willfully engaged in commercial 
sex, some self-identified trafficking victims, and others who identify as belonging to both groups at 
different times in their lives. Critics argue that distorted and unsupported statistics, 
misrepresentation in the media, and fearful language have contributed to a moral panic that raises 
serious questions about what trafficking is, who victims are, and who gets to say. Subsequently, I will 
consider how these criticisms raise serious questions about the veracity of  those definitions and, at 
times, suggest additional epistemic injustices have been committed by those advocates. The subjects 
of  those epistemic injustices may be the very people who advocates aim to support, or they may be 
other marginalized people, like sex workers. 
 
At the start of  this project, I thought that the hardest step in moving from theory to 
application would be attempting to identify the existence of  hermeneutical lacunas. This is, of  
course, incredibly challenging. But perhaps just as hard is coming to know when those lacunas have 
been filled. How to determine when we have the right epistemic resources and whether they are 
being produced and disseminated by the appropriate epistemic authorities will also prove to be a 
significant and ongoing challenge. 
 
In what follows, I will sometimes explore not only how anti-trafficking advocacy may 
epistemically harm victims of  sexual assault and commercial sexual exploitation, but also non-
exploited sex workers. This dissertation is about epistemic injustice and victims of  sexual violence, 
so I want to make it clear that by including sex workers in the discussion and identifying epistemic 
injustices they may face as byproducts of  anti-trafficking work, I do not mean to suggest sex 
workers are necessarily survivors of  sexual violence. I have chosen to refrain from endorsing any 
particular views about sex work, consent, and how to determine who is and is not exploited, but I 
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am committed to leaving open conceptual space for understanding that there may be people 
engaged in commercial sex who do so willfully and as the consequence of  rational deliberation of  
the options available to them. But whether sex workers are understood to be victims or not, it is 
undeniable that they are impacted by discussions of  sex trafficking. Because sex workers are so often 
treated with disregard and even outright contempt, they are often denied an active role in defining 
and explaining their experiences to outsiders. They are, regardless of  whether they are or are not 
victims of  sexual violence, relatively socially powerless. Thus, a discussion of  how anti-trafficking 
advocacy addresses and possibly perpetrates epistemic injustices must include consideration of  how 
sex workers may also be wronged as knowers.  
 
4.1 The Controversial History of  the Anti-Trafficking Movement 
 
Nothing I say in what follows, though at times critical of  the work of  and approaches taken 
by some advocates, should be taken as a denial of  the reality of  trafficking or a skepticism about the 
severity of  trafficking when and for whom it occurs. Victims are physically and psychologically 
harmed in ways that cannot be captured in words, though many courageous and resilient victims 
have shared their stories in an effort to improve collective understanding of  their experiences and 
the conditions and events that led to their exploitation. 
 
While many of  the most visible activists involved in raising awareness of  sex trafficking are 
largely in agreement about how to define the problem, this threatens to obscure the fact that there 
are serious and important disagreements about who is trafficked and what should be done about it. 
Peters notes that the belief  that trafficking is awful is widely shared, but also acknowledges that what 
counts as trafficking has proved to be a divisive question. Some critics have argued that the 
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presentation of  trafficking by some of  the most visible advocates is misleading. In Ronald Weitzer’s 
words “[w]hile no one would claim that sex trafficking is fictional, many of  the claims made about it 
are wholly unsubstantiated” (2012, 1337). 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two opposing camps in the anti-trafficking world: the rights-
based movement (also known as the liberal feminist coalition, mainstream feminists [Weitzer, 2007], 
or autonomy feminists [Schwarz, Kennedy, and Britton, 2017]) and the abolitionist movement (also 
known as the left/right coalition or the neo-abolitionist movement [Doezema, 1999], or the anti-
prostitution feminists [Peters 2010 citing Stolz]). Alternatively, Weitzer describes those who see all 
commercial sex as “institutionalized subordination of  women” as endorsing the oppression 
paradigm, while those who believe that there are many ways that someone might engage in 
commercial sex, with some involving subordination and others realizing other kinds of  power 
dynamics, endorse the polymorphous paradigm (2012, 1338).   
 
Activists in both camps see human trafficking as a real and devastating problem and believe 
that victims are under recognized and under supported. However, the rights-based movement tends 
to view sex trafficking as a species of  labor trafficking and distinguishes between sex trafficking and 
sex work.16 The abolitionist movement is marked by a tendency to view all sex work as inherently 
                                                          
16 GAATW is a strong representative of the rights-based movement. Doezema says of 
GAATW that “their vision on trafficking and consent… inspired by the global sex worker rights 
movement, GAATW sees prostitution as labour” (2005, 68). 
 
It is not always clear if the claim that sex work and sex trafficking are distinct is empirical or 
theoretical. Schwarz, Kennedy, and Britton state that autonomy feminists “believe that most sex 
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exploitative and directly tied to trafficking.17  A number of  influential organizations like the Coalition 
Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) and Standing Against Global Exploitation (SAGE) have 
endorsed an abolitionist approach and adopted the oppression paradigm. Then co-director of  
CATW, Dorchen Leidholdt, wrote in 2000 that “prostitution, sex trafficking, and related practices 
are, in fact, forms of  sexual violence that leave women and children physically and psychologically 
devastated” (2000, 1). 
 
When the TVPA and the Palermo Protocol were being debated and developed, abolitionists 
wanted it to be stated that “recruitment, transportation within or across borders, sale, transfer, 
receipt or harboring of  a person for the purposes of  prostitution, sexual exploitation, exploiting the 
marriage of  such a person, exploited labor, or slavery-like practices with or without the consent of  
victims” (CATW 1999, emphasis mine, quoted by Doezema 2005, 72). Whether or not to call sex 
trafficking out as distinct from other forms of  labor trafficking was also central to many hearings 
and debates held at the time of  the development of  the law. Abolitionists felt strongly that sex 
trafficking should be noted as a separate category because they felt that form of  exploitation “is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
workers actively choose this employment” (2017, 17). Alternatively, one might think that many or 
even most people involved in commercial sex are exploited, but that conceptually there can be and 
at least sometimes actually is a distinction. 
17 The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) is a strong representative of the 
abolitionist movement.  
 
Again, there is some ambiguity here, as there is a difference in saying all sex work is 
inherently exploitative (and thus itself constitutes trafficking) or that the existence of a commercial 
sex industry leads to conditions in which trafficking can be sustained. 
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uniquely vile, uniquely brutal, and cries out for its own comprehensive solution” (Representative 
Smith in the Markup of  the Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act, quoted by Peters 2010, 47-48). 
 
Rights-based advocates wanted sex work and sexual exploitation to be left out of  the 
definition entirely. Rather, they advocated for a single definition that would encompass both sex and 
labor trafficking. They felt commercial sexual exploitation should not be singled out as a distinct 
kind of  trafficking, as they felt sexual exploitation was one of  many forms of  exploitation and that 
common causes of  all kinds of  trafficking could and should be sought. A previous bill - the 
International Trafficking of  Women and Children Victim Protection Act of  1999 - did not 
distinguish between sex and labor trafficking, and did not include general and severe definition 
distinction. This bill did not make it out of  committee. 
 
The wording of  the definition of  trafficking presented in the TVPA and Palermo Protocol 
was intended to be a compromise between the two parties. As it became clear that if  no such 
compromise was reached, there was concern the entire project of  introducing national and 
international language to define trafficking - an end both sides wanted to bring about - would be 
jeopardized (Peters 2010, 39). As Doezema notes, during these discussions, both sides took 
themselves to “speak the truth about trafficking, and by extension, about the meaning of  
prostitution” (2005, 72). While the TVPA does define trafficking as any act that abets commercial 
sex and distinguishes between sex and labor trafficking, only instances that involve force, fraud, or 
coercion are designated as “severe” and punishable (Grant, 2018). 
 
Notably, the unlikely alliance between conservatives and some feminists that produced the 
left/right coalition was also reflected during the “white slavery” panic of  the early 20th century. 
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Social purists, intent on reforming behavior generally, found support from some feminist sects, 
particularly Butlerite feminists, who believed legal sex work helped sustain the trafficking of  women 
(Doezema 1999, 27, citing Coote, Walkowitz, and Gibson). And as has been the case in the modern 
era, purists and their allies were criticized by other feminists who felt the alliance “provided arms 
and ammunition for the enemy of  women’s emancipation” (Theresa Billington-Greig, quoted by 
Doezema 1999, 27). 
 
By and large, the modern-day abolitionist movement has been more successful in spreading 
its message.  Influential abolitionists have been the face of  the anti-trafficking movement before 
Congress, on task forces, and on big and small screens. In doing so, abolitionists have made 
significant strides toward bringing their conceptions of  trafficking into the realm of  collective 
understanding. The National Security Directive 22 (NSPD-22) is evidence of  the relative success of  
the abolitionist approach. Signed by George W. Bush, this directive asserted that the United States 
officially takes an abolitionist approach toward sex work and sees sex works as “contributing to the 
phenomenon of  trafficking in persons.” In 2003, Bush also included a conscience clause in the 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief  (PEPFAR), requiring that any organizations receiving 
aid through the plan explicitly denounce prostitution. While the Supreme Court found this 
requirement unconstitutional in 2013, organizations outside the United States that receive aid are still 
required to adopt such a position.18  
 
Advocates often cite shockingly large numbers when describing the scale of  the problem of  
trafficking. And much of  the time when the problem is spoken or written about, it is described as an 
                                                          
18 The Supreme Court reached this decision in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for 
Open Society International, Inc. (2013). 
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epidemic, a rapidly growing but woefully under recognized threat. But critics have noted that many 
assertions about the scope of  trafficking and stories about the experiences of  victims are based on 
generalizations from too-small samples, highly speculative, and arguably cherry-picked. Some of  
these problematic statistics are consistently asserted in literature on and campaigns directed at raising 
awareness of  trafficking. After being repeated enough, these frequently cited numbers come to be 
treated accepted knowledge.  
 
For example, activists often state that the average age of  entry into prostitution is 12 years 
old (Bergquist, 315). Linda Smith states the average age is 12-14 in her TEDxPortland talk (2015), 
and Kanani Titchen says 15 in her TEDx talk (2017). In a 2010 special hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, Senator Durbin stated that approximately 100,000 
American children are trafficked each year, adding that the average age of  entry into sex work is 13 
(United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 2010, 2). But the Polaris Project, a leading 
organization in the fight against trafficking, reports these commonly cited figures are “not actually 
supported by any data” (2016). 
 
Because of  the covert nature of  trafficking, it is extremely difficult to estimate the number 
of  people who are affected. A review of  human trafficking literature published by the U.S. 
Department of  Health and Human Services notes that, “the data and methodologies for estimating 
the prevalence of  human trafficking globally and nationally are not well developed, and therefore 
estimates have varied widely and changed significantly over time” (Human Trafficking into and 
within the United States: A Review of  the Literature 2009, 4). The reliability of  the numbers cited 
when discussing human trafficking was questioned in a 2006 report by a Government Accountability 
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Office, acknowledging that there was not yet “an effective mechanism for estimating the number of  
victims” (quoted by Weitzer 2007, 456). 
 
As stated earlier in this dissertation, the first TVPA report to include estimates of  the scale 
of  both national and international trafficking stated that as many as 4 million people were trafficked 
transnationally and that 50,000 victims were trafficked in the United States. In the years since this 
2002 publication, the estimate of  how many people are trafficked nationally and internationally has 
dropped, and by the end of  the first decade of  the millennium, included only the vague claim that 
“thousands” of  people were trafficked each year. (See Weitzer’s tracking of  these numbers in 2007, 
462). Contrastingly, in the introduction to the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, Mike Pompeo 
stated that a staggering 24.9 million people “are robb[ed]… of  their freedom and basic dignity,” 
despite the report itself  dedicating significant attention to the difficulty of  tracking and reporting 
accurate numbers. Of  the databases cited in the report, the greatest number of  recorded cases is 
91,416, which reflects the transnational number of  cases included in the IOM Counter Trafficking 
Data Collaborative (CTDC). 
 
Because the prevalence of  trafficking has not been tracked in the past, we cannot compare 
current rates to some prior baseline (Weitzer 2012, 1348). However, neither that nor the dipping 
figures cited in annual Trafficking in Person’s Reports has stopped abolitionists from describing 
trafficking as a rapidly expanding epidemic.  
 
The fact that prosecutors report that they were trying cases that today would be considered 
criminal even before the passage of  the TVPA also provides evidence that the problem is not new, 
despite renewed attention and ways of  speaking. A federal prosecutor stated to Peters during an 
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interview that “[w]e’ve been doing trafficking cases since before the enactment of  the TVPA; we just 





Now that I have introduced various approaches to epistemic resistance and rebellion, I will 
review various pitfalls of  consciousness raising, a form of  epistemic rebellion frequently used by 
activists and movements to improve collective understanding of  the experiences of  marginalized 
people. These pitfalls are themselves epistemic harms and wrongs. I am referring to them as 
“pitfalls” to highlight their relationship to consciousness raising efforts, as I see them as sometimes 
threatening to undermine or, at the very least, complicate, efforts to bring about epistemic injustice. 
However, I do not mean to insinuate they are different in kind from the potential epistemic 
injustices highlighted earlier in the project.  
 
 I will frequently refer to events, dynamics, and arguments related to activist work around the 
sexual assault and sex trafficking intervention movements to demonstrate how these pitfalls play out 
in real life. My ultimate goal is to contribute to a better understanding of  some of  the common 
dynamics that play out when efforts are made to improve collective understanding of  the 
experiences of  marginalized people. 
 
In particular, I will spend much of  this chapter exploring disagreements between two 
prominent factions of  the anti-trafficking movement. But I must note that I do not have the kind 
insight into the best way to define or describe sex trafficking that first-hand experience might 
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provide. I am not a survivor of  commercial sexual exploitation, and I do not feel any sense of  
certainty that I am in a position to contribute to available hermeneutical resources for understanding 
the experiences of  people who are. Therefore, I want to be careful not to suggest that the concepts 
advocated for by either group of  activists are clearly right or clearly wrong. Rather, my hope is to 
show that disagreements in the sex trafficking intervention activist movement highlight the ways that 
efforts to address epistemic lacunas could potentially lead to further epistemic harms. I believe many 
of  these points can be made without endorsing either the abolitionist or rights-based approaches to 
defining sex trafficking and distinguishing it from sex work, but instead by highlighting how the 
statements made by advocates with different views can be understood by applying the language and 
theoretical tools introduced in works on epistemic injustice.  
 
For this reason, I will do my best not to issue any verdicts of  losers or winners when 
considering the concepts, definitions, and resources put forth by activists and dissenters (both 
groups include insiders and outsiders). However, I also recognize that my comments are more 
critical of  the abolitionists. This is in large part because of  my perception that 1) more self-identified 
sex workers tend to stand in opposition of  the abolitionist approach to anti-trafficking work than 
support it, and 2) survivors and victims are more often centered as leaders in rights-based groups. 
As I acknowledge in this work, I believe it is possible for outsiders to possess hermeneutical tools 
that insiders may be lacking. However, situations in which this appears to be the case - situations 
where outsiders take themselves to be educating insiders about the nature of  their experiences - are 
rife with danger, since all of  the societal prejudices that led to the epistemic oppression faced by 
those subjects will make it difficult for them to resist or revise those attributions. That being said, 
there are many self-identified victims of  trafficking who support and lead abolitionist efforts. Their 
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voices are important, their epistemic labor and insights are valuable, and throughout my critique I 
will attempt to respect those perspectives. 
 
4.3 Epistemic Exploitation 
 
“We share and share and share. We offer up our experiences for mass consumption, hoping that maybe this will be the 
time we break through. But does any of  it make a difference?” - Lyz Lenz, 2019  
 
Epistemic exploitation occurs when marginalized people are compelled by those in 
dominantly-situated positions to offer an explanation of  their own oppression (Berenstain 2016, 
570). This labor is often unrecognized and uncompensated, despite being extremely costly. But 
importantly, oppressed people do not have a legitimate choice about whether or not to engage in 
this work, as they face a double bind. If  they do not engage, then they could be blamed for being 
complicit in their own oppression by not taking a more active role in re-educating others. When 
speaking up, there is a significant risk that marginalized people will not be granted due credibility, 
thereby being subjected to a subsequent testimonial injustice (Berenstain 2016, 576). Berenstain 
notes that after oppressed people provide the labor demanded of  them, presenting arguments 
demonstrating and evidence of  their marginalization, that work “rarely leads to actual institutional 
change” (2016, 574). Those in relative positions of  power may choose to ignore it or find it 
insufficient.  
 
Even when the person compelled to provide testimony about their experience is successful 
in communicating with the hearer or hearers and their testimony is given appropriate credibility, 
there are still costs associated. In particular, Berenstain describes the opportunity cost that occurs 
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when an oppressed person has been compelled to explain their oppression. Even when in doing so 
they transform the hearers understanding of  their experience, they still had to spend their time 
doing that instead of  something else. This can result in a kind of  busy work that keeps oppressed 
people caught up in activities and conversations related explaining their experiences and trying to 
explain to other people why those should be taken seriously.  
 
In her paper, Berenstain describes a situation in which Richardson is expected by her white 
peers to educate them about what it’s like to be a black woman. Further, she reports feeling that she 
is not allowed to complain or express frustration with those experiences unless she can offer some 
solution. She’s not permitted to simply have feelings of  frustration, sadness, and anger about her 
oppressive experiences, and she is saddled with the responsibility of  coming up with a positive 
solution to contribute to the conversation (2016, 577).  
 
It is important to note that, as defined, epistemic exploitation is a constitutive part of  efforts 
to improve collective understanding of  the experiences of  marginalized people if  those efforts 
involve the participation of  insiders. Berenstain herself  notes that epistemic exploitation “is 
common within… activist coalitions and alliances” (2016, 570). The hermeneutical resistance 
strategy of  storytelling places the burden of  improving collective understanding on the shoulders of  
those who have the most at risk, and this by its very nature is epistemic exploitation. Marginalized 
speakers risk not being heard, understood, or believed. Listeners may not give them due credibility (a 
testimonial injustice) or may be unable to understand them because of  a deficit of  interpretive tools 
(a hermeneutical injustice).  Even in the best circumstances, ones in which they’re heard and 
believed, there is an opportunity cost to be considered as well as the cost of  engaging in an 
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emotionally and sometimes physically taxing experience that can be upsetting or traumatizing. Too 
often this labor is under recognized and under compensated. 
 
Epistemic exploitation may occur in instances where it appears listeners are deferring to the 
authority of  marginalized knowers. But even when granted credibility, marginalized knowers may 
still be subject to epistemic objectification, treated as “mere sources of  information” or as subjects 
whose contributions are limited to those that relate to their marginalized status (Davis 2016, 488-89). 
Survivor-speakers may be invited to conferences or rallies to tell their stories, but could harmed and 
wronged if  they are treated as informants rather than full and genuine participants in the search for 
and generation of  knowledge. Medina argues that we may sometimes mistake regulated inclusion of  
marginalized speakers as unproblematic, but notes this is still problematic when they are not given 
“full and equal epistemic” involvement in the production of  knowledge. As Medina describes them, 
informants are not permitted to fully engage by “formulating hypotheses, probing and questioning, 
assessing and interpreting opinions, and so forth.” The relationship between a speaker and hearer 
when the speaker is treated as an informant is not fair, as it is neither reversible nor reciprocal (2012, 
204) 
 
When an insider is identified as a possible spokesperson for their group, there is tremendous 
pressure to present information about the experiences of  one’s group accurately and compellingly. 
This burden, the anxiety it may induce, and the lack of  recognition of  what is being demanded 
means that even when speakers are granted significant credibility, they may be epistemically 
exploited (Davis 2016, 492).  
 




While there may be many ways to assess the effectiveness of  storytelling, one indication of  
success is when a listener’s attitudes are changed or when a listener comes to treat a speaker as an 
appropriate epistemic authority. But even when effective, storytelling brings with it potential costs 
and harms.   
 
Consider again the lifetime commitment Katie Koestner has made to raising awareness of  
the prevalence and harm of  acquaintance rape. Many would argue, and I believe Koestner herself  
would say, that her efforts to improve understanding have been relatively successful. While her first 
attempts to get outsiders to understand her experience were met with incredulity, she is now a 
“sought-after exper[t] on student safety and healthy relationships” (Koestner Biography, 2020).  
Collective attitudes about sexual assault have changed since Koestner’s rape in 1990, and her 
contributions to bringing about those changes are important. But they have also been costly. 
Koestner enrolled at the College of  William and Mary to study chemical engineering and Japanese. 
Her entire life changed in the aftermath of  her assault. The costs of  her epistemic labor or 
immeasurable, and she’s felt some responsibility to perform this labor in service to other victims, 
nothing that “every time I make myself  tell my story” there are tens more stories to be told, and that 
because of  a sense of  responsibility to other victims she “felt like I couldn’t stop” (Koestner, 2016). 
 
Anita Hill and Christine Blasey Ford told their stories very publicly, and while there are many 
who believe and support them, they faced significant risks in doing so. Both women saw their 
characters impugned by skeptics. Both women saw their alleged assailants confirmed to the Supreme 
Court, nonetheless. Both women will forever be tied to their victimhood. Being ignored or called a 
liar are not the only risks one faces when storytelling. People who share their experiences of  assault 
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risk being threatened or even physically harmed. Their reputations may be ruined; their professional 
and personal lives may be derailed.  
 
In her opening statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Blasey Ford stated “I am not 
here today because I want to be. I am terrified. I am here because I believe it is my civic duty to tell 
you what happened to me while Brett Kavanaugh and I were in high school” (U.S. Congress, 2018) 
Her deep reluctance to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee, but resolve to do so out of  a 
sense of  obligation, highlights just how exploitative it is to compel a person to turn their traumas 
inside out for public scrutiny in the hopes of  being believed.  
 
While telling her story in a TEDx talk, Casandra Diamond, a survivor of  commercial sexual 
exploitation, begins by saying she is partially holding cue cards to “help focus on her messages while 
at the same time shielding [her] from painful memories and intrusive thoughts” (2020). She notes 
that retelling her story retraumatizes her, but that she tells it in order to improve collective 
understanding and hopefully savings others from trafficking.  
 
Some anti-trafficking advocates have complained that when survivors are present in 
decision-making spaces (i.e., at conferences or on task forces), it is often to provide testimonials 
rather than to play a full role in decision making processes. Some sex workers have also expressed 
the feeling that they have been excluded from the process of  defining and legislating around sex 
trafficking only notionally. This in and of  itself  is an epistemic harm when speakers are 
hermeneutically marginalized because survivor speakers are put in the costly position of  having to 
provide testimony about the nature of  their oppression to an audience that may or may not believe 
them. Even if  they are believed, there are opportunity and psychological costs. If  the survivor-
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speaker is not made a fully participating member of  the task force or decision-making body, then 
they may also be harmed by being alienated from the outcome of  their testimony. 
 
In response to the outpouring of  survivor stories triggered by the popular #MeToo hashtag, 
movement creator Tarana Burke stated at a conference in 2019, that what she had witnessed was 
“the world trade on the labor of  survivors… they trot us out to tell these gory stories, and nobody 
takes into account what that does it us” (quoted by Wulfhorst, 2019). While the very idea of  
#MeToo was to raise awareness and create a sense of  solidarity by demonstrating the pervasiveness 
of  sexual assaulted, Burke’s statement also highlights the frustrating limits of  storytelling.  In a TED 
Talk, Burke states “[s]urvivors of  sexual violence are all at once being heard, and then vilified” 
(2018). Re-opening traumatic wounds to convince others that those experiences are real and worthy 
of  consideration is effortful, painful, and according to Burke, neither sufficient nor necessary for 
understanding. 
 
Epistemic Exploitation and the Expectation of  Storytelling 
 
Sometimes victims choose to tell their stories. They may do so enthusiastically, out of  a 
sense of  obligation, or with motivations that are somewhere in between. But other times, stories are 
demanded from them. The explicit or implicit threat may be that if  they do not cooperate by 
disclosing their traumas and victimhood, then they will not be given the support they need. 
According to interviews conducted by Corrigan and Shdaimah, divulging intimate information, 
including deeply personal traumas, is essentially required in order for “legal resources, recognition, 
and protection” to be made available (2016, 434). Peters cited Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) as 
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describing stories as a kind of  currency that victims have to exchange with listeners in order to gain 
access to services they need (like case management, federal benefits, housing) (2010, 18). 
 
Court diversion programs that work with people arrested for prostitution-related offenses 
often encourage defendants “to tell their stories, offer compelling explanations of  their behavior, 
and emerge as full and complex human beings” (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016,434). According to 
Corrigan and Shdaimah, courts “use questionings to elicit information in ways that justify prostitute 
women’s claims to resources and recognition” while committed to “the fundamental belief  that 
prostitute women are victims.” Defendants are told to “come clean of  their secrets” in the same way 
that defendants in drug diversion courts are expected to come clean about their drug use (2016, 461-
62). Participants in various prostitution diversion programs studied by Leon and Shdaimah reported 
that court representatives were “intrusive,” as the researchers report that one program supervisor 
told them that she encourages court participants to share their secrets, and advises that keeping 
them will lead them down a dark path (2012, 259).  
 
When marginalized people attempt to resist epistemic exploitation by disengaging, this can 
be interpreted as confirmation of  whatever skeptical or critical attitudes may have been assumed 
about that person. As Corrigan and Shdaimah note, “[c]ompliance is one of  the most important 
ways that women establish their intelligibility, the therefore their worth, to criminal justice actors” 
(2016, 467). Non-compliance will, in most cases, not be met with understanding, sympathy, or 
support. Rather, it is likely to frustrate the person asking that the marginalized person provide a 





One woman involved with a treatment court in Philadelphia reported that a staff  member 
insisted that she had a history of  trauma and that she disclose it. When she denied this 
characterization, “a probation supervisor accused her of  being ‘evasive’ and ‘dishonest.’” In her 
words “I just felt like I was being abused all over again” (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016, 477). 
Compelling marginalized people to expose parts of  their lives that they are not comfortable 
disclosing in order to convince listeners in positions of  authority who are gatekeepers to resources 
that those marginalized people need is a manifestation of  epistemic exploitation. But such 
requirements also leave victims vulnerable to other kinds of  harms. To begin, it is not always safe for 
victims to be open about their experiences. Traffickers do pose a threat to some people’s safety or 
the safety of  their family members. Many victims may have negative or even traumatic experiences 
with law enforcement in their pasts. Disclosing such private information may mean one’s life is 
totally uprooted, including where one lives, who one talks to, and how one makes a living. 
Furthermore, discloser of  intimate and possibly painful details may be emotionally difficult. 
Schwarz, Kennedy, and Britton also note that survivors of  trafficking could be retraumatized as they 
“are called upon to tell and retell their stories within the judicial system and research studies” (2017, 
3). This is compounded by the ever-looming threat that even disclosure will not result in their being 
believed. 
 
While such programs may tacitly or explicitly promise victims that they will receive 
compassionate treatment and care if  they expose their traumas and vulnerabilities to the court, 
scholars have argued that access to compassionate treatment is more dependent on a person’s ability 
to convincingly appeal to the listener’s ideas about what a victim is like than the reality of  their 
situation. This expectation of  the performance of  victimhood is a manifestation of  epistemic 
exploitation, and the requirement that display their trauma in a way that is interpretable to those who 
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have the power to control whether the defendant has a good outcome increases the likelihood that 
the marginalized person’s efforts to educate others about the nature of  their oppression will fail. A 
defendant unwilling or unable to present a convincing portrayal of  trauma may be given a harsher 
mandate (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016, 434). Peters interviewed a prosecutor she calls Kyle who 
admits that deciding whether or not someone should be processed through the system as a 
trafficking victim is “often times a gut check” (2010, 93). Of  course, such a subjective and imprecise 
method of  evaluation means victims, who are likely to have their credibility unduly downgraded 
because of  aspects of  their social identities, may be dismissed as unreliable. In such cases, epistemic 
exploitation (the marginalized person has been asked to convince the outsider of  their own 
oppression), testimonial injustice (the marginalized person is not given due credibility because of  
their social identity), and posturing (the outsider has inappropriately deemed themselves an 
epistemic authority) have all occurred.  
 
We certainly do not take it to be the case that everyone must reveal their most personal and 
traumatic experiences in order to be trustworthy or to be seen as deserving of  good treatment or 
credibility. Someone uninterested in baring their soul to strangers would typically be thought of  as 
reasonable or even prudent. But if  that person is a victim of  sexual violence, especially one 
interested in humane treatment by the criminal justice system, then this reticence is often interpreted 
as noncompliance, incriminating, and justification for adversarial treatment.  
 
Epistemic Exploitation and the Risk of  Testimonial Smothering 
 
Because of  the risks that accompany epistemic resistance, epistemic exploitation can have the 
terrible effect of  driving marginalized people into silence. Berenstain highlights the role skeptical 
 
144 
responses from those in privileged positions may play in leading speakers to self-silence to avoid the 
risks involved with attempting to have a conversation with someone who is not a competent hearer 
(2016, 580-581). This harm, described by Dotson, is one of  testimonial smothering.  
 
For example, before Blasey Ford’s story was leaked, she had resigned herself  to silence out 
of  a conviction that sharing her story would not change anything, asking, “Why suffer through the 
annihilation if  it’s not going to matter at all?” (quoted by Lenz, 2019). 
 
In 2019, I attended a discussion at the Rebellious Lawyering Conference hosted at Yale 
University where a panel of  sex workers discussed how lawyers can provide advocacy and support 
for people engaged in commercial sex. All members of  the panel expressed frustration with the ways 
that some anti-trafficking advocates have cast a wide net and defined trafficking to include most if  
not all of  sex work. They reported feeling that they could not complain about their experiences or 
talk about what actually is dangerous or uncomfortable about being a sex worker without it 
somehow being used against them. If  they complained, then they feared they were providing fodder 
for those who wanted to say that their work is inherently oppressive and coercive. In one panel 
member, Kaya Lin’s, words “If  you are a sex worker, you can’t have bad days.”  
 
Another member of  the panel, Lorelei Lee, describes elsewhere how she “pretended all of  
[sex work] was a kind of  adventure. That what I gained from it was more than rent,” to fend against 
the common response of  pity when other people discovered she was a sex worker (2019). This 
pretending prevented her from also sharing the hard parts of  trading sex - being paid less than 
promised, being violated, and dealing with times that she did not want to do that work at all. But this 
pretending, despite its costs, was preferred over the alternative of  repeatedly attempting to convince 
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outsiders that her mistreatment mattered. In Tarana Burke’s words, “[w]e shouldn’t have to perform 
our pain over and over again for the sake of  your awareness” (2018). 
 
In these examples, Blasey Ford, Lin, and Lee all report feeling pressured into silence when 
confronted with the impossible demands to explain their own mistreatment and oppression while 
also being denied the credibility necessary to do so. These are all cases of  testimonial smothering, 
which occurs when epistemically oppressed people choose or are coerced into not engaging in 
conversations because those conversations are too risky, possibly because other people in those 
conversations have demonstrated in the past that they’re unwilling or unable to properly receive the 
testimony provided by the speaker. In many cases, testimonial smothering is a means of  self-
protection; it is a way for folks who have been exploited in the past and who are epistemically 
oppressed, to protect their well-being and to avoid putting energy and resources into something that 
has proved to be harmful or futile. Silence may also be a way to avoid other kinds of  threats, like 
arrest or deportation.  
 
There is a collective loss when testimonial smothering occurs, as all outsiders lose the 
opportunity to gain access to valuable epistemic resources. Testimonial smothering prevents 
knowledge from entering the epistemic marketplace. But of  course, the harm that comes from 
testimonial smothering is asymmetrical. Ultimately those who are in a relatively privileged position 
are mostly fine without these additional epistemic concepts that aren’t being introduced because of  
the silencing of  those who are oppressed, whereas oppressed folks are further harmed because their 




While demonstrating epistemic exploitation and testimonial smothering, the comments of  
Lee and Lin also point to the power of  the threat of  posturing, as the panel members feel they must 
conceal their thoughts and beliefs because they may be misconstrued or misrepresented by outsiders 
who feel they are better positioned to make sense of  those experiences than the subject themselves.  
 
Avoiding or Mitigating the Harm of  Epistemic Exploitation 
 
When social movements aimed at improving collective understanding of  the experiences of  
epistemically marginalized people make use of  a storytelling strategy, the weight of  the request that 
oppressed people provide this labor should be recognized and given due respect and appreciation. 
At the very least, subjects should be met with open-minded, receptive listeners. They should also be 
appropriately compensated for their time. To avoid casting speakers as mere informants, subjects 
must be given “full and equal epistemic cooperation” (Medina 2012, 204). Finally, it is important to 
consider the possibility that when subjects are silent in conversations about their oppression, it may 
be because they have elected to disengage to avoid epistemic exploitation and not because they are 




“Save us from our saviors.” - Slogan of  VAMP, a collective of  sex workers 





Outsiders who occupy positions of  privilege, or expertise (like social workers, lawyers, 
academics, or activists) may have the authority and influence to improve collective understanding of  
the experiences of  people who are hermeneutically marginalized, like victims of  sexual violence. 
They may be considered more credible than victims, and thus less likely to have their testimony 
disregarded or downgraded. They may be able to speak in spaces and to others in positions of  
power in ways that are not available to marginalized victims. For these reasons, outsider allies may 
have the opportunity and even an obligation to try to right epistemic wrongs through consciousness 
raising efforts. 
 
But we cannot lose sight of  the fact that this also puts outsider allies in the position of  
gatekeepers. When engaged in the practice of  consciousness raising, or when enforcing regulations 
or distributing resources, outsiders may find themselves making determinations of  who “counts” as 
a victim based on their own feelings, judgments, and assessments of  whether the person in question 
is behaving as they expect a victim would.  
 
In such cases, an outsider may be guilty of  posturing. Posturing occurs when a listener 
inappropriately positions themselves in a way that suggests they are the epistemic peer of  a speaker. 
This harm constitutes an injustice if  the listener’s presumption that they are qualified to scrutinize 
the testimony of  the speaker is produced by an ethically and epistemologically culpable error, like a 
prejudiced attitude directed toward the speaker. Assessing whether someone is or is not guilty of  
posturing will be difficult in practice. In many cases, we will not be able to determine with certainty 
if  this harm or wrong has occurred, as we will not have enough information to determine whether 
the listener’s assessment of  themselves as appropriately situated to judge the speaker’s testimony is 
mistaken or not. But because of  the possibility that the testimony of  less socially powerful speakers 
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will be treated with less than due credibility because of  their social identity, and given the significant 
harms that are caused when these speakers are degraded as knowers, we should tread carefully when 
even the risk of  posturing is present.  
 
Posturing during consciousness raising efforts can occur when outsiders presume to be 
epistemic authorities on the experiences of  marginalized people. When presented with the testimony 
of  insiders, outsiders, even with the best of  intentions, may posture and consider themselves to be 
an epistemic peer to the person who is hermeneutically marginalized. They may express skepticism 
about what they are being told about the other person’s experience. They may insist that the speaker 
do more work to provide a convincing case that they are, in fact, oppressed (epistemic exploitation), 
or they may call upon that person to consider views or opinions that undermine their epistemic 
agency. Posturing on the part of  outsiders may lead marginalized folks to silence themselves, 
expectant that if  they speak they will be inappropriately challenged by people who have mistaken 
themselves to be epistemic peers. This may lead to testimonial smothering, and in extreme cases, 
hermeneutical death. Posturing may also incline outsiders to believe they are best positioned to 
define an experience they have not had. Thus, posturing may be involved in hermeneutical hijacking, 
which we will discuss in the next section.  
 
Posturing as a Persistent Threat for Some Species of  Hermeneutical Injustice 
 
In some cases, it may be that outsiders are better positioned not only to generate 
hermeneutical resources for understanding the experiences of  those subjects, but also to apply them. 
This may be true when the species of  hermeneutical injustice is one of  separation or exclusion, 
meaning relevant epistemic resources are available to outsiders, but at least some subjects of  the 
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experience at hand do not have access to the relevant hermeneutical resources to make sense of  
their experiences. In such cases, an outsider who is skeptical of  or disagrees with an insider’s 
testimony or perspective is not guilty of  posturing, as they are, in fact, an epistemic peer of  the 
speaker. They have as good, or possibly even better, of  an understanding of  the topic at hand.   
 
However, there is good reason to worry that the voices of  outsider advocates will take on a 
disproportionately large significance given that it is likely that many outsider advocates have a degree 
of  social power that will result in their opinions and judgments being taken seriously even when the 
value of  opinions and judgments expressed by victims of  sexual violence are unjustly downgraded 
because of  their social identities. If  outsider advocates and epistemically marginalized insiders 
disagree about how best to describe or evaluate some type of  experience, in many circumstances the 
outsider advocate may have an unfair advantage in swaying public opinion. 
 
Furthermore, an outsider advocate can support a position that is accurate, even one that 
aligns with the perspective of  insiders, but still be guilty of  posturing. Posturing is an epistemic harm 
that is not dependent on the judgments endorsed by outsiders being untrue. Whether posturing has 
occurred depends, rather, on the inappropriate presumption of  epistemic authority. If  a correct 
judgment is formed, but the outsider bases their reasoning on prejudiced assumptions about the 
speaker or if  they refuse to consider the subject’s perspectives and opinions in their assessment, then 
the listener will be unwarranted in their determination that they are an epistemic peer of  the speaker, 
nonetheless. Thus, even if  a hermeneutical lacuna has been successfully identified by an outsider, an 
additional epistemic injustice could be perpetrated in that identification. This possibility, that an 
outsider could accurately diagnose a hermeneutical lacuna and advocate for conceptual changes that 
insiders either do not have the epistemic tools to make sense of  or even actively disavow, 
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demonstrates that in the process of  improving awareness, epistemic harms are difficult to avoid. 
Rather than preventing any and all epistemic wrongdoing, the goal should be to engage in 
thoughtful, subject-centered,19 efforts to improve collective understanding.  
 
4.4.1 Posturing and Advocacy 
 
McKinnon notes that allies who see themselves as working with and on behalf  of  
marginalized people may sometimes give the testimony of  insiders diminished credibility, relying 
more on “their own fist-hand experience over the testimony of  the person they’re supposed to be 
supporting.” She adds that this may occur when the “‘ally’ suspects that the affected person isn’t 
properly epistemically situated” (2017, 169). As we reviewed in Chapter Two, many advocates believe 
victims of  both sexual assault and sex trafficking are not epistemically situated in such a way that 
they are able to properly assess and articulate their experiences. This presumption that insiders are 
ignorant of  their own experiences creates a dynamic rife for posturing.  
 
Risk of  Posturing in the Identification of  Victims 
 
While the TVPA does distinguish sex work from sex trafficking, commonly cited statistics, 
publicity around the topic, and law enforcement strategies obscure the line between the two. We 
reviewed elements of  that controversy earlier in this chapter.  
 
                                                          
19 Service providers often state something along the lines of “survivors are the experts on 
their own lives.” This kind of mantra is intended to fend against posturing. 
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Chief  Judge Lippman, who pioneered the expansion of  the New York City Human 
Trafficking Intervention Courts (HTICs) in 2013, stated “[w]e have come to recognize that the vast 
majority of  children and adults charged with prostitution offenses are commercially exploited or at 
risk of  exploitation” (Un-Meetable Promises 2018, 23). The very fact that the court is called a 
human trafficking intervention court and that cases related to prostitution are diverted there is 
indicative of  an assumed synonymy of  sex work and sex trafficking. According to a report produced 
by a partnership between the Yale School of  Public Health, Yale Law School, and the Sex Workers 
Project of  the Urban Justice Center, the goals of  the HTIC courts rest on the assumptions that 
“trafficking is, at its base, equivalent with all prostitution, prostitution is exploitative, and prostitution 
is criminal” (Un-Meetable Promises 2018, 41). Judge Fernando Camacho of  the Queens Criminal 
Court describes the HTIC defendants he sees as “poor, unfortunate, lost souls who have no choice 
but to do this” (quoted in Un-Meetable Promises 2018, 27). Leon and Shdaimah report that 
stakeholders in a prostitution diversion court they studied “debated for months over whether 
prostitute women ‘needed’ to be coerced into accepting help for their own good” (2015, 262). To 
argue such a paternalistic point, stakeholders must consider themselves appropriate epistemic 
authorities capable of  evaluating the question, even when the apparent necessity of  coercion 
indicates the court’s assessment of  what is in the defendant and purported victim’s interest is at odds 
with their own self-assessment. 
 
 Abolitionists assert outright that all commercial sex either is or directly facilitates sex 
trafficking and that all sex workers are exploited, regardless of  whether they see themselves that way. 
For example, when lobbying for how trafficking would be defined by the Victims of  Trafficking and 
Violence and Protection Act in 2000, the National Organization of  Women (NOW) argued that the 
bill must identify punishments for “all traffickers who lure or force women into prostitution 
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regardless of  whether or not their victims ‘consent’” (cited by Chapkis 2003, 928). The inclusion of  
scare quotes around “consent,” as noted by Chapkis, suggests NOW does not believe legitimate 
consent is possible. 
 
In a report on trafficking in New York City informed by interviews with “top law 
enforcement officials, prosecutors, advocates and victims from around the five boroughs,” The New 
York Post states that one of  the reasons it is so hard to prosecute traffickers is because “[t]he women 
and girls often don’t see themselves as victims” (Gonen, 2018). This statement renders victims who 
are not girls or women completely invisible, while also taking for granted that those women and girls 
who do not self-identify as victims are mistaken. In Chapter Two, I quoted Hughes as saying that 
“[f]ew women and girls in prostitution are willing to acknowledge that they have or are controlled by 
a pimp. The pimp has convinced her that he is a boyfriend or someone who cares about and looks 
after her” (2005, 15). While she describes the experience of  coming to see one’s partner as actually 
being one’s trafficker as an admission that is potentially “psychologically devastating,” she provides 
no support for this claim.   
 
While it could be that an exploiter’s psychological control over a victim or a victim’s 
reluctance to conceive of  their circumstances as exploitative or abusive may make it difficult for that 
person to see themselves as being taken advantage of, the confidence expressed by Hughes and the 
other self-appointed experts cited above that they can see when someone is being trafficked or 
exploited when the purported victim cannot demonstrate a concerning degree of  assumed epistemic 
authority. Again, that these outsiders are not themselves victims of  trafficking does not necessitate 
that they are harming or wronging insiders when they determine that they are the insider’s epistemic 
peers or even that they possess superior hermeneutical resources that enable them to see clearer 
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what victims themselves cannot see. I am not in a position to determine whether these outsiders are 
or are not posturing, but it is clear to me that they risk posturing when they reach conclusions about 
how best to categorize the experiences of  those they believe they speak for, and the risk is greater 
when those they believe they speak for actively resist those ascriptions.  
 
There is also a risk of  posturing when people are being ruled out as victims. When outsiders 
assume that they occupy an appropriate epistemic position to evaluate the experiences of  others, 
they may inappropriately use that judgment to determine what is or is not forgivable, 
understandable, or believable in a given circumstance. Peters reports that a federal prosecutor she 
interviewed felt that sometimes purported victims “strategically misrepresent themselves” (2010, 
93). The prosecutor, who she calls Kyle, felt these individuals were coached, he alleges by NGOs, to 
say certain things during raids to access desirable benefits and avoid deportation. Peters notes that 
“NGO services providers complained that law enforcement agents, in particular, often accused 
victims of  lying because their stories were incoherent or the agent had a feeling the victim was lying” 
(2010, 94). A prosecutor Peters interviews and calls Kyle states that possible victims he encounters 
are simultaneously secretive - “They could be afraid of  the trafficker, or they might not trust you, or 
all of  those kinds of  reasons that make them vulnerable.” -  and deceitful - “But, on the other hand 
these women are subject to be dishonest with you because they know they can get money and they 
can get freedom” (2010, 93).  
 
Of  course, such feelings may be mistaken, especially when they do not take into 
consideration the effects of  trauma. To assume that one’s feelings about whether another person has 
done a good job telling a consistent, convincing story about their experiences requires assuming that 
one has the epistemic authority to make such a call. Furthermore, it may be that the testimony 
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provided by speakers in such cases is unfairly treated as less credible because the speakers are likely 
to be members of  marginalized groups.  
 
While the advocates quoted above do not identify themselves as survivors of  sex trafficking 
or as sex workers, they have concluded that they have the epistemic authority to define both 
trafficking and sex work, nonetheless. Further, they are so confident in their epistemic authority, they 
believe they can recognize circumstances of  trafficking even when those they identify as victims do 
not and protest that classification. In doing so, these outsiders presume to be experts on the 
experiences of  those marginalized people and risk epistemically harming or wronging those 
individuals by posturing.  
 
Risk of  Posturing and Infantilization of  Survivors and Sex Workers 
 
Doezema argues that sex workers who are not victims of  trafficking are rendered illegible 
according to the abolitionist’s proposed hermeneutical schema. To deny that there can be non-
exploitative sex work is to take the position that sex workers who are not exploited are impossible 
and to disregard those who disagree as “deluded or frauds” (2005, 74). She adds, “the notion of  a 
prostitute who is unharmed by her experiences is an ontological impossibility: that which cannot be. 
This is the ultimate exercise of  power: to deny sex workers our very existence, to insist that we 
cannot be” (2005, 74). Bergquist describes this view that “that sex workers are unable to perceive 
their own exploitation” as “infantilizing” (2015, 322). In “Cash/Consent,” Lee reports that she has 
been told she is “too traumatized, or too brainwashed, to understand [her] own experiences,” and 
that when listeners acknowledge her intelligence they insist she is an outlier and that other people 
involved in the sex trade are not as smart. To this she responds “[e]very sex worker I have ever met 
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is as smart as I am; many are smarter” (2019). By portraying sex workers and trafficking victims in 
this way, it becomes easier to discount testimony from those who resist the label of  victim.  
 
When outsiders posture, they may come to believe that they know what is in an alleged 
victim’s best interest even when that person disagrees. This paternalistic approach can result in 
purported victims being treated in ways that are hurtful and cruel. For example, a sex worker in 
Canada named Mi reported that during a two-month detention she was not allowed to contact her 
friends or family because the judge “said they had to protect me” despite her insistence that she was 
not being trafficked or exploited (Lam 2018, 14). 
 
 If  both trafficking victims and sex workers are portrayed as naive, helpless, uneducated, 
manipulatable, or brainwashed, then activists who ascribe a label to their experiences that they resist 
can more easily dismiss their objections as uninformed. For advocates who conceptualize those 
involved in trafficking and sex work in this way - as essentially inactive, exploited, and without 
choices - denying their ability to understand or define their experiences is a relatively uncomplicated 
step. There is a persistent representation of  victims of  commercial sexual exploitation and sex 
workers as being incapable of  accurately assessing their situations and needs. For example, Kathleen 
Barry, founder of  CATW, states that women who describe their labor as sex work do so “out of  
despair…because it seems impossible to conceive of  any other way to treat prostitute women with 
dignity and respect than through normalizing their exploitation” (quoted by Doezema 2005, 73).  
 
When confronted with the fact that some sex workers do not identify as victims or explicitly 
deny that the label applies to them, abolitionists like Barry respond by dismissing their testimony 
and re-asserting their own presumed epistemic authority. A testimonial injustice in and of  itself, this 
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tendency also sets the stage for allowing outsiders - positioning themselves as more knowledgeable 
and objective - to hijack the process of  crafting hermeneutical tools for understanding the 
experiences of  both sex workers and trafficking victims. I will discuss this in more detail in the next 
section. Such complete erasure, were it to be successful, would result in hermeneutical death.  
 
Risk of  Posturing When Comparing Sex Trafficking to Labor Trafficking  
 
In a briefing on child sex trafficking, Representative Chris Smith describes trafficking as 
“destroying a woman’s soul and body,” and states that the women forced into commercial sex by a 
convicted trafficker had their lives “destroyed” (U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 2012). While some victims do feel this way - a survivor identified as Mr. B. testifying at the 
same event shared his story and stated “[m]y life has been ruined…” - the sweeping statement about 
all survivors and focus on those who are women (despite the survivor-speaker at the event being a 
man) is presumptuous and threatens to erase the experiences of  those who would describe their 
lives and reactions differently.  
 
Similarly, Peters quotes a federal law enforcement agent she calls Jim as saying, when 
explaining why he views sex trafficking cases as “more important” than “forced labor” cases, that 
“[w]hat happens in sex trafficking is horrendous. It takes everything away from a person.” He adds, 
“In my opinion it’s worse than murdering someone, to continuously degrade someone like that” 
(2010, 109-110).   
While some survivors describe their own stories in ways that are reflected by the sentiments 
expressed by Jim and Representative Smith, others see their lives and futures less bleakly. Peters 
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reports that many victims “emerge from their experiences resilient and motivated to move forward” 
(2010, 176, also, see Sylvia’s optimism in Peters’ work 158-59).  
 
Agent Jim elaborates on his conviction that sex trafficking is worse that labor trafficking, 
adding that he believes labor trafficking victims “wanted to come here in the first place,” whereas 
most sex trafficking victims did not. This is challenged by evidence that suggests that some victims 
who are trafficked after crossing borders were aware that the work they would be doing would 
involve commercial sex (Doezema 1999, 24 and 32, citing GAATW study and Wijers and Lap-
Chew), though they may have been deceived about the conditions in which they would be working 
and living. In such cases, sex trafficking victims have a great deal in common with labor trafficking 
victims, as the problems they face are best understood by considering the conditions of  their labor.  
 
When outsiders determine that they are appropriately positioned to make judgments about 
what kind of  exploitation is worse, particularly when they do so without or in opposition to input 
from victims, they risk epistemically harming or wronging victims by posturing. When they use that 
assuredness of  their own insight to motivate arguments about trafficking to influence policy and 
legislation, they also hijack the process through which collective understanding could be improved. 




 I do not know if  being sexually exploited is as bad as or more terrible than being forced, 
defrauded, or coerced into performing other kinds of  labor, and I suspect that there is no definitive 
answer to the question of  which is worse. Rather, the awfulness of  instances of  trafficking will be 
 
158 
more a function of  the conditions, duration, and means of  control exerted in particular instances of  
forced labor, as well as incomparable considerations of  particular victim’s responses to and ability to 
recover from what has happened to them. I also do not feel confident I know where to draw the line 
between intentional, consensual sex work and commercial sexual exploitation.  
 
But importantly, it is not necessary that we endorse any particular view to identify the 
statements and actions of  outsider advocates like those quoted above as potentially harming victims 
and other marginalized people through posturing. It is consistent with my presentation of  posturing 
that abolitionists could, as a matter of  fact, be right, when they conclude all commercial sex is 
inherently exploitative, and that victims who do not recognize themselves as such are suffering from 
denial or delusions. Agent Jim could be correct when he concludes that sex trafficking is much 
worse than labor trafficking, and therefore worthy of  more attention. But even if they are right, the 
abolitionists and Jim could be guilty of  posturing. That is because posturing occurs when outsiders 
deem themselves to be the appropriate epistemic authorities capable of  evaluating the experiences 
of  marginalized people, independent of  whether they exercise their self-appointed authority to reach 
the right or wrong conclusions. Thus, the quotes I have selected in this section were not chosen 
because I feel the speakers are especially misguided, but rather to demonstrate the tendency outsider 
advocates have toward presenting themselves as authorities on these experiences, even when their 
judgments are resisted by those they see themselves as advocating on behalf  of.  
 
4.5 Hermeneutical Hijacking 
 
“[W]e must be mindful of  who speaks and who raises awareness of  whom and on behalf  of  whom. Those of  us 
who hold the power of  production and distribution of  knowledge must let the people in vulnerable and exploitative 
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situations, or in irregular work, speak for themselves and demand the change they need” - Sharapov, Hoff, and 
Gerasimov 2019, 10 
 
Consciousness raising is a valuable strategy for improving collective understanding precisely 
because outsiders may have social advantages, including credibility excesses, that can be leveraged to 
bring about the desired result and in a way that is not as costly to the epistemically marginalized 
person. Furthermore, if  it is possible that members of  other social groups have the interpretive 
tools to make sense of  an experience while subjects of  that experience lack those tools, a species of  
hermeneutical injustice Goetze calls separation, then it may be the case the that sometimes these 
outsiders have to take a lead role in generating and dissemination interpretive tools because subjects 
themselves do not have them.  
 
But, as we covered in the last section, separation is rife with the potential for further 
producing further harms, both epistemic and practical. Because outsiders positioned to use their 
privilege to improve collective understanding have greater social power and credibility, the concepts 
that they champion are most likely to permeate into collective understanding. What they contest or 
ignore will likely remain invisible or may be met with even greater skepticism. At times, these 
outsiders may come to believe that their concepts and definitions are more accurate than those 
advocated for by insiders, and they may endorse them to others during consciousness raising efforts.  
 
In Chapter One I introduced a type of  hermeneutical injustice I called hermeneutical 
hijacking. Hermeneutical hijacking occurs when outsiders involve themselves in the process of  
creating new hermeneutical resources in ways that make it harder for the subjects of  those 
experiences to develop and disseminate their own interpretive resources. Hermeneutical hijacking is 
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a danger closely related to posturing. It occurs when an outsider takes hold of  the project of  
defining the experiences of  an epistemically marginalized group and presents themselves as an (or 
even, the) authority capable of  facilitating collective understanding. When outsider advocates have 
greater social power, they will be more likely to be believed and to have their voices amplified, and 
thus they may come to dominate the conversation about the experiences of  marginalized insiders. 
This can make it less likely that the voices of  those insiders can or will be heard. As Alcoff  notes in 
“Problem of  Speaking for Others,” even well-intentioned speakers may “reinforce racist, imperialist 
conceptions and perhaps also further silence the lesser-privileged grips own ability to speak and be 
heard” when they take themselves to be capable of  speaking for the marginalized (1992, 26). 
Hermeneutical hijacking is not characterized by the intentions with which outsiders operate or even 
how accurate their representations of  the experiences that have been illegible are. Rather it is 
distinguished by the potentially problematic position outsiders occupy, which can lead to their 
domination the processes of  knowledge production; they risk speaking not only for, but also over 
the marginalized.  
 
4.5.1 Hermeneutical Hijacking and Advocacy 
 
Critics of  the abolitionists’ view of  trafficking and those who suggest current anti-trafficking 
advocacy is generating a sort of  a moral panic argue that abolitionists have popularized myths about 
trafficking that distort the truth. Similarly, critics of  changing and expanding definitions of  sexual 
assault have argued that these advocates have not exposed heretofore unrecognized cases of  sexual 
violence, but have reclassified regular, blameless behavior as violent. For example, Koss’ Ms. 
Magazine study inspired criticisms that accused feminists of  attempting to “redefine seduction as a 
form of  rape,” (Podhoretz, 1991) and suggested the expanded understanding had the ulterior motive 
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of  “giv[ing] women a simple way of  thinking about sex that externalizes guilt, remorse or conflict” 
(Is Date Rape a Fraud?, 1990). 
 
These distortions are sometimes presented as unintended side effects of  work carried out 
with the best of  intentions. Alternatively, some critics argue the truth is disregarded or 
misrepresented for political gain. For example, critics of  the work of  Koss and others who have 
advocated for greater attention to the problem of  sexual assault by citing alarmingly high rates of  
such assaults have suggested that those numbers are intended to elicit strong public responses. 
Gilbert describes these statistics as “advocacy numbers,” which “embody less an effort at scientific 
understanding than an attempt to persuade the public that a problem is vastly larger than commonly 
recognized” (quoted by Rutherford 2017, 101). 
 
Doezema argues that the narrative that trafficking has spiked relies on concepts of  feminine 
vulnerability and innocence that are mythical. Importantly, Doezema’s conception of  mythicalness 
does not entail distortion of  truth, but instead recognizes the performative nature of  statistics and 
narratives like those put forth by advocates. In her words, a myth is not “a distortion of  truth, but 
rather a performative expression that interpellates, or brings into being, a vision of  society” (2005, 
65). Because what it means to be trafficked is without a fixed definition, and arguably the boundaries 
of  such an experience are essentially changing, discussions about what trafficking is contribute to the 
evolution of  that meaning being sought.  
 
Similarly, Stanley Cohen’s notion of  moral panic does not require that the subject of  the 
panic is not real. Rather, it means that the “condition, episode, person or group of  persons emerges 
to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests” (1, 1972). Collective attitudes about 
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the subject of  the panic take on a strong, maybe even out-sized gravity, representing a great deal 
about our social values.  
 
According to Rutherford, social scientists do not merely measure what they study. Rather, 
they play an active role in creating and shaping reality. Thus, they have the ability to generate 
hermeneutical resources that at times may not reflect the beliefs or attitudes of  those they are 
studying (Rutherford argues for such a performative understanding of  social science methods in 
2017, 102).  Rutherford presents her analysis of  the performative natter of  social science as an 
explanation of  the controversy surrounding and defense of  Koss’ work on acquaintance rape. But 
this commentary on the way social science interacts with the world it aims to describe - that it does 
not occupy some outside, objective position - also highlights the potential risk that social scientists, 
who occupy positions relative social power, will exert undue influence when trying to define certain 
experiences. The fact that so many of  the individuals identified as victims of  sexual assault by Koss’ 
study did not self-identify their experiences as rape has been used to criticize the survey method. By 
identifying these individuals as victims despite their apparent denial that such a descriptor applies to 
them, we may worry advocates risk speaking for those individuals, hijacking the process of  epistemic 
resource development. 
 
It is hermeneutical hijacking that Doezema is worried about when she says “I am concerned 
with how certain definitions of  [trafficking] become dominant, whose knowledge is accepted and 
whose is sidelined, and the social practices involved in constructing and legitimating knowledge” 
(2005, 62), and asks about “the relationships among those who shape meanings of  ‘trafficking in 
women’ and between these ‘discourse masters and the object of  their concern: the ‘sex slaves’” 
(2005, 64). In the case of  activism around the issue of  sex trafficking, some survivors and many sex 
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workers have argued that outsider activists have hijacked the tools for developing and the means for 
disseminating conceptual tools.  
 
Many sex workers and some trafficking victims vigorously objected to the passing of  
SIESTA/FOSTA, and often their objections appealed to the inappropriateness and harm of  
outsiders presuming to understand the lives of  those involved in commercial sex and taking control 
of  the means for altering collective understanding of  those experiences. Kristen DiAngelo, executive 
director of  the Sex Workers Outreach Project, who identifies herself  as a trafficking survivor, 
protested the SESTA/FOSTA bill saying, “I understand that very well-meaning people want to help, 
but I also understand that they don’t know anything about our lives and what we live through” 
(quoted by Lampen, 2018). We can understand DiAngelo’s statement to mean that those supporting 
and advancing the bill are posturing when they take themselves to be appropriately positioned to 
determine what is in the best interests of  victims and sex workers, and hijacking the process of  
generating and proliferating epistemic resources to make sense of  the experiences of  members of  
those groups. A sex worker named Melissa stated to the Huffington post in an interview that “[t]his 
stupid bill literally has taken away the one thing I felt as if  I had control over in my life.” 
Importantly, many sex workers report that the passing of  SESTA/FOSTA has interrupted the 
ability of  people involved in commercial sex to communicate with one another. In the words of  
Kendall from Los Angeles, “we mainly rely on our close-knit community and one another for our 
safety and well-being. Ripping that away from us puts everyone at risk…” (quoted by McCombs, 
2018). Valerie Scott reports that as a sex worker in Canada, her work is made more dangerous and 
difficult by new Nordic-like laws that institute harsher punishments for buyers and require 
mandatory counseling for sex workers when arrests are made. She states that good clients are more 
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hesitant and call from blocked numbers. Predatory clients are emboldened because sex workers 
cannot take the steps that were previously available to protect themselves (2015).  
 
Rather than facilitating a better understanding of  epistemically marginalized people and 
making them safer, the sex workers quoted above feel outsiders have made their lives more 
dangerous and voices harder to hear. Representative Ro Khanna was one of  the minority of  house 
members who did not vote in favor of  SESTA/FOSTA. Khanna has since stated that “[o]ne of  the 
travesties of  passing FOSTA-SESTA is that the sex worker community was never consulted. They 
were never in hearings. They never got to testify” (quoted by Irwin, 2020). In a video he released on 
twitter, Khanna states, “We passed these laws without even considering their voice. They didn’t get 
to testify in Congress.” When the voices of  sex workers are given so little consideration that the 
effect is they’ve said nothing, because they have not been meaningfully heard, this is an example 
testimonial quieting.  
 
In many spaces where trafficking intervention policies are decided, survivors and victims are 
absent. Specialized anti-trafficking task forces have been created in some cities, but Bergquist notes, 
“sex workers and their allies are usually not represented” on them (2015, 316). The Empower 
Foundation stated in a 2012 report that “[n]o sincere consultations have ever been undertaken with 
sex workers to seek their input, assistance, knowledge and experience in designing and implementing 
trafficking intervention and prevention strategies without our own industry” (quoted by Bergquist 
2015, 318). Kate Zen, co-founder of  the sex workers’ rights organization Red Canary Song, 
describes the importance of  survivor and sex worker led groups like hers, stating migrant sex 
workers “don’t have a voice… when it comes to policies that affect their lives” (quoted by Song, 
2019). According to Peters, “Trafficked persons are rarely given the opportunity to voice their own 
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experiences. They are often viewed at one end of  an uncomplicated binary as either helpless victims 
with no control over their own circumstances, or criminals because of  their status as undocumented 
immigrants or prostitutes” (2010, 151).  
 
Conferences attended by social workers, academics, doctors, law enforcement, and politicians 
are held to discuss causes of  and responses to trafficking, but in some cases, victims are not 
meaningfully included. For example, Elizabeth Bernstein describes a 2008 event in which an “all-
white array of  panelists spoke to the audience about the urgent need to root out inner-city street 
pimps and ‘pimp culture’” (2010, 53). While an exploration of  the stereotypes about traffickers and 
epistemic injustices committed against those who are cast as the villains - most of  whom are men of  
color - goes beyond the scope of  this paper, this report serves to illustrate the disparity in the social 
identities of  those who are allegedly involved in trafficking and those who are considered experts on 
the subject.  
 
Hermeneutical Hijacking When Determining When and Which Survivor’s Stories are Heard 
 
Survivor stories sometimes appear in spaces where survivors are absent. At a separate event 
in 2009, Bernstein describes an activist who told a moving story about a trafficking survivor who 
inspired her, the activist, to dedicate herself  to anti-trafficking work (Bernstein, 59). Linda Smith, 
founder of  the anti-trafficking organization Shared Hoped International, often tells a story about 
seeing a young woman in the brothel district of  Mamba as the start of  her being compelled to anti-
trafficking work. Peters reports hearing Sonia Ossorio, then President of  the New York City 
Chapter of  the National Organization for Women (NOW), retelling a buyer’s retelling of  a survivor’s 




 Inevitably, these stories are repackaged in these tellings. Certain details may be left out, 
either accidentally or willfully. Others may be embellished. Telling stories involves making decisions 
about what details to include and exclude; it must involve attributing thoughts and feelings to the 
victim that no outsider can attribute with certainty. Stories may be synthesized to craft a more 
compelling narrative, as good stories bring followers, advocates, and funding. This creative license 
threatens to fictionalize a real person’s experiences.  
 
 Notably, the telling of  these stories also frequently centers the role of  the ally or advocate. 
Stories about advocates traveling internationally to raise awareness about trafficking and provide 
support for alleged trafficking victims are often told as rescue stories, with the activist filling the role 
of  savior. Politicians and movement leaders sometimes describe themselves as saviors or as speaking 
for those who cannot speak for themselves. They persist in these characterizations even when those 
they claim to speak for vocally resist their proposed “solutions” and characterizations.20 
 
Hermeneutical Hijacking Rendering Non-Exploited Sex Workers and Non-Women Victims Illegible and 
Impossible 
 
Abolitionists do not distinguish between sex trafficking and sex work. Rather, they maintain 
that either all sex work is exploitative or all sex work contributes to the maintenance of  conditions 
that permit exploitation. Linda Smith, a prominent abolitionist advocates, states that, “[n]o girl 
                                                          
20 Lorelei Lee recalls assemblyman Isadore Hall describing himself as a “voice for the 
voiceless” (her quote) while advocating for a bill that hundreds of performers in adult films argued 
would make their work more dangerous (2019). 
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wakes up and looks in the mirror and says, ‘I want to be a prostitute’” (2015). She then goes on to 
say that these girls don’t want to grow up and be abused, unable to have families, to be used by men 
however they wish. These statements conflate sex work and sex trafficking, suggesting anyone who 
would want to engage in commercial sex acts would also want to be mistreated.  
 
Notably, Smith’s statement is not consistent with the statements of  some sex workers. 
Valerie Scott, for example, shares that she has wanted to be a sex worker since she watched old 
Western movies and shows as a kid, and says a friend of  hers who is also a sex worker was inspired 
by an episode of  I Love Lucy (2015). Of  course, neither of  these women indicated they wanted to 
grow up and be mistreated - the kind of  life Linda Smith indicates is inevitable for prostitutes - but 
they did want to grow up to realize a certain kind of  life that involved sex work.  
 
When anti-trafficking advocates like Smith or Hughes present all sex work as exploitative, 
they deny the possibility of  non-exploited sex workers. In the previous section, I explained how the 
depiction of  sex workers who resist being classified as victims of  exploitation as being in denial, 
brainwashed, or delusional creates a significant risk of  posturing.  By defining trafficking in a way 
that includes all sex workers despite many sex workers rejecting that definition, advocates risk 
hermeneutically hijacking the process of  improving collective understanding of  the experiences of  
both sex workers and trafficking victims. They make it more difficult for individuals from those 
marginalized groups to speak for themselves and be heard by others. They make it more difficult for 
definitions that those groups endorse to gain uptake.   
 
Some sex workers and victims who are willing and able to argue against the depiction of  
trafficking put forth by the most visible activists and politicians feel that such resistance results in 
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their being reclassified as criminals. Doezema argues that abolitionists tend toward a dichotomous 
presentation that identifies everyone involved in commercial sex work as either being dangerous 
criminals (and thus undeserving of  sympathy) or helpless victims (and thus vulnerable and unable to 
speak for themselves) (1999, 45). In Doezema’s words, “[t]he myth of  trafficking both creates and 
limits the discursive space around which these issues can be aired” (1999, 45). Those capable of  
shaping the narrative of  what trafficking is and who is impacted thereby control the hermeneutical 
tools available; they control what counts as legible, scrutable, or reasonable. They define the terms.  
 
The presentation of  sexual violence as exclusively impacting women also means that people 
who are not identified as women are sometimes denied resources and recognition. While there may 
be value in investigating sexual assault and sexual exploitation as gendered forms of  violence, most 
often inflicted on women by men, that depiction also renders the experiences of  men, boys, and 
gender non-conforming people invisible.  
 
4.6 Epistemic Appropriation 
 
“How do we talk about our experiences without letting their meaning be stolen?” - Lorelei Lee, 2019 
 
According to Davis, epistemic appropriation occurs when, during hermeneutical dissent, 
marginalized folks become detached from the dissemination of  new hermeneutical resources they 
created or when those resources are then used in ways that disproportionately benefit the powerful 
(2018, 705). Thus, while epistemically marginalized subjects are able to contribute to the 
development of  conceptual tools that make sense of  their experiences, they are “prevented from 
being recognized” for that labor (2018, 722). Importantly, epistemic appropriation is not a species of  
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hermeneutical injustice, as in cases of  appropriation, Davis argues there is no conceptual deficit 
(resources exist - they are precisely what is being appropriated) and individuals may behave in 
culpable ways when participating in the process of  conceptual theft (2018, 719).  
 
 While I agree with Davis that there a instances where the individuals who appropriate the 
hermeneutical resources produced by marginalized people are blameworthy for doing so, I do not 
believe individual wrongdoing gets to the core of  the injustice brought about by epistemic 
appropriation. Davis herself  acknowledges that “epistemic appropriate involves individual agents 
(some of  whom are culpable) and structures alike” (2018, 719). Marginalized knowers may be 
unfairly detached from the resources they have created even if  no particular, dominantly-situated 
knowers intend to exclude them. Rather, the primary wrong of  epistemic appropriation is the 
continued hermeneutical marginalization and epistemic oppression of  victims, even when they have 
done work that should prove to any naysayers that they deserve to be full participants in the 
production and sharing of  hermeneutical resources. The exclusion of  the hermeneutically 
marginalized from making on impact with and on shared epistemic resources is sustained by their 
being detached from their efforts. While in cases of  epistemic appropriation, the epistemically 
oppressed have succeeded in impacting the collective’s shared epistemic resources, this success is 
mediated by the insertion of  dominantly-situated knowers and speakers into the process. Exclusion 
from knowledge-production processes cannot be executed by any particular listener. Rather, it is the 
product of  structural prejudice that privileges the resources and ways of  communicating available to 
some knowers and not others. 
 
If  a hermeneutically marginalized knower is detached from their epistemic contributions and 
those resources disproportionately benefit the powerful, then the knower is both harmed and 
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wronged by epistemic appropriation. This can occur even when individual agents involved in the 
appropriation have not behaved in ethically culpable ways.  
 
However, if  agents involved in the co-opting of  hermeneutical resources developed by 
marginalized knowers are or should be aware that their actions unduly benefit the powerful, or if  
they are motivated by prejudiced attitudes about the marginalized knowers, then those wrongs are 
both structural and interpersonal. In such cases, those agents are culpable for the harms and wrongs 
that result from their actions.  
 
4.6.1 Epistemic Appropriation and Advocacy 
 
While I am unsure of  whether the hermeneutical resources that anti-trafficking activists have 
attempted to introduce into collective understanding have been disproportionately beneficial to the 
powerful, it is important to acknowledge that anti-trafficking work does benefit people in relative 
positions of  social power and privilege. As Kempadoo notes, “[a]ccolades abound for the rescue 
work, including a Pulitzer nomination and prize, an honorary doctorate, various awards for human 
rights and peace work, appointments as U.N. ambassadors, and Emmy awards for documentaries, 
often launching individual campaigners to celebrity status” (2015, 12). 
 
To start, there are political benefits for involvement with anti-trafficking work. For example, 
Grant argues that this work allows conservative advocates to engage in work that is moralizing and 
humanitarian. It’s an opportunity to “adopt a new identity: neither preachers nor scolds, but 
defenders of  human rights” (2018). Weitzer argues that moral crusades (he believes the anti-
trafficking movement to be one) aim to achieve both instrumental and symbolic goals. Those 
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symbolic goals provide an opportunity to “redraw or bolster normative boundaries and moral 
standards” (2007, 448). According to some, the unlikely alliance between some radical feminists and 
evangelical conservatives was no accident. Rather, it was a vision of  Michael Horowitz’s. In ‘Beyond 
Strange Bedfellows,’ Melissa Gira Grant asserts that Horowitz had previously attempted to form a 
left-right coalition by stoking passions about religious freedom. Horowitz introduced the problem 
of  trafficking to Smith, who introduced the Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act to the House in 
1999 (Peters 2010, 44 citing Skinner 2008). Grant states that Horowitz and other conservatives like 
Representative Chris Smith were drawn to the issue of  human trafficking specifically because the 
sexual components of  the conversation. This would explain why the focus of  human trafficking 
conversations has historically been on sex rather than labor trafficking. While they both involve 
coercion, only one brings with it the salacious, media attention-grabbing elements of  sex.  
 
Abolitionist anti-trafficking work also aligns well with conservative values about sex and 
sexuality. The founder of  an anti-trafficking group called Evangelicals for Social Action states that 
abolitionist work “certainly fits with an evangelical concern for sexual integrity. Sex is reserved for a 
marriage relationship where this is a lifelong covenant between a man and a woman” (quoted by 
Weitzer, 2007, 451).  A federal prosecutor interviewed by Peters that she calls Mark suggests that 
some abolitionists may willfully misunderstand criminal responses to trafficking and sex work that 
recognize a spectrum ranging from willful and intentional to trafficking. In doing so, Peters notes 
that “he suggests the conflation of  trafficking and prostitution is both purposeful and political” 
(2010, 120). If  this is the case, if  the conflating is politically motivated, then this may be an instance 
of  willful ignorance. Peters quotes Berman as saying that, “[t]he mere existence of  prostitution is 
antithetical to their moral system. Thus, constructing human trafficking as sex trafficking allows the 
Christian right to reiterate and reinvigorate their other ideological positions, ultimately equating 
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loose sexuality with criminality” (Berman 2006, 278 quoted by Peters 2010, 54). Such statements 
suggest abolitionists’ comments about the inherently exploitative nature of  sex work seem 
duplicitous, since they suggest their concern is not so much with whether sex workers are choosing 
their work, but with the nature of  what they may be choosing. 
 
 Berenstein also notes that the alignment of  some feminists with conservative groups has 
happened at times of  significant conservative political power. This may be because agendas that are 
consistent with those conservative values are more likely to be successful and receive funding. 
Reporting terrifyingly high rates of  trafficking, even when those numbers are impossible to 
substantiate, makes it easier to secure funding and instantiate harsh punishments for alleged 
traffickers (Weitzer 2012, 1348). Faith-based organizations have been especially well-positioned to 
capitalize on increases in funding, with Caroline Tetschner, State Department spokeswoman at the 
time, reporting that the number of  religious organizations receiving funding increasing from 7 
percent to 22 percent from 2002 to 2003 (McKelvey, 2004). Doezema accuses some organizations 
of  appealing to the “mythical resonance” of  trafficking to gain access to publicity and funding 
(1999, 45).  
 
For those who are opposed to people from certain parts of  the world immigrating to the 
United States, treating immigration and work in the sex industry as synonymous with trafficking not 
only criminalizes the work of  migrants, but morally impugns it as well. Rather than refusing to 
welcome such immigrants to the country based on their immigrant identity, they can be refused on 
more apparently humanitarian grounds. Schwarz, Kennedy, and Britton note that scholars (they cite 
Davydova, Agustin, and Bernstein) “have argued that Europe’s anti-trafficking movement is a thinly 
veiled attempt to surveil and maintain national borders” (2017, 8). Chapkis argues in “Trafficking 
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Migration and the Law” that depictions of  trafficking villainize “guilty migrants” through gendered 
depictions of  guilt and innocence, while also tying the protection of  “innocents” to their 
compliance with efforts of  prosecutors (2003). In a review, Sharapov, Hoff, and Gerasimov note 
that the horror of  trafficking has been invoked to discourage and raise fears about immigration by 
the likes of  the European Commission and President Trump (2019, 3). 
 
Critics of  Koss’ findings on acquaintance rape “charge that Koss and other feminist 
researchers were overruling women’s own perceptions and engaging in ‘politically-motivated 
distortion’” (Rutherford 2017, 108 quoting Koss 2011).21 Roiphe’s criticisms of  Koss’ study and the 
popularity of  Warshaw’s I Never Called it Rape suggest that part of  what is so troubling about the 
expanded definition of  sexual assault is that the evolution of  the concept is propelled by certain 
people with certain motives. In particular, she suggests that the discovery of  a crisis of  rape was 
utilized by feminists to popularize a particular kind of  patriarchal critique and a sort of  feminist 
agenda. This could be understood as an accusation that the feminists Roiphe’s objects to have either 
hijacked or appropriated the hermeneutical resources introduced to make better sense of  sexual 
violence, though Roiphe considers those resources to be misguided rather than revelatory.  
 
4.7 Narrative Constraint 
 
“But whatever community coalitions we build, whatever work we do to speak about our own lives even when it is 
dangerous to do so, our voices will continue to be ignored if  what we’re trying to say doesn’t fit into preexisting 
narratives. Not only have the legal and cultural frameworks of  the past two decades shaped the public meaning of  our 
                                                          
21 Critics include the likes of Roiphe, Hoff Sommers, and Gilbert. 
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work, caricaturing us as permanent victims or as “empowered” businesswomen (and in these narratives, we are always 
“women”); they have shaped our ability to even point out their faulty premises.” - Lorelei Lee, 2019 
 
Storytelling as a means of  improving collective understanding is necessarily limited. A person 
is only able to speak from their particular perspective. No group of  people is monolithic, so as 
certain stories come to shape the collectively accepted narrative, the experiences of  individuals with 
different perspectives will not be represented and may become further marginalized. When, in the 
process of  improving collective understanding about the experiences of  epistemically marginalized 
people, certain kinds of  experiences come to be seen as representative in a way that further 
marginalizes the experiences of  others with different experiences, I will refer to this as narrative 
constraint.  
 
Accepted narratives may even come to be prescriptive, such that victims feel a pressure to 
make sense of  their lives and tell their stories in particular ways to be seen as a real victims. Both 
insiders and outsiders interested in creating greater collective understanding may suggest that “real” 
victims look, act, or feel a certain way that is not representative of  the experiences of  all. This could 
further marginalize people whose experiences are not well-described by the newly introduced tools. 
It could also cause victims whose experiences are not reflected in the most visible stories to be 
treated incredulously or disqualified from needed support, while also changing how victims conceive 
of  their experiences and themselves. In fact, it may be that any time we introduce a new concept, 
there will be people whose experiences are not well-accounted for using that new language and 
understanding. They may find that they are even more epistemically marginalized than before, and in 




The narratives available to victims may be produced by both positive and negative 
stereotypes. In her discussion of  identity-prejudicial credibility excess, Davis notes that one of  the 
reasons that identity-prejudicial credibility excess is ethically wrong is that it involves hearers treating 
people who are identified as members of  a stereotyped social group as if  they are interchangeable 
(2016, 487-88). Individuals from marginalized groups have their presumed epistemic authority 
limited to reflect only that which outsiders view as their area of  expertise - their stereotyped identity. 
Speakers may be harmed when the voice they are permitted is one “of  distinction” such that they 
are compelled to speak as representatives of  their group rather than as individuals (2016, 490). 
Particular individuals from marginalized groups may come to be seen as ambassadors by those on 
the outside. They may be compelled to speak on behalf  of  their group (a manifestation of  epistemic 
exploitation) as spokespersons, or they may do so voluntarily. These token individuals may be 
“granted positions in spaces primarily occupied by the advantaged” even while all but these chosen 
few from the group are “systematically denied opportunities for advancement” (2016, 491).  
 
But spokespersons can only speak to their personal experiences, which may be representative 
of  some experiences shared by other group members. They cannot provide universal access or 
insight. Further, the visibility of  some stories may create an impression that “disparities between the 
advantaged and disadvantaged have largely disappeared” even when that is not the case, as visible 
testimony can still be marginalized (2016, 493).  
 
4.7.1 Narrative Constraint and Advocacy 
 




As Lorelei Lee points out in “Cash/Consent,” both abolitionists and liberal feminists have 
painted in broad strokes when talking about sex workers. Abolitionists have taken the position that 
all sex workers are exploited, regardless of  whether they believe themselves to be or not. Liberal 
feminists, on the other hand, have tended toward descriptions of  sex workers that portray them as 
“empowered” by having “‘consented’ to our work” (2019). Both camps also selectively listen to the 
stories shared by people engaged in commercial sex. Lee identifies the liberal feminist approach as 
the “less terrible of  the two ideas,” but notes these activists often treat victims and sex workers as 
sources of  data rather than the complicated, multi-faceted people that they are. Schwarz, Kennedy, 
and Britton also argue that both sides of  the dichotomy of  autonomy versus abolitionist feminists 
fail to recognize the complexity of  the lived experiences of  both sex workers and trafficking victims. 
Attending to how it is that those involved in commercial sex shape their lives so that they are livable, 
the authors argue that both major voices involved in the anti-trafficking debate advocate for a 
picture that fails to capture the lived experiences of  many (2017).  
 
These constraints result in conditions that might induce testimonial smothering, as sex 
workers and victims who do not feel that either available narrative describes their experiences may 
feel they are unable to express themselves in ways that will be received by others. Taken to the 
extreme, this narrative constraint may make it such that people with experiences that are not 
captured by either paradigm are rendered illegible or even impossible. Consider, again, Doezema’s 
assertion that abolitionist activists have rendered the existence of  non-trafficked sex workers 
impossible according to their concepts. For abolitionists committed to the idea that all sex work is 
inherently exploitative, “the notion of  a prostitute who is unharmed by her experiences is an 
ontological impossibility: that which cannot be. This is the ultimate exercise of  power: to deny sex 
workers our very existence, to insist that we cannot be” (Doezema 2005, 74). The realm of  
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narratives about life as a sex worker that are legible given these epistemic resources is not only 
constrained. It is obliterated.  
 
Narrative Constraint and Whose Stories Are Told and Heard 
 
The stories that tend to receive attention are those that feature especially innocent and 
passive victims, extreme violence, and/or “successful”22 rescues. These stories also often feature 
outsiders who play a prominent role in the victim’s “rescue” from exploitation.23  
 
The importance and limitations of  improving collective understanding by appealing to 
compelling stories about and by victims is highlighted by looking back at the ways politicians and 
journalists portrayed sex workers at the turn off  the 20th century. During the moral panic about sex 
work that ultimately led to the passage of  the White-Slave Traffic Act, also known as the Mann Act, 
stories about sex workers tended to draw sharp distinctions between lost souls and fallen ones. 
Certain women, especially those from white, respectable families, were thought to be victims, stolen 
away into sex work. Others were presumed guilty offenders. This stark contrast, this black and white 
                                                          
22 I’ve included scare quotes here because what counts or does not count as success will vary 
depending on the standard applied.  If a victim chooses to continue to be involved with commercial 
sex, but does so in a way that they do not feel is hurtful, some may consider that to be a success. 
Others would not. 
23 “Anti-trafficking discourses often follow a rescue narrative, where an innocent, helpless 
female is rescued from an evil trafficker by a heroic rescuer” (Baker, 15). “Despite their diversity, 
most awareness-raising messages continue to deliver simplistic narratives of ‘victims, villains, and 
heroes’” (Sharapov, Hoff, and Gerasimov quoting O’Brien, 8). 
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portrayal of  everyone involved as either low-life criminal or helpless victim, is woefully under-
nuanced for capturing the complicated spectrum of  choice and coercion involved for most people 
involved in commercial sex.  
 
Thus, the stories that tend to receive most attention are those that feature a victim whose 
innocence is hard to deny. Typically, this victim is a woman or child, and they are presented as having 
few or no opportunities to make choices that would suggest they are in any way culpable for the 
things that have happened to them. According to Peters, “[t]he construction of  a victim who appeals 
to the public and policymakers must be sexually blameless, and anti-trafficking policies continue to 
be based on the notion of  the ‘innocent,’ unwilling victim” (2010, 18). This is illustrated by the 
presentation of  the character Alisha in (Un)Trafficking, a game intended to facilitate better 
understanding of  sex trafficking. Alisha, who is the trafficking victim and character controlled by the 
player, is only given voice through a sob that is heard when someone else in the game makes a 
decision that harms her (like refusing her help when she asks for it) (O’Brien and Berents 2019, 92). 
They lament that of  the few games that aim to educate people about trafficking, some, like 
(Un)Trafficking, reduce victim’s stories to ones of  mere passivity and tragedy, with game victims 
exerting no agency and given little back story beyond their victimhood. 
 
One reason narratives available to those involved in commercial sex, willfully or not, are 
constricted may be because condemnatory attitudes toward sexuality require that in order to see 
someone involved in sex work as deserving of  compassion, kindness, and humane treatment, the 
public needs to also believe they are helpless. In describing the circumstances around the “white 
slavery” panic of  the early 20th century, Doezema reports that it was “[o]nly by removing all 
responsibility for her own condition could the prostitute be constructed as a victim to appeal to the 
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sympathies of  the middle-class reformers” (1999, 28). If  not innocent, sex workers are often 
depicted as criminal and treated with low regard. To generate sympathy for those involved in 
commercial sex, the counter-narrative highlights their vulnerability, focusing on conditions of  
poverty, innocence, and lack of  education to paint a picture of  someone in need of  rescue and 
rehabilitation. 
 
While this alternative depiction has some benefits that the criminalized narrative lacks (it is 
more likely to induce judges, lawyers, doctors, and laypeople to respond with kindness rather than 
harsh judgment), it also undermines the credibility of  sex workers and trafficking victims. If  they 
disagree with statements about themselves or take issue with proposed policies that relate to their 
work and lives, those disagreements can be discounted as uninformed, naive, or even the result of  
brainwashing. Portraying trafficking victims and sex workers as ignorant victims who were too 
desperate, too weak, or too foolish to avoid their circumstances means that they can never be right if  
they disagree with educated, worldly, or powerful people.  
 
Ultimately, these stories undermine the epistemic authority of  insiders, crafting a dynamic 
between victims (helpless, ignorant) and advocates (knowing) that can be used to justify paternalistic 
responses to both trafficking and sex work and creating conditions in which testimonial injustices 
like posturing and other epistemic injustices like hermeneutical hijacking are likely. Advocacy that 
reduces the role that survivors play in their own stories to such a degree that they are denied the 





The stories that are told also usually feature graphic, and some have argued gratuitous, 
violence. According to Weitzer, moral crusades rely on “horror stories and ‘atrocity tales’ about 
victims in which the most shocking exemplars of  victimization are described and typified” (2007, 
448). The stories that are told are those “of  a few ‘rescued’ victims,” which “are presented as 
evidence” (2006, 463). Publications also use these atrocity tales to probe reader interest. Headlines 
cite rescued sex slaves, report disturbing and extraneous details, and even include pictures of  the 
locations of  alleged trafficking. Chapkis reports that lobbying for the Victims of  Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of  2000 “relied heavily on very graphic accounts of  extreme sexual 
violation of  innocent women and children” (2003, 929).  
 
Victims who have the opportunity to tell their stories to an audience that is receptive to 
hearing what they say are usually “rescued” already, meaning they are no longer engaged in sex work. 
In Bergquist’s words, “[d]ue in part to the nature of  the problem, the voices that get heard are of  
those that have been ‘rescued’ and more specifically, whose stories either support the publisher’s 
intended message or have potential to elicit humanitarian responses” (2015, 316). According to 
Doezema, “‘prostituted women’ who agree with the feminist abolitionist analysis of  their situation 
are accepted and supported” (2005, 73).  
 
Narrative Constraint and Whose Stories Are Not Told and Heard 
 
Advocates may not share, support, or create platforms for the stories of  victims whose stories 
are complicated by a perceived lack of  innocence. If  victims have made decisions that may be 
expected to elicit moral condemnation, were coerced or defrauded in ways that some may not see as 
sufficiently exploitative, or reject offers of  assistance they feel are invasive or harmful, they are not 
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as likely to have their stories heard. Because sex trafficking victims are most often represented as 
being women, the experiences of  victims who are not women are also underrepresented. As Bonilla 
and Mo state, because, “[h]uman trafficking tends to be represented by issue-area elites in a fairly 
singular manner… [t]rafficking victims who are not women, and neither sexually exploited nor 
smuggled, are often being overlooked in programming about human trafficking” (2018, 2).  
 
While there is value in investigating sexual assault and sexual exploitation as gendered forms of  
violence, most often inflicted on women by men, that depiction also renders boys, men, and non-
binary victims invisible. Limiting the realm of  accepted narratives so that the issues of  sex 
trafficking and sexual assault are presented as exclusively impacting women also means that people 
who are not identified as women are sometimes denied resources and recognition.  
 
Greater credibility and visibility is typically granted to trafficking victims who are considered 
“recovered.” According to Sweet, some people have to work harder than others to perform recovery 
in a convincing way, as they may met with incredulousness because of  stereotypes (2018, 418). In 
other words, the testimony they present about their experiences as victims may not be given due 
credibility, combining testimonial injustice with the other epistemic harms perpetrated against them. 
People with more complicated relationships with the rescue missions of  anti-trafficking initiatives - 
like sex workers who distinguish between sex work and trafficking or people how have felt 
personally harmed by the efforts to reduce the prevalence of  trafficking (like those who have been 
arrested during police raids) - are less likely to have their voices amplified. Some organizations 
require that the victims that they work with and provide support to (housing, financial support, 
emotional connection, etc.) must abide by strict criteria to remain eligible for those services. These 
criteria may include requirements like participation in Bible studies and prayer groups and promises 
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not to engage in sex work again (Bernstein 2010, 65). Victims who feel constrained or oppressed by 
these conditions may have to choose between accessing critical, possibly life-sustaining resources 
and honestly expressing themselves.  
 
Those who are unable or unwilling to tell their stories in ways that meet these expectations 
may be denied services and sympathy. As Corrigan and Shdaimah and state, “[r]eliance on victim 
stories also privileges some women (who may fit more closely with the ideal victim narrative) over 
others in the competition for scarce public resources (investigation, prosecution, treatment options)” 
(2016, 440). People who are not willing or able to perform recovery in satisfying ways are unlikely to 
be recognized as victims, may be denied services and support they need and deserve, and may be 
villainized or even criminalized. Doezema goes as far as to say that abolitionists treat sex workers 
who deny that they are exploited “as being in league with ‘pimps’ and ‘traffickers’” (2005, 73), as 
their continued participation is allegedly creating conditions for the demand of  trafficking to be 
sustained. 
 
Whether or not a case leads to an investigation or prosecution depends, in part, on whether 
law enforcement finds a trafficking victim’s story to be believable and one that will garner sympathy 
in court. Victims whose cases do not lend themselves to investigation and prosecutions may not get 
immigration relief  (TVISAs), federal benefits (like Medicaid, food stamps, and cash assistance), case 
management, or legal assistance (Peters 2010, 92). So, not being considered believable has significant 
costs. 
 
Narratives that differ from the trope of  victimhood advocated for by some person or group 
may be disregarded and marked as anomalous. For example, when criticizing the idea that pimps 
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could create safer conditions for sex workers on the street or that sex workers might feel safer when 
working (for or with) a pimp, Hughes acknowledges that some women did report feeling safer.24 But 
she quickly disregarded this minority opinion. It seems then like the expressed attitudes of  sex 
workers who disagreed with Hughes’ personal feelings about pimps had beliefs not worthy of  
consideration.  Critics may also choose to ignore dissident opinions as the result of  brainwashing or 
ignorance, a strategy that threatens additional epistemic harms in the form of  testimonial injustice, 
posturing, and hermeneutical hijacking.  
 
While some advocates may choose not to highlight the stories of  victims whose experiences 
may be harder to sympathize with or who are critical of  the most visible anti-trafficking work, others 
who are committed to increasing the visibility of  all victims, no matter how heterogeneous, may not 
be able to do so. Given the nature of  epistemic lacunas and hermeneutical injustice, there is always 
the chance that someone’s experiences will remain so inscrutable given available hermeneutical 
resources that they are omitted from discussion and consideration. This suggests a need for 
continuously evolving conceptions of  who victims are, so that our definitions remain responsive to 
new and unforeseeable developments.  
 
Narrative Legibility and Access to Resources 
 
Prosecutors may choose not to bring cases to trial if  they don’t think they’ll be able to 
convey a sympathetic narrative of  a victim’s experiences to the jury (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016, 
452). This in and of  itself  can constrict the ways that victims can tell their stories in multiple ways. 
                                                          
24 Hughes reports that “a minority of the women interviewed said they felt safer [when their 
pimp was around]” (Hughes 2005, 17). 
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“[R]eal victims are also expected to offer meaningful and appropriate presentations of  trauma,” 
Corrigan and Shdaimah state, adding, “[d]emonstrations of  trauma themselves are insufficient to 
mark women as worthy victims; trauma must be presented and experienced in ways that coincide 
with law enforcement expectations” (2016, 473). Peters makes a similar observation, stating, “[o]ften 
whether someone was recognized and counted as a trafficking victim depended on how a victim’s 
circumstances and story fit into the investigating agent of  officer’s own narrative of  trafficking” 
(2010, 89). 
 
Sweet, in discussing the separate issue of  domestic violence, states that victims must 
convince those in positions to offer them assistance that they are true victims to access things like 
“housing, police protection, and pathways to citizenship.” This requires a demonstration of  what 
she calls “survivorhood” (2018, 412). Survivorhood requires that one has experienced significant 
trauma, but not so much trauma that recovery seems unlikely. Corrigan and Shdaimah make a similar 
observation, noting victims “should be sufficiently traumatized to be sympathetic and convincing, 
but not so traumatized they are unable to fulfill their role as a witness to the assault” (2016, 479). To 
be perceived as recoverable, one must present oneself  as tenacious and destined for greater things, a 
truly paradoxical requirement if  we believe that victims of  violence did nothing to deserve or earn 
the abuse they must now present themselves as being recoverable from. According to Sweet, “to be 
recoverable to institutions, women learn to narrate their experiences through the language of  
emotions, selfhood, and internal transformation” (2018, 413). Victims must learn to tell their stories 
in ways that can be heard and will be accepted, which involves learning new language, restricting 




If  someone presents their story with too much detail, too lucidly, too accurately, or too 
calmly (with what counts as too much of  any of  these determined by outsiders in positions of  
power), then their credibility is reduced because they do not behave as traumatized people are 
expected to behave (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016, 479). Trafficking survivors who display character 
traits of  strength and agency may see that count against them “in terms of  having their cases taken 
by law enforcement… their testimony believed by juries… their plans and aspirations supported by 
service providers… and may even paradoxically heighten vulnerability to trafficking” (Hume and 
Sidun 2017, 9).  
 
Strategic Storytelling  
 
In the section on the controversial history of  the anti-trafficking movement, we explored the 
unreliable statistics frequently cited by advocates. Data that is available is likely skewed by the way it 
is collected. Many trafficking survivors who access resources do so through religious agencies or 
service programs that may adopt an abolitionist philosophy. Others participate in programming 
because they are mandated to do so by a court. People in such positions may feel that they must 
describe their experiences in a way that conforms with the picture of  victimhood prescribed to them 
in order to access critical support and be shown compassion. Thus, they may alter their narratives to 
fit those expectations. As Weitzer notes, there is no reason to believe these sample populations are 
representative of  the whole, and reliable inferences generalizing from non-representative samples 
cannot be made (2007, 452).  
 
Sweet notes that advocates for survivors of  domestic violence often try to help by 
“translating” their “experiences across these systems in order to make victims more sympathetic.” 
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These efforts are carried out with the best of  intentions, and may produce very real benefits for the 
folks advocates are working with. However, they can also bring about the undesirable consequences 
of  reinforcing the idea that victims look a particular way, and clients may feel pressured “to perform 
recovery” (2018, 417). By focusing on ways to navigate an unjust and unfair system to help particular 
clients or victims, advocates (like social workers, counselors, lawyers, and activists) play a direct hand 
in shaping institutional and collective notions of  who deserves help and who deserves to be 
believed.  
 
This requirement that victims describe themselves in ways that will be positively received by 
those that they need assistance from has epistemic consequences. First, it involves epistemic 
exploitation and results in some testimonial smothering, as victims must explain their oppression to 
those in positions of  privilege while also keep some things to themselves out of  fear that they will 
not be believed or will be punished. Sweet calls this kind of  work narrative labor, a term she uses to 
describe how survivors “must make contortions of  their selves and social networks, and they must 




It is also important to note that in doing narrative labor, victims may come to see themselves 
differently. In other words, a victim may, in determining how to present experiences and events in 





Sweet writes about how the medicalization and institutionalization of  domestic violence has 
altered the way victims talk about and even make sense of  their experiences. She describes “how 
women who have experienced domestic violence become domestic violence survivors as they navigate 
institutions of  surveillance and aid after abuse” (2018, 411). A person’s status as a “survivor” is not 
automatic, but rather comes to be ascribed through interactions with institutions that prescribe or 
sometimes even require such a designation to process, make sense of, and assist those individuals. 
Coming to present oneself  as a victim that will be recognized accordingly may require suppressing 
parts of  aspects of  one’s life. 
 
She quotes one victim as referring to her status as a domestic violence survivor as a 
“diagnosis,” which dramatically altered her understanding of  her life and 40-year marriage (2018, 
419). Another victim interviewed by Sweet, Margaret, notes that even thigh she feels she has a lot of  
confidence, she apparently does not have “good self-esteem.” Her evidence for this seemingly 
contradictory state is that she is a victim of  domestic violence, which she has learned through 
interactions with institutions and services for domestic violence services means her self-esteem is 
low. Sweet assesses Margaret’s commentary on the chasm between what she believes she is supposed 
to feel and how she actually feels, stating “[t]his is the paradox of  legibility at work: Margaret is 
transforming her life to become a savor according to DCFS demands, telling her story in the 
language of  domestic violence even though other structural forms of  violence are more pressing, 
and the language she is given to explain the situation is that of  self-esteem” (2018, 422).  
 
The highly personal nature of  storytelling produces what Sweet calls the paradox of  
legibility. In describing how narrative constraint impacts survivors of  domestic violence, she states 
that “women must tell stories of  psychological survival, even as those very stories erase the 
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structural context of  their victimization and their infrastructural labor surviving abuse.” As we have 
noted already, hermeneutical injustices are systemic problems. As the failure to understand the 
experiences of  victims is a collective failure, hyper fixation on the details of  the decisions and 




There is so much disagreement about who sex workers are and why they do the work that 
they do. Are they fallen, criminals who engage in work that warrants punishment? Are they victims 
who should be rescued and rehabilitated? Are they empowered and enlightened professionals, 
engaged in work that provides economic opportunity that is not otherwise available? Are they care 
workers, providing a service that should be seen as essential and compassionate?  
 
 It may be that the tendency toward dichotomous thinking makes the problem of  
distinguishing between exploitation and choice, sex work and trafficking, necessarily lacking and 
artificial. Certainly, the gray area between the two remains uninterpretable for many.  
 
All these depictions are certainly oversimplifications of  reality. Some recent scholarly work is 
critical of  the dichotomous argument that has emerged between those who feel all sex work is 
trafficking and those who have mostly established themselves as opposed to those abolitionists 
(sometimes falling prey to over generalizations themselves, see, Weitzer citing studies involving only 
12 or 15 subjects), and sentiments of  frustration are sometimes shared by service providers (Peters 
interviewed a provider who bemoaned the extensive infighting). For example, work published by 
Bettio, Giusta, and Di Tommaso found that “agency operates along a continuum,” and whether a 
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person has greater or lesser agency is largely a function of  stigma. This is because stigma impacts 
“the ability of  sex workers to influence the terms of  exchange - earnings, working conditions, hours 
of  work, choice of  clients, choice of  service, and so on” (2017, 5).  
 
Continued work toward recognizing greater nuance is essential for counterbalancing the 
tendency to marginalize some in the pursuit of  improving recognition and support of  others. One 
important step toward creating a more honest narrative about trafficking is acknowledging that some 
people who are being trafficked might still be interested in engaging in sex work under better 





In this project, I have worked to demonstrate that anti-sexual violence advocacy work can 
illuminate epistemic injustices, but that the consciousness raising efforts of  both insider and outsider 
advocates can lead to further injustices committed against marginalized knowers. A possible 
response to these assessments of  harms or wrongs that advocates might commit while trying to 
address injustices might be one of  defeat. If  one can perpetuate unjust, marginalizing conditions 
when aiming to address epistemic wrongs, are our advocacy efforts doomed? 
Fortunately, we need not arrive as such a bleak conclusion. My hope is that the work I have 
done here shows not that advocacy work is futile, but rather that it is complicated and situated in 
existing systems and dynamics of  power and powerlessness. Advocates need not feel they cannot 
help shape a more just society through consciousness raising work, but rather should remain open to 
feedback and even criticism out of  an acknowledgement of  just how difficult and complicated it is 
to address injustices, epistemic or otherwise. Good intentions are not in and of  themselves sufficient 
for justifying the efforts made by insider or outsider advocates intent on improving collective 
understanding of  the experiences of  marginalized people. One can hijack, appropriate, or otherwise 
undermine or disrespect hermeneutically marginalized people even when motivated by a sincere 
desire to be of  service to them. And as I have acknowledged throughout the project, it will often not 
be easy to assess who knows what and who is appropriately or inappropriately speaking for whom 
during particular moments in time. All of  this uncertainty requires that advocates remain humble, 
open to critical feedback, and reflective.  
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